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Religion as Man's Completion

Religion as Man's Completion

A Socio-Religious Study

by

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Religion as Man's Completion
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TO THE OPEN MINDED MEN AND WOMEN,
WHETHER YOUNG OR OLD IN YEARS,
WHO ARE, LIKE THE AUTHOR,
LOOKING FOR A TRUER RELIGION.

Preface

RELIGION has always dealt with the deepest problems of human life. That is the reason why it has so many forms and shapes. Whatever any people considered its most important problem at a particular stage of its development, found its way into religion. That is the reason why it has been in a constant flux, ever changing but never finished, ever adapting itself to conditions but never absorbed by them.

Under all the different phases through which it has passed and which it assumes to-day, religion has been a search for a fuller and larger life, and more specifically for a permanent life. This search may be summed up under the term *Completion*. What men really seek in religion is not the satisfaction of some temporary whim or passing fancy, but something that will give them a universal and eternal value. In the midst of continuous and variegated changes they look for a goal that will inspire them constantly and at the same time broaden their vision and deepen their lives.

In the great field of human endeavor there are two other activities which have occupied much of

man's attention—art and science. At the present time they are becoming increasingly important and, in the opinion of some, threaten to dislodge religion from its pivotal position. Religion, in order to hold its own, must be redefined so as to meet the new situation. This can be done only by an attempt to show what each of these activities is and what it tries to do. The conclusions which, after a careful examination of all three, the author has reached are presented in this book and may be summarized briefly.

Religion offers more incentives and objectives for man's completion than either art or science. Each of these two manifestations of human endeavor deals only or at least chiefly with one aspect of our mind, while religion enlists the whole mind. Religion is essentially concerned with making a finer type of man by presenting and meeting the permanent and universal needs of his nature. Few of us are artists, perhaps fewer are scientists. To be one or the other, a man must have some special native endowment. All of us want to live, and to live fuller and larger lives, and to continue our existence beyond the grave. This need is met by religion only, not by art and not by science.

If religion is to meet this need, it must not engage in abstractions and in casuistries how to attain permanence of life by means of some ritual

trick or ceremonial performance. It must put the burden for this attainment squarely on man by making him responsible for the consequences of his actions. The human individual does not, though, live in a vacuum; he lives in society. He is influenced for better or for worse by what is going on around him. He is part of it, and shares in its advantages and disadvantages. This implies that his social environment must be of the kind which will aid in the development and thereby in the completion of his individuality. In the past and to a large extent in the present, men are constantly handicapped by adverse social conditions. The final conclusion is therefore that these must be improved in order to give every human being an opportunity for completion.

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Religion as Man's Completion

I

The Scientific Point of View in Religion

1. *Religion World-wide and World-old.*—Religion has been the greatest power in the life of mankind during the ages past. It matters little whether we look at the savage prostrating himself before his fetish perhaps made by his own hands, or whether we read the fulminations of some atheistic would-be scientist—the problem is always the same: How am I to adjust myself to that power which is higher than I, but which somehow always defies definition? With the savage the problem is, how to give that idea of the higher power a worthy representation. His conception of this power is so very crude that he imagines it to be almost any object which strikes him as odd or peculiar by its shape, texture, odor, or reflection of light. Some modern novice in science, on the other hand, tries his very best to escape the necessity of believing in that power which his whole mind prompts him to believe in. Are these chemical reactions which produce such wonderful

changes all that there is to the world and to himself, or are there other entities behind them? He cannot find God under the microscope nor discover Him with the telescope. He is able to produce results which would be considered magical in a less enlightened age, but—that something which binds all these marvels together defies being caught anywhere and he cannot even imagine how it may look. So he tries to prove its non-existence.

2. *It Is a Problem of Life.*—With both the savage and the scientist this problem is, however, one of life and not merely of comprehension. How much trouble each would save himself if he only could rid himself of the idea that there is something inscrutable behind all the observable phenomena, whether in the dark forest or in the electrically lighted laboratory. It would be so very simple to disregard it, to do what one pleases, and to have no fear of an unseen power. The savage often denies himself food which he himself needs badly in order to make his peace with that unknown entity. It affects his whole life in so many ways. He cannot go out on the chase, take a mate, or gather his fruits and berries without referring in some way to it. Neither can the scientist escape its influence. He may try to build up a logical argument to prove to himself that it has nothing to do with his life, but—there it is; his

very attempt to shoo it away proves its influence. In his subconsciousness there is always something that reminds him of that other something the existence of which he tries to deny. And so he regulates his life not according to his science, but according to those unfathomed promptings which well up from his subconsciousness.

This power is universal. What happens in the case of the savage and of the scientist is happening with every people on earth. In the jungles of Africa and in the streets of New York, in the crude assembly of the Hottentots and in the Parliament at Westminster, in the meetings of the Fiji Islanders under a cocoanut tree and in the dome of St. Peter's in Rome, the peoples of the earth have always sought God if haply they might find him.[1]

Some travelers may report a small tribe here or there as being without religion. They are mistaken. They either do not recognize the lowly forms of worship as religion, or they have been unable to gain the confidence of those people. Uncivilized tribes are averse to giving confidence to any stranger who happens to be in their midst. Religion is their deepest interest and they guard it carefully, since harm might befall them if they revealed the nature of their god. Even as advanced a people as the ancient Hebrews did not dare to pronounce the name of their God so that

to this day there is some doubt whether it was pronounced Jehovah or Jahveh. A name meant the closest possible identity with the person, and among many uncivilized peoples different names are given to a person as he advances in age so as to more closely identify his status in the tribe with his present work. He may have one name as a boy, another as a young man, a third as a man of parts, and finally, a different one in his old age. This secrecy and change of names has been a puzzle to many transient travelers, but not to men trained in anthropology who report finding some kind of religion among all the peoples visited and studied.

The power of religion is world-old. The Neanderthal man and the Piltdown man have left few traces of their lives, and we cannot make any safe deductions as to whether they were religious or not. As soon as the survivals of culture became more numerous, there are unmistakable indications of religious ideas to be discovered. Beginning with prehistoric times down through the pages of history, every people has in one way or another given expression to its religious beliefs. These may vary in many ways, but roughly speaking, they may be summed up in the words of Solomon: "Hear the prayers of Thy people, O Lord! And when Thou hearest, forgive!" In a thousand different ways

the peoples of the earth have sought to settle their problem of adjusting themselves to the unknown power higher than themselves.

The economic motive is the only one that approaches the religious in importance. It has been over-emphasized in recent times by socialists and some economists. It is undoubtedly important, since the first problem for man is to live. Before he can be wise or foolish, righteous or unrighteous, or anything else, he must live; so he must strive to seek his food in order to maintain life. This motive is, however, not purely human; man shares it with every living being from the protozoon to the most noble man. The quest for religion, on the other hand, is purely human, and we are concerned now with traits which man does not share with animals. As a physical being man must seek food like all animals; as a spiritual being he seeks what never even enters the mind of any animal.

The motive of sex has recently been put forward as a competitor to both the economic and religious motives in point of importance. The school of Freud and Jung has had many followers and psycho-analysis is still enjoying the reputation of having opened up new paths of insight into human nature. Its vogue is, however, waning, and the movement has already passed its zenith. It was never taken very seriously by the most as-

tute psychologists and physiologists, although as scientists they had to give it a fair chance for investigation. The motive of sex is likewise shared by man with animals, and there is nothing peculiarly human in it. The religious motive is, consequently, the only one peculiar to all men at all times.

3. *The Study of Religion.*—As a human phenomenon, religion is subject to investigation. It has, as a matter of fact, always been studied by men according to the best of their ability just because it was a matter of the greatest importance to them. There are only two possible approaches to the study of religion—the old one based on revelation, and the new one based on science. Each has its defenders and opponents, advantages and drawbacks.

A brief examination of each method is necessary to bring them out and make a selection of the one to be followed, if possible.

According to the defenders of revelation as an approach to the study of religion, man can do but little else than to accept what a deity has pleased to give him either in oral or written form, and to render obedience to what is revealed. It matters little what particular religion is considered for the moment—the attitude of the believers in revelation has always been that of having received from

a deity a certain amount of information as to the nature of the deity itself, the relation of man to that deity, and incidentally, some kind of cosmic and social philosophy. The religions originating among peoples sufficiently advanced to possess the art of writing all agree in this respect whether we look to the Sacred Books of the East, to the Bible, or to the Koran.

Another tendency of the defenders of these various sacred writings consists in looking upon these different revelations as fixed and terminating at a certain period. When the "book" was closed, nothing new was supposed to be added to religion except by way of further explanation and elucidation. The dates for this termination differ widely; the sacred books of India were closed several centuries before the Christian Era, the Bible about 400 A.C., and the Koran perhaps before 650 A.C. If the official explanations of the canonical books are included, the period for the Christian religion is extended considerably. Some Christians stop with the Bible, others with the first six ecumenical councils, still others with the Augsburg Confession (1530 A.C.), while in the Roman Catholic Church the Lateran Council of 1870 is thus far the latest guide. Still other denominations—*e.g.*, the Quakers—believe in a more or less continuous, direct, and general inspiration, while the Roman Catholic

Church shares this belief to the extent that this inspiration is confined to the ecclesiastical organization under the control of the papacy. The time at which revelation is believed to be complete is thus very indefinite.

From another angle there seems to be some difficulty. The methods of inspiration vary considerably. There is the dream, the trance, the vision, the guidance of a more general character. The last, at least, does not preclude careful study of sources as the writer of the third Gospel plainly intimates. It may not be saying too much that those who acknowledged no such dependence on sources drew their material from their own experience and their social environment, and saw it magnified and glorified in their dreams and visions. This inference can be made without being guilty of an intellectual *tour de force* when we remember that all of them deal with contemporary matters. The visions of Isaiah differ from those of Daniel because each had a different historical and social background.

A still further difficulty lies in the claim of the authoritativeness and exclusiveness of every revelation. There is no need to go into details as to different religions. One example will suffice.

"One of the most remarkable things in the Sanâtana Religion is the way in which it has laid down

a complete scheme of knowledge and has then crowned it with a philosophy composed of six faces, but governed by one idea and leading to one goal. No such comprehensive and orderly view of human knowledge is elsewhere to be found. This has been sketched in the elementary textbook, but now requires some further elucidation."

Changing only the name, this quotation would fit the claims of any religion. It is not taken from a book sent out by the ignorant founder of an obscure sect, nor from a book centuries old, but is found on page 2 of *Sanâtana Dharma, An Advanced Textbook of Hindu Religion and Ethics*, and published by the board of trustees, Central Hindu College, Benares, 1904. As a sample of this philosophy, we may refer to Part II, Chapter VII on "The Caste System," which is declared to be the only true explanation of life, although it has fallen into decay, owing to abuses.

"Unless the abuses which are interwoven with it can be eliminated, its doom is certain, but equally certain is it that if those abuses could be destroyed and the system itself maintained, Hinduism would solve some of the social problems which threaten to undermine Western civilization, and would set an example to the world of an ideal social state." [2]

The promise of an ideal social state has been

made by every religion which lays claim to being based exclusively on revelation.

Whatever truth there may be in these claims is beside the point for the present. One thing only is certain—that those who believe in revelation admit, whether explicitly or implicitly, that it is progressive. The Christian believes that there is a gradual unfolding of divine truth from the first chapter in Genesis to the last one in Revelation. The Hindu has his Vedas, with numerous later explanations which may be compared to the creeds of Christians. The Mohammedan accepts the Old and the New Testament as preparatory to the Koran.

Another admission is made by all the more advanced religions. They deal not only with matters pertaining to the relation of man to the deity, but with others—*e.g.*, cosmology, anthropology, psychology, economics, etc. This admission is frequently, if not always, turned into the positive and definite claim of furnishing a complete system of philosophy for the individual and society. In these fields the claims have, at least among Christians, gradually yielded to the different sciences. The story of the Creation as given, for instance, in Genesis, is no longer accepted as literally true by intelligent Jews and Christians. They have yielded

geology and astronomy to those who have made a special study of these fields of knowledge.

When these two fields were admitted to come under the purview of purely "secular" knowledge, a breach was made into the claim of the infallibility of revelation or of inspired sacred writings. Gradually other fields—*e.g.*, psychology, anthropology, and economics—were taken over by the scientists, often against the protests of the believers in literal inspiration. The battle was long and acrimonious, but the victory of science was complete and decisive.

The believers in revelation held one last stronghold. Science might explain how the earth and the stars were made, how man came to be what he is; but it could not explain his moral and religious nature or the personality of God. Science is not concerned with these matters, as will be explained later in Chapters IV and V. The last fort could not be held, however, without serious damage to its walls and defenders. Science had brought home the idea of a gradual evolution to all educated men, and they had to think the idea through, since man's mind is a unity and he must try to explain all things from one cardinal principle. So the idea of a gradual revelation was conceived and was stated explicitly instead of being admitted grudgingly. The whole mental attitude of reli-

gious men was thus changed, and that meant that they could without fear and trembling believe in a gradual revelation of higher forms of religion suitable to the needs of man. A new search into the authorship, composition, and dependence of particular books of the Bible on social conditions was made, and the progressiveness of revelation was accepted. It was found that man could have only certain forms of religion at certain stages of mental development, since he could appreciate and assimilate only as much of a revelation as his intelligence permitted. Revelation might be perfect, but his understanding of it was still imperfect.

A gradual revelation implies, however, an historic process which can be studied like any other process. This means that scientific methods may be applied to the study of religion just as to the development of other human affairs. It also means that science rightly used and religion rightly understood may not be so far apart as some people imagine. It implies that a Christian may calmly face new and higher forms of religious ideas and consider them as a further unfolding of old ones or additions to old ones to meet his more numerous and complex needs. It may suggest to him that revelation took place, after all, in a certain order and was continuous, instead of being more or less

chaotic, ephemeral, and sporadic. The Kingdom of God has a certain order—"first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear."[3] If so, the preparation for it must be methodical, too, and not capricious. Such an orderly development would not preclude the probability of certain men arising at particular times who had a special message to give to contemporary and succeeding generations. This happens in other fields of human life at so-called critical periods, and the history of religion has its peaks as well as its valleys, just as happens in science, art, and philosophy. Owing to the unity of the human mind, mentioned before, advance in one line must eventually produce advances along other lines. Such advances always take place at critical times—that is, when the conditions are ripe—and exceptional men always open up the new paths.

Such a Christian may, perhaps, even be bold enough to entertain the hope that ultimately no contradiction need exist between scientific reasoning and religious faith. There have always been some men broad and deep enough to span the supposed gulf between the two, and the possibility at least exists that their number will increase and eventually include all mentally normal men.

4. *Scientific Approach to the Problem.*—Considering all the possibilities mentioned, there seems

good reason to approach the problem of religion from the scientific point of view—that is, from the study of facts. Science ultimately means nothing more than a careful investigation of all possible facts, their classification and their interrelation. On the basis of inductive reasoning science has made vast strides and has greatly benefited man. Its progress took place, as a matter of fact, in proportion as it observed, counted, and correlated facts, and then proceeded to make inferences, to build up hypotheses, and eventually to arrive at principles and laws which in turn were combined into systems. A similar procedure ought to yield at least satisfactory results in the study of religion.

There is, however, a considerable difference in the way a problem is approached even from the scientific point of view. A chemist might explain a famous painting—*e.g.*, the Sistine Madonna—as consisting of so many shades of brown and red and blue, and be perfectly justified, since that is what the picture actually consists of from the mere physical point of view. The painter would be ready to admit that these various shades of color are actually there, that they are combined in a particular manner, but—that they are far from making the picture what it is and what has given inspiration to thousands of people. He would

justly claim that the conception, the *soul*, so to say, of the picture is something very different from the mere arrangement of colors in a certain manner. He might go further and say that if there was nothing else in the painting, any man of fair intelligence could be taught to paint a Sistine Madonna, whereas the fact stands that only one man, Rafael, was able to produce that exquisite masterpiece of motherly love. An understanding of art is necessary for appreciating a painting of that kind, or of any other, for that matter. A piece of literature cannot be explained by studying prosody; something else is necessary for its appreciation than a knowledge of meter, length of syllables, accent, and cadence.

In religion we have a similar problem. The irreligious man—if such there be—may approach the tender and exquisite plant of man's relation to the divine with as much objectivity as he is capable of; but he will fail to find its real meaning with his calm and elaborate measurements and deductions. He may see all kinds of forms and phenomena; their essence will be as effectually hidden from him as the glory of a sonata by Beethoven from a deaf man.

The student of religion must have a certain equipment, just as the historian of art. He must have a sense for values which are not revealed by

the microscope or the telescope, the chemical retort, or even the finest instrument measuring the ions or electrons. This appreciation of moral and spiritual values is not a matter of the intellect, but of refined emotions. He must be able to put himself in the place of others and sympathize with their aspirations even though they are crude. He should have the ability to remember his own earlier gropings in childhood after something tangible yet imponderable in the realm of the spiritual. He should have a sense of the gradual and very slow development of the finer and higher values as the history of religion reveals them. He needs to feel the struggle of our earlier and later forebears who were so earnest in seeking the Lord if haply they might find Him. He cannot leave the crude and uncouth alone like the priest and the Levite, and observe only the attractive and the beautiful. He must literally follow the poet's dictum: *Homo sum; nihil humanum a me alienum puto.* He should have the gift of historical imagination which enables him to see what men tried to do at different stages of their development, what their perplexities were, how they tried to solve them. A sympathetic understanding is of more value than keen analysis. There is a word in German, *nacherleben*, which expresses perhaps better than a long description what is necessary

in a man who would approach the religious problem rightly. That word means to live through the different stages of development and feel, so to say, their heartbeat. This sympathetic interest need not cloud one's vision as to the facts, but simply open the door for a better understanding. It will make possible a conception of religion in its lowest and highest stages.

[1] Acts xvii: 27.
[2] Page 255.
[3] Mark iv: 28.

II

The Meaning of Religion for Life

1. *Statement of Problem.*—If religion is to be investigated, the first question which arises concerns the nature of religion itself. Is it based on some special sense, faculty, quality, or whatever one may choose to call it; or is it based on the general endowment of the human mind as such? Can religion be known only by means of a special gift which some men possess and others do not, or is it a field which permits investigation by the usual means of inductive science? Is the gulf between the "natural man" and the "twice-born" man really so great that the former looks upon the "things of the Spirit of God" as foolishness, because the latter are "spiritually discerned,"[1] and understood only by the true believer?

The idea that the Christian religion constitutes a separate domain in man, and that it cannot be known by the usual means of acquiring knowledge, has had a long history and a great vogue. The twice-born man could always, when closely pressed, take refuge in the alleged distinctness of

this field of knowledge which was closed to the other man. The Society of Friends has stood pre-eminently for this doctrine, and has boldly proclaimed the self-sufficiency of experience as a basis of faith in God.

"The fundamentally significant thing which stands out in early Quakerism was the *conviction* which these founders of it felt, that they had actually discovered the living God and that He was in them. They all have one thing to say—'I have experienced God.'"[2]

Other denominations have not stood so boldly for this doctrine, but they contain numerous individuals to whom the divine presence is as real as the spatial world. The mystics of all ages and religions have firmly held it. The idea has had sufficient vogue to receive a special name from scientific investigators, and Professor Wundt has called it the autonomous theory.

"The autonomous theory, plainly foreshadowed in the views of Hamann and Jakobi, became explicit in the work of Schleiermacher. It maintains that religion is an independent domain, above and beyond those of metaphysics and ethics. While the subject of metaphysics is theoretical knowledge of finite things, and that of ethics the relations of empirical conduct, religion is an 'immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all

finitude in infinity, of all temporal things in things eternal,' or, as Schleiermacher expressed it later, 'a feeling of absolute dependence.'"[3]

A few words in criticism of this theory are necessary before we proceed. First, if the religious sense is something apart and distinct from the general mental endowment, only one conclusion is possible—a man either has it or he has not. If he has it, the question is still to be answered, how did he get it? Was it by a special favor of the Creator? Was it by revelation? If so, it passes out of human ken and cannot be investigated. The opponent to the theory will be baffled no matter how acute his reasoning and scientific his method, for the proponent will always be able to say that his experience is immediate, and no argument will move him.

When the fruit of this experiential knowledge is good, we may perhaps let it pass for whatever it may be worth. When it is not, society steps in and puts the poor woman who claims that God has bidden her to poison her husband and children on trial for murder. In such a case we charitably suppose the woman to be insane. But time was not so many centuries ago when people were killed by the hundred and thousand on just such an alleged command of God. The "inner light" may lead rightly, but not infrequently it leads wrongly.

The only test is the objective deed, and that is subject to investigation by a perhaps unsympathetic world.

Second, questions may be asked to this effect: Where did the Quaker get his experience? Why do persons outside the fold of Christianity not have that experience? The Quaker plainly has heard of Christ, of the Holy Spirit, and of other matters pertaining to his religion, while the Chinese sage, Confucius, had not. The inference is justified that if the Quaker were not living in a Christian country his experience would be different because his knowledge comes from his fellow Christians.

If, on the other hand, a man has no such immediate sense of God, who is to blame? He certainly is not, since he cannot give anything to himself that is not a part of his heredity or bestowed upon him by special favor. The dilemma of a special grace granted at the time of conversion comes in here. If the "natural man" cannot discern the things that are of God, how is he to acquire such knowledge? The old answer was, he must pray for light and grace. Yes, but how can he pray for something which is "foolishness unto him"? The defenders of the doctrine of the utter depravity of human nature can solve the problem in one way only—that of predestination. The adher-

ents of strict logic have seen that and have believed in it. St. Paul does not hesitate to draw the conclusion—God has chosen to turn some lumps of clay into vessels of honor and others into vessels of dishonor, or some into vessels of mercy and others into vessels of wrath.[4] Down to our own times this doctrine is held by some, although it is destructive of human personality, as will be shown later in Chapters VI and VII. The defender of the theory of free will must necessarily assume that there is something in the general endowment of human nature that is capable of apprehending the divine, that it can be developed and strengthened by practice and prayer, and that all men have this ability at least to some extent.

The conclusion of this brief criticism is, then, that the autonomous theory is too uncertain; that it may lead wrongly as well as rightly; and that it leaves the object of its feeling of dependence entirely undefined. Religion is, consequently, something that may be investigated.

2. *Difficulties in defining Religion.*—It is almost impossible to get an accurate definition of religion. There are two reasons for this difficulty.

There is first the many-sidedness of religion. As Professor Ellwood says: "In one aspect it is participation in, and universalization of, the ideal

values of life. In another aspect it is a form of social control, constraining through supernatural sanction the individual to conform his beliefs and actions to those of his group. In another aspect it is a consecration of individual life and energies to social ends. Finally, it is an affirmation of the reality of 'the spiritual', and a belief in its ultimate dominance and triumph in human life."[5]

Here are four aspects of religion, each of which is very comprehensive. Any attempt to synthesize them would end in failure.

Religion is, however, many-sided not only from the point of the aspects and subjects included, but also from that of the mind. Since the whole mental nature of man must participate in religion, and since the aspects of the mind are not equally represented in our religious experience, it is inevitable that some men will define it primarily in terms of the intellect, others in those of the will, and still others in those of the emotions. Examples of each will be given presently.

The second difficulty in a definition of religion lies in its subjective nature or in the fact that it is chiefly an attitude of the mind as a whole. Attitudes cannot easily be defined, since they are the most important aspects of personality. An illustration may throw some light on this statement. When a man has a specific disease—*e.g.*,

pneumonia—the case can be diagnosed easily and remedies prescribed readily. But when he is in a state of nervous exhaustion and his vitality is low, his case is much more serious since every organ functions below normal and the whole system has to be built up. Similarly, when a man is pessimistic, it is not this or that thing which appears wrong to him, but the whole world and everything it contains. His whole view of life is colored by his point of view, just as to the optimist the world seems on the whole well ordered. It will be futile to argue with the pessimist; he has to be reconstructed mentally if a change is to be brought about.

Religion is essentially a spiritual attitude; it is a belief that the things which are bought and sold in the market are not by any means the only values, not even the most important values. It is plainly difficult to define in terms of something else—and every definition is that—what is almost an exclusively personal matter. This difficulty will be considered more fully in Chapter IV. It can only be mentioned here to show the necessity of a variety of definitions of religion, and the versatility of the human mind in describing a complete experience of life.

3. *Definitions.*—Each of the three aspects of consciousness has claimed attention from those who

have defined religion. The terms intellectualistic, affectivistic, and voluntaristic have been applied to these definitions.[6]

I. Definitions from the Intellectualistic Point of View.—One of the best-known definitions is that of Max Mueller: "Religion is a mental faculty of disposition, which, independent of—nay in spite of—sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the Infinite under different names and under varying disguises."[7]

In the same place, he claims that without that faculty not even the lowest worship of idols and fetishes could have come into existence, but that if "we will but listen attentively, we can hear in all religions a groaning of the spirit, a struggle to conceive the inconceivable, to utter the unutterable, a longing after the Infinite, a love of God."

The claim of a special capacity for religion has already been considered above, and rejected. Apart from that, the term "faculty" is not well chosen and has been abandoned by psychologists.

According to Herbert Spencer both science and religion have the same problem to solve—*viz.*, the ultimate ground of existence. This search for the ultimate is common to all religions and constitutes their deepest meaning.

"That this is the vital element in all religions is further shown by the fact that it is the element

which not only survives every change but grows more distinct the more highly religion is developed. Aboriginal creeds, pervaded by thoughts of personal agencies which are usually unseen, conceive these agencies under perfectly concrete and ordinary forms—class them with the visible agencies of man and animals—and so hide a vague perception of mystery in disguises as unmysterious as possible. Polytheistic conceptions in their advanced phases represent the presiding personalities in idealized shapes, working in subtle ways, and communicating with men by omens or through inspired persons; that is, the ultimate causes of things are regarded as less familiar and comprehensible. The growth of a monotheistic faith, accompanied as it is by a lapse of those beliefs in which the divine nature is assimilated to the human in all its lower propensities, shows a further step in the same direction; and however imperfectly this higher faith is at first held, we yet see in altars 'to the unknown and the unknowable God,' and in the worship of God who cannot by any searching be found out, that there is a clearer recognition of the inscrutableness of creation."[8]

The problem for both science and religion is, then, one of knowledge, but—"the Power which the Universe manifests to us is inscrutable."[9]

G. J. Romanes says: "The distinguishing fea-

ture of any theory which can properly be termed a religion is that it should refer to the ultimate source or sources of things; that it should suppose this source to be an objective, intelligent, and personal nature. . . . To speak of the Religion of the Unknowable, the Religion of Cosmism, the Religion of Humanity, and so forth, where the personality of the First Cause is not recognized, is as unmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a triangle; or the rationality of the equator.

"Religion is a department of thought having for its object a self-conscious and intelligent Being." [10]

II. Definitions from the Affectivistic Point of View.—Cornelius P. Tiele says: "I am satisfied that a careful analysis of religious phenomena compels us to conclude that they are all traceable to the emotions—traceable to them, I say, but not originating in them. Their origin lies deeper." [11]

Georg Simmel believes that "the religious life creates the world anew; it means the whole existence pitched in a certain key, but in such a way that its pure concept will neither clash with world-views based on other categories, nor contradict them." [12] He claims that the religious feeling arises in the relation of man to nature, to fate and to humanity, and is in that way coördinated with other world-philosophies. By "key" or the Ger-

man *Tonart,* Simmel means what we have called an attitude of mind.

III. Definitions from the Voluntaristic Point of View.—"Every religion is, or should be, a conviction that regulates man's conduct, affords comfort in affliction, and consecrates all the purposes of life."[13]

Professor James has a comprehensive definition: "Religion . . . shall mean for us *the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.*"[14]

One thing is evident from these definitions—*i.e.*, that religion is many-sided, as was pointed out before, and that it is practically impossible to sum up its various aspects in a single statement. That difficulty only proves, though, that religion is vital and that men of various philosophical schools have given their best to a definition of it.

4. *Basis for a New Definition.*—The definitions given above include only the higher forms of religion—*i.e.*, they aim too high to include the more humble forms. The primitive savage had little conception of the infinite either within or without himself; that idea was not only beyond his ken, but did not enter his mind. We may get nearer

the truth if we approach the problem from the point of view of values.

What does man value? Primitive man did not have those lofty conceptions with which modern philosophers and mystics are familiar. His aim was much lower. It is unscientific and an indication of a lack of knowledge of savages of even our own times to ascribe to men on the lower rungs of the ladder conceptions which are possible only on the higher. In what, then, was primitive man primarily interested? Plainly, only in himself and in his immediate kith and kin. He could not look beyond the small circle of those with whom he associated every day, upon whom he depended, and who depended upon him. His mental horizon was limited to this interdependence. And so we find all those people who live on a low mental plane confining their efforts to themselves and their narrow social environment. This was the case not only with primitive man, but happens today with savages, barbarians, and many people living in the midst of civilization. The inhabitant of New York or Chicago, London or Paris, may have infinitely greater opportunities than the cave man of old, but in many cases his efforts are confined, just as those of the latter, to his immediate kith and kin. He has his family and relatives for whom he is solicitous; but in the midst of a coun-

try counting millions of people he erects his own narrow social structure of the horde and the clan beyond which his interests do not go.

What did this man of low mentality desire? He wanted enough to eat, find a mate, protect himself against enemies in the animal and human realm, and perhaps give vent to his emotions when all was well with him. He danced in a crude way, shouted his defiance to his enemies after victory, perhaps indulged to excess in food and sex, and otherwise acted like a physical adult with the mind of a child. He wanted to live, enjoy himself, and escape destruction.

In promoting this simple object he was fairly active and circumspect. He knew where the best fruits and berries grew, where to watch for the game, and how to take warning from an unusual rustle in the leaves or a strange track in the woods. He lived in a narrow environment geographically; the vale and the hills in which he was born he knew well, but beyond them was a world full of dangers because inhabited by strangers. As his world of space was limited, so was that of time. He lived preëminently in the present. He would recall the past on account of its joys and sorrows, but would not usually dwell on it unless some circumstance recalled it. Of the future he had but little conception. The sun might rise again tomor-

row, but the one thing to do was to keep alive today. This lack of foresight is one characteristic of many savages of our own times.

In his attempts to keep alive, to enjoy, and to avoid destruction, primitive man found many obstacles. The toll of death was heavy, and the death rate was so high that a civilized community would be greatly shocked. Not even in times of epidemic diseases does our own death rate approach that of savage tribes. Try as he might, primitive man found his life in constant jeopardy. Now it was famine owing to the disappearance of game or to drought; again, an unexpected attack from ambush, or again, some disease that would carry off a wife, children, or parents. Frequently whole hordes or clans would be wiped out and only a few individuals would escape the catastrophe. The leader of the little band himself would not be exempt from these calamities. Notwithstanding his caution, valor, or anything else that he could do, the uncertainty of life was the one fact that stared him in the face; sudden death might come any moment to him or his people from an unexpected quarter. Such was, briefly, the actual situation. What was his reaction to it?

The one thing that distinguishes even the lowest of men from animals is some degree of reflection. This power may not extend into the distant

past or future, but it enables man to take a sort of inventory of his situation. In a crude way he figured out that notwithstanding all his skill in avoiding death there was no way of avoiding it ultimately. Not only was he himself helpless, but the little group of which he was a member was unable to find a way out of the difficulty. The idea was thus gradually brought home to him that there were powers which neither he nor his associates could master—powers which eluded every attempt of his to bend to his will. This was the situation in general.

There were, in addition, special occasions which baffled his understanding. A child was born to his wife. How did this new life originate? He could not tell, and for many thousands of years men were unable to tell. Just as among animals, even the highest, the cause of propagation is unknown, so it was unknown among early human beings. A custom—called the couvade—has survived down to our own times among some savage tribes—*e.g.*, some Indians of Brazil and of Guiana—and until lately even among the comparatively civilized Basques in the Pyrenees. The custom requires the husband, after the birth of the child, to behave exactly as if it were he who had been confined; he betakes himself to bed, receives congratulations, and in some cases looks after the

baby. It made its appearance at a time when the suspicion arose that the male was the cause of pregnancy, and it was continued later by sheer inertia, as so many customs have done. To the primitive mind, childbirth is caused by some spirit and a pregnant woman is looked upon as impure and possessed; the "churching of women," still practiced in most European countries, is the last vestige of this superstition.

That spirits have something to do with childbirth, according to early beliefs, is testified by the care taken to prevent harm coming to the newborn baby from other spirits. The Laotians hang bells, rattles, and cloth bands in the vicinity of the house where a baby has arrived, so that, shaken by the wind, they may make a noise and keep away evil spirits. The Malays and the Nias Islanders prepare special fetishes, called Modigliani, for this purpose. Owing to these beliefs, pregnancy and childbirth have been surrounded with a large number of superstitions—for instance, that a woman has to occupy a hut apart before, during, or after delivery, according to the customs of different tribes.

Another of these unaccountable occurrences was puberty. It would take a good-sized volume to describe the various superstitions and customs which have arisen around it.

Here were, then, at least two important events which defied explanation. It might, of course, be said that mammals have these experiences. So they have, but they lack the "fatal" gift of reflection. Man has always had it, and has been cursed and blessed by it in turn. The numerous stories about a lost innocence which are found among many peoples have their root here. Man could not leave natural things alone; he must try to find out their reason. If a real one could not be found, he resorted to a fictitious one, since a reason he must have. So he resorted to the expedient of attributing propagation to some kind of unseen powers. It is hardly fair to say that these powers were spirits as savages of today understand that term. They were simply things which in some incomprehensible way influenced his life.

It was an easy transition from crediting these powers with birth and puberty to crediting them with other things. Food was not always provided by nature; war might break out for unaccountable reasons, and catastrophes happened in nature with sufficient frequency to instill into the dull mind of primitive man this important lesson: Do what you may, there are powers higher than you!

So a dualism arose in man's mind—some things he was able to do by virtue of his own skill and strength; others he could not do, no matter how

much he exerted himself; both individual and collective cunning was in vain against them. Just how soon a system of dealing with these powers arose, no man living can tell. An outline of what we know will be given later in the chapter on the Development of Religion. Here we are concerned only with the fact that this dualism did arise, and became the cause of an important new departure. Henceforth man lived in two worlds —the world he could master and the world he could not. What was he to do?

One imperishable desire he had, *to live his life and avoid destruction.* In his attempts to realize his desire he soon learned how to deal with the world he could master by inventing better weapons and utensils—*e.g.*, the club, the bow and arrow, the spear, the trap, the net, and others too numerous to mention. In this realm he reasoned scientifically, as we would say, from cause to effect: the heavier the club the greater the force of the blow. And he progressed remarkably well in this field, as the history of ancient and modern nations amply testifies. In the other field progress was much slower, since he dealt with unknown powers. In the course of time the two realms became more distinct, and whatever attempts he made to deal with the unknown powers came to be looked upon

as *sacred* and were hedged about with all kinds of secrecy.

What was, however, the motive behind these various exertions? Nothing but the desire to live undisturbed and avoid destruction. All those activities which he performed with the forces known to him he perfected as far as he could so as to realize his desire. All those activities which were centered on the unknown powers he performed with more or less of hesitation and doubt as to the result. But in each case the purpose was the same. This purpose may give us a new definition of religion, covering its lowest as well as its highest forms.

Religion means a search for completion through powers with whom man cannot deal by ordinary means. At its lowest it is merely an attempt to secure physical comforts and avoid destruction; at its highest it is a desire to come into full harmony with the ultimate cause of all things, intellectually, emotionally, and volitionally.

This definition implies that religion is to be explained as an aid in the struggle for existence. That it is still employed by many men in that capacity is unfortunately too evident, and we cannot blame primitive man for using every possible means that promised help in his many vicissitudes. Three instances from widely different fields will

be given to illustrate the point. The prayer of Jacob is well known. Fearing pursuit from Esau and being about to enter a strange and therefore hostile land, he was anxious to secure divine protection and he tried to drive a bargain with Jehovah.

"And Jacob vowed a vow, saying, If God will be with me, and will keep me in this way that I go, and will give me bread to eat, and raiment to put on, so that I come again to my father's house in peace, then shall the Lord be my God: And this stone which I have set for a pillar, shall be God's house; and of all that thou shalt give me I will surely give the tenth unto thee." [15]

No contract drawn by a modern lawyer could be more terse and explicit.

An interesting prayer from our own Indians is as plainly a commercial transaction. It is offered by a Sioux:

"I wish to kill a Pawnee! I desire to bring horses when I return. I long to pull down an enemy. I promise you a calico shirt and robe, I will give you a blanket also, O Wakanda, if you allow me to return in safety after killing a Pawnee!" [16]

The Russian peasant who offers six candles to one saint in return for a good crop, then fears that another saint may get jealous and makes the same

offer to the latter, may use a more deft tool than the poor Indian, but the method and the spirit are the same. And such cases abound in Russia and elsewhere.

A psychological study of the prayers offered by the different belligerents during the World War would reveal millions of similar attempts to bribe the Almighty into granting temporal benefits.

From the highest forms of religion three examples may be given. The cry of Job in the face of his accusers is well known: "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him!"

Passing over centuries, we find the same spirit in Thomas à Kempis's *Imitation of Christ:*

"Lord, thou knowest what is best; let this or that be according as thou wilt. Give what thou wilt, so much as thou wilt. Do with me as thou knowest best, and as shall be most to thine honor. Place me where thou wilt, and freely work thy will with me in all things. . . . When could it be evil when thou wert near? I had rather be poor for thy sake than rich without thee. I choose rather to be a pilgrim upon the earth with thee, than without thee to possess heaven. Where thou art, there is heaven; and where thou art not, behold there are death and hell." [17]

At the opposite pole of the behavior of the persons mentioned under the lowest forms of religion,

we have that of the Christian martyrs who joyously and exultantly embraced death so as to enter into the presence of the Lord. The three cases given are examples of the highest form of this kind of religion, but not necessarily of the best religion.

Between the two extremes there are any number of variations, depending on individual dispositions and on social conditions. Since both differ widely, there can hardly be any definition which will do justice to the experiences of every person. Underneath all of them there lies, however, one dominant desire—that for completion through powers with whom man is unable to deal by ordinary means. The idea of completion may and does have infinite variations, since individuals vary infinitely. But whatever conceptions of completion man has, he seeks to realize in religion. What the idea means in a general way, without reference to individual conceptions of it, must now be discussed more fully.

5. *Meaning of Completion.*—Inherent in every specimen of every species is the tendency for completion—*i.e.*, every living organism tries to develop whatever capacities it may have to the utmost extent. Needless to say, all the animal organisms are unconscious of this tendency, or, at any rate, not clearly conscious of it so as to project

it in the form of a proposition or a clearly defined purpose. It is simply inherent in life itself, as we may judge from its innumerable manifestations. If the idea does not seem too absurd, we might put it this way: The horse, if it had the power of abstract thinking, might say to himself, "I want to be the finest kind of horse I can possibly become, and will fight, struggle, and exert myself for that purpose!" The struggle for existence has no other meaning. Every plant and every animal, from the lowest to the highest, certainly struggles and exerts itself for this very object. It wants to make the most of itself and fights against all comers. The battle may be waged singly as in the case of carnivorous predacious animals, or may be waged in groups as happens with the herbivorous social animals. But always it is waged, because as long as there is breath in the organism the tendency is toward maintenance and continuation and completion of life. And the battle is not for the sake of the species, since animals have no idea of reproduction; that is a by-product of the maturity or physical completion of the organism. It is for the sake of the individual pure and simple. Many animals help one another, especially the parents their offspring. This aid is due to an inherited instinct which has developed in the struggle for existence and which the parents can no more resist

than the corn can resist developing into the blade, then into the ear, and finally into the full corn again, only to have the process repeated endlessly in succeeding generations. The corn which is put into the ground and is able to get the necessary nutrition, moisture, and sunlight must go through this process. And so must the mammal pass through all the stages of its development and the rearing of its offspring, since the care of its young is a part of its natural instinctive endowment which it must live out and act upon. Each act in this process of creation and death through endless generations is, however, one which the individual must perform without any chance of knowing what its consequences may be. The chain of events is there, but the animal is conscious only of the separate links when the impulse to action comes; and the impulse always demands the most complete satisfaction by being acted out fully. The impulses form a series which is called an instinct, and the various instincts form another series which by virtue of the most intricate forms of coöperation and interdependence constitutes the unity of the organism. This unity is physical and only incidentally psychical in the case of animals. In other words, the animal is conscious only of separate impulses and acts in these many series, and experiences the effects of the totality of their performance in the

form of general well-being or abounding health. The relation of the separate acts to the whole organism is never realized, although it is there; the unity is, consequently, predominantly physical and not psychical.

It is different with man. Owing to his ability to reason, he realizes this unity and projects it into a dimly conceived proposition that he wants to make the most of himself. It is at first so dimly conceived that we call it a desire; but as he grows older and becomes more intelligent he conceives it more clearly and puts it into the form of a deliberate purpose. He begins to adapt means to this end, and learns to connect cause and effect. His unity is chiefly psychical.

We have, then, a new departure here. Man seeks completion deliberately, whereas the animal is prompted and guided and impelled to seek it owing to the organic unity existing between its series of instincts. This departure opens up a new development, not only for the present life as far as making a better living is concerned, but into a new realm and beyond the span of his terrestrial life.

What kind of completion does man seek? He starts life primarily as a physical being and can never get away from that fact. The early years of his life are devoted principally to the growth

and development of his body. After maturity has been attained, most of his waking hours are taken up with the task of making a living. And he needs safety and protection while he pursues these economic activities. That implies a properly constituted government. Food and safety or sustenance and protection, with their numerous and varied subdivisions, are the principal physical needs of man, and if all are supplied in proper measure he attains physical completion by rounding out his life at a fair old age. There are apparently some men to whom the physical life and its embellishments in the form of comforts and luxuries appear as their chief occupation.

Man has, however, other needs which must be satisfied; these are psychical. The mind may be looked at from three different angles. At one time it is chiefly cognitive or concerned with knowledge, at another it is predominantly emotional or has a strong feeling tone. Again, it may be principally volition, when the whole mental energy is centered upon a certain goal. These are not different faculties, but different aspects of the mind, the unity of which has these three facets, if a term from physics may be applied to psychology. The only point which concerns us here is the fact that man seeks completion along all three lines.

As a knowing being he wants to know the rela-

tion of himself to the universe, to life and death, and many other things. His insatiable curiosity has given rise to philosophy, science, and theology. As an emotional being he wants to be loved, to give expression to his sense of the beautiful, and to enjoy himself in many ways. As a willing being he wants to try his strength against obstacles, to triumph over difficulties, and prove his mastery over himself and his environment. Men may have different dispositions and temperaments, but each one wants to achieve something along these three lines.

Sociologists claim that man finds this completion in society, and they are right, but only to a certain extent. It is in and through society that man finds an opportunity to get more knowledge, to love and perhaps to hate more, and to find a field for expressing his will. It may not be saying too much when the statement is made that one man is no man. Without the social influences which are constantly affecting him from the cradle to the grave, he would be merely a more cunning beast than other animals. It is certainly due to society that he gets a chance to develop his capacities and gains protection. Does he, however, find completion in society? The answer is a decided and emphatic, No! Why not?

Man is a unique creature, and every individual

is, strictly speaking, *sui generis*. No two individuals—not even identical twins—are exact duplicates.[18] While he is a member of society, he is an incommensurable part of it. All his social activities still leave him partly dissatisfied. Of late many people, even strong defenders of religion, have advocated *social service* as a new religion or a substitute for the old. The call has gone out far and loud, and has found eager response. But after a number of years the most eager and candid social workers have come to the conclusion that completion cannot be found in those activities. They have become discouraged and many have entered other professions. This does not mean, of course, that social service is not good and necessary work —society being constituted at present as it is— that work absolutely needs to be done. Doing this work is, however, one thing, and it is a very different thing whether social service offers the opportunity for completing the individual. Society is only a part of a larger whole, and the individual does and must look to the whole for completion. He must look to the universal and ultimate powers for full satisfaction.

In his quest for a comprehension of the scheme of things, man is continually baffled by the constant enlargement of the scheme. As a child he is satisfied with immediate and proximate causes.

As his knowledge increases, the number of questions multiplies and they become more complex. The scheme deepens and broadens with every step he takes into new fields of knowledge, and every apparently satisfactory answer he gets opens up new horizons. In these higher and broader steps which he is urged on to take by his own quest for completion, he has the feeling of a creative experience, since the new solutions he finds by means of more complex combinations always give him a temporary satisfaction. But he must go on to a final solution, if haply he may find it. This is the problem of philosophy as well as of religion.

The next problem is that of man's will. The search for the ultimate is not one of idle curiosity nor of mere abstract knowledge. It is one of life. He must try to attune his own life to that of the ultimate forces if he would be happy and contented. Science gives him a certain amount of useful and piecemeal information along these lines. Long before science had attained its present high status, experience had taught him many valuable lessons. He is, consequently, not lacking knowledge how to act in this or that situation, and what to do or avoid in these or other circumstances. That, however, still leaves his life as a whole unsatisfied. What he wants and what he sorely needs is to bring his life as a totality in unison with the

ultimate powers. Some basic and comprehensive principle is necessary for that purpose. This is the problem of higher ethics and religion.

The last problem is that of man's emotions. It is in his feelings and emotions that the real man is to be found, since these are purely subjective. Knowledge he can share with others, and his will enables him to act with others, but his pains and pleasures, his joys and sorrows, are his and his alone. Other men can enter into them only indirectly by the circuitous route of knowledge. In this subjective aspect we find the uniqueness of every individual to have its real basis. And here the clamor for completion is loudest. He may get many emotional satisfactions from kind friends and loving members of his family. But how often do they hurt us deeply with their well-meant intentions! We may readily and gladly forgive them and try to make a cheerful face over their good intentions, but—the hurt is there and cuts and sears. What we cry out for inwardly in those moments is a power that does always love us, and knows how to love without hurting. This means that we want to be loved uniquely by an all-wise and benevolent power with whom we may act in harmony.

The problem of emotional completion is, then, not isolated from that of the intellect and of the

will; it is rather the concentration and the coming to a focus of all three. And this is, *par excellence*, the problem of religion.

Emotional completion can, however, be attained in one way only—by a confident belief in a personal God. If we were only intellectual beings, one of the numerous solutions of philosophy for the unity of the universe might satisfy us. In moments of highest abstraction it is possible for some men to conceive of a universal and eternal principle, such as the *absolute* or the *ultimate*, as a satisfactory explanation of the unity of the manifold phenomena. Treatises and books by the hundred have been written within historic times to this effect.

Again, if we were merely volitional beings, science would be able to show us how we should act so as to attune ourselves to the universe, and some scientists believe that it can be done. Haeckel claimed that he had solved the problem in his *Riddle of the Universe*. But to most men, and not to those of low but to many of the highest intelligence, the Sphinx has not given away her secrets as yet.

The insuperable obstacle against both a purely philosophical and a purely scientific solution lies in our emotional nature. This is not mere sentimentality, but the most fundamental aspect of

our very being. The farther we proceed intellectually and volitionally, the more refined our emotions become, and the more urgent the clamor for a worthy conception of a personal God becomes. We may be told that this is all wrong, but the clamor will not down and has to be dealt with. It is as much a fact for investigation as the law of gravitation or the vibrations of the ether. All through history men have striven to solve their religious problems without resorting to an anthropomorphic conception of the deity; but always and everywhere the attempt has proved futile.

The unity of man's mental nature demands not only intellectual and volitional completion, but chiefly and predominantly emotional completion. He is a person and must necessarily project his ideas as to the final goal of his completion into the form of a personality, superpersonality, or whatever one may choose to call that being. And always and everywhere the ordinary means of his knowledge and will power have proved inadequate to furnish him the key, since both these aspects of his personality form rather the shell of his personality, while the real man is found in the emotions.

The immediate problem which confronts us now

is twofold—what is a personality, and what is its value?

[1] I Cor. ii: 14.
[2] Rufus Jones, *Social Law in the Spiritual World,* p. 161.
[3] *Ethics,* vol. i, tr. by Gulliver and Titchener, p. 49.
[4] Rom. ix: 21-24.
[5] *The Reconstruction of Religion,* p. 47.
[6] James H. Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion,* p. 339.
[7] *Introduction to the Science of Religion,* p. 13.
[8] *First Principles,* p. 38. Appleton, 1910.
[9] *First Principles,* p. 39.
[10] *Thoughts on Religion,* p. 41.
[11] *Science of Religion,* vol. ii, p. 15.
[12] *Die Religion,* p. 11, 1906.
[13] Paul Carus, *Religion of Science,* p. 7.
[14] *Varieties of Religious Experience,* p. 31.
[15] Gen. xxviii: 20-22.
[16] G. Owen Dorsay, *A Study of Siouan Cults, Eleventh Annual Report, American Bureau of Ethnology,* 1889-90, p. 376; quoted by Leuba, *op. cit.,* p. 16.
[17] Quoted by James, *Varieties of Religious Experience,* p. 44, from book iii, chaps. 15 and 59.
[18] The problem of individuality will be discussed more fully in Chapter III, "Value of Personality."

III

The Permanent Value of Personality

See p. 127

1. *What Is an Individual?*—There are four aspects to this problem—the biological, the philosophical, the social, and the religious. It would be impossible and perhaps out of place to take up the argument for each one *in extenso*, since we are concerned chiefly with the religious aspect. A brief review of the first three aspects is, nevertheless, necessary as a basis for the last one.

Mention has already been made of the uniqueness of the individual, but the argument must now be extended. The biological aspect of the individual will, naturally enough, be presented best by an expert in that field.

"As a result of the permutations of ancestral characters, the appearance of mutations, and the fluctuations of organisms, due to environmental changes, it happens that in all cases offspring differ more or less from their parents and from one another. No two children of the same family are exactly alike (except in the case of identical twins which come from the same oösperm).[1] Every

living being appears, on careful examination, to be the first and last of its identical kind. This is one of the most remarkable peculiarities of living things. The elements of chemistry are constant, and even the compounds fall into definite categories which have constant characteristics. But the individuals of biology are apparently never twice the same. This may be due to the immense complexity of living units as contrasted with chemical ones; indeed, lack of constancy is evidence in itself of lack of analysis into real elements or of lack of uniform conditions; but whatever is the cause, the extraordinary fact remains that every living being appears to be unique."

The reason for this uniqueness may be readily inferred from the fact that a molecule of highly organized living tissue may contain over 2,300 atoms. And now the chemists have broken up the atom into still smaller compounds—*e.g.*, ions and electrons. When we realize that a human being is composed of millions of cells, and each cell contains in turn several hundred molecules, the infinite number of possible new combinations is apparent. A slightly, or rather an infinitesimally different structure and combination of atoms in the cells will give a different physical organism, and, owing to its unity, this organism must present

a different aspect and express itself differently from any other specimen of the same species.

Philosophically, the uniqueness of the individual is inevitable on the basis of the biological differences. Suppose that two individuals had minds exactly the same, they would nevertheless appear different to the beholder, since they would have to manifest and express themselves through a different physical organism, because we can know of the mind only through the body, at least under the ordinary conditions with which science deals. Even such individuals would feel that they were different because their minds would have to be influenced to a greater or less extent by the difference in their physical structure. Philosophers have, consequently, always insisted on the essential dissimilarities of individuals. A few quotations will make this plain.

"The individual is a concrete existence which is indivisible because organized into a coördinated or purposive unity."[3]

If this description is dissolved into its component parts, we find that it contains six characteristics—uniqueness, discreteness or separateness, singleness or what the Germans call *Einzelwesen*, particularity, indivisibility, organization. A few words about each of these characteristics will help us to recognize their meaning and their relation

to one another. If the individual is unique, there can be none other like it, it must be strictly single and indivisible, otherwise there would be two or more of a kind. If it is to be distinguished as unique, it must be discrete or separate in space and time. If it is to be recognized as discrete and separate, its uniqueness cannot and must not be absolute; it can only be a variation of a generic, recognizable species or genus—*i.e.*, it must be a particular of a universal. As a variation of a species, it must be organized as a unity, so as to maintain its uniqueness. Indivisibility is the negative aspect, unity the positive aspect, of organization.

Kant[4] elaborates the idea that "an organized product of nature is one in which the parts are reciprocally end and means." If so, nothing in an organism is useless or without purpose, and nothing in it can be ascribed to blind, natural mechanism. Each part must contribute to and receive from the whole—*i.e.*, each part must be reciprocally end and means, not means now and end then, but both means and end all the time and in every action. Only in that way can the organism preserve its life, unity, and organization. Even organs which have now become useless—*e.g.*, the appendix—had a function in the past, and the organism has not as yet had time to divest itself of this survival from a lower organization.

Josiah Royce says:[5] "By an individual, then, we mean an essentially unique being or a being such as there exists, and can exist, but one of the type constituted by this individual being." He stresses the uniqueness and singleness of an organic individual—features which have already been discussed.

Herbert Spencer says:[6] "A biological individual is any concrete whole having a structure which enables it, when placed in appropriate conditions, to continuously adjust its internal relations to external relations, so as to maintain the equilibrium of its functions."

The equilibrium of functions plainly points to a unity of organization, and to what Kant means by each organ functioning reciprocally as means and end. The environment is, of course, the principal field for the activity of the individual.

We have now described, although not defined—since that is impossible—what the philosopher means by an individual. Let us now see what the sociologist does with this conception.

If the individual is unique, he must have some particular gift or ability which he does not share with any other human being. And if the individual is a concrete existence organized into a coordinated or purposive unity, he must have some special task to perform. This task must be his

alone; it cannot be yours or mine, since you and I have our own task because we are likewise concrete existences organized into coördinated, purposive unities. What, then, is the purpose of the individual?

It can plainly be only one—the development of that particular gift or talent which constitutes, perhaps, the essence of his uniqueness, and which we found to be a variation, in whatever slight degree, of the generic qualities of his species. This variation from the type gradually increases as we ascend in the scale of the biological and psychical orders. The amœba has less individuality than the frog, the frog less than the eagle, the eagle less than the gorilla, the anthropoid ape less than the savage, the Black of Australia less than the stone mason in New York, and the last named less than William Shakespeare, Herbert Spencer, or Theodore Roosevelt. The genius is the most pronounced and widest departure from what is called the average or normal man, and has for that reason often been called degenerate or insane. If these variations are an improvement on the general pattern of society, there is, at least, slight progress; if not, there is disruption and retrogression, or, at any rate, stagnation, according to the degree of variation from the normal.

Omitting any discussion of the subnormals with

whom society deals in a repressive manner, and confining our attention to the normal and supernormal individuals, we find that their object can be only one—the development of their peculiar talent, or the development of their own particular individuality. But here the individual encounters many obstacles. He must *live* as a mere biological specimen before he can live in his own particular way as a psychical specimen. As long as his whole time and energy are consumed in the mere attempt of making a living, there is no chance of developing his special talent. In the distant past all men were in that position. Knowledge of how to exploit nature was so limited that everybody, from the weaned child to the tottering old man, was put to work to help make a living, and scant it was at that. Later, with the greater number and higher quality of tools, at least a few men, such as priests and chieftains, were able to devote most of their time to pursuits other than economic. And this opportunity has increased with the introduction of machinery in civilized countries. The result is briefly that a larger number of men are able to devote at least part of their time to the fostering of their particular talent. This greater amount of leisure is the product of what is known as specialization. In proportion as the more distinctive individuals were relieved from economic drudgery

they were able to think, meditate, and devise better ways and means for exploiting nature. These processes increased their reasoning power. They progressed and helped other men to progress by communicating to them the product of their thought. This procedure was possible, though, only in society where the most gifted men had at least some chance to develop their gifts. By exchanging their ideas, their products and their experiences, the whole society benefited, and the individual had an increasingly better opportunity to live his own life—*i.e.*, to devote most of his time and energy to the fostering of his own gift. He found satisfaction in this opportunity, and completion in society through the interchange of the products of different talents. Individuality means to the sociologists, consequently, a concrete being who seeks and must seek the completion of himself in society through the development of his talent by the exchange of the products of his work with the products of other men's work. Modern science with its world-wide exchange of ideas furnishes the best example of this coöperation; and its rapid development in recent times is largely due to this give-and-take.

Religiously, the individual is the offspring of some deity. Practically all religions look at man as a descendant of some divine ancestor. The con-

ception of that deity may have been crude, but it was the highest which man at that particular stage of development had, and he was proud to be able to trace his origin to it. Omitting all the different stages in this development and passing directly to the Christian religion, we have various expressions in Holy Writ concerning man's individuality. He is the son of God, made in the image of his maker; he is to be perfect as his Father in heaven is perfect; he is loved with a unique love, such as a human father bestows upon each of his children according to special need and response. Just as in society the individual develops through the interplay of give-and-take, so in the relation of man to his heavenly Father, the more he responds to divine love, the more he is able to appreciate it and grow into it. Whether God loves those people more who respond more fully, is a purely academic question which can never be settled this side of the grave. The only thing we know is that those who respond willingly and constantly experience an enlargement of life and have a peace which passes understanding. Growth in grace and in the knowledge of Jesus Christ is not an empty phrase, it is a fact verified in millions of human lives. It is not a commodity sold in the market place, nor an object to be analyzed in the laboratory of the chemist, but it

is a fact just the same. For, while many things are knowable, few are demonstrable, as will be discussed more fully in Chapter IV.

What special significance has religion for the individual? Society gives him an opportunity to develop his particular talent, and since he can find that nowhere else, he is driven by inner necessity to become a member of a social group. Does religion offer an opportunity for the development of something in the individual which is offered nowhere else? It must do so, or lose any importance it may have had for man in the past. The attempt to exploit religion for economic purposes, which was so strong in earlier religions, is no longer acting as a motive among the more intelligent members of civilized communities; they know how to apply their knowledge to nature so as to make her yield her treasures. Something else which man cannot attain except in religion must replace the older and lower motive. This other and higher motive was present in an incipient form even in the older religions. Man wanted not only blessings for this life, but permanence of life and the fullest possible completion of life. Society could not furnish these, and all attempts to make religion a mere social function have failed and are bound to fail. As society has risen to higher planes and has furnished the individual a better

opportunity for developing his talent with consequent greater satisfaction, it has become increasingly more evident that man has needs which the most ideally conceived social organization cannot meet. It is very significant that religious unrest seems to grow almost in proportion to the increase of our social activities. Why? Because while society furnishes invaluable opportunities for expansion and satisfaction, its functions are confined to the here and now.

Medical science may be able within a few decades to increase the average length of life far beyond the Biblical threescore years and ten; the limit is reached, nevertheless. The development of our talent may delight ourselves and benefit our fellow men; the pleasure lasts only a short time. History may spread our name over its pages for centuries after we are gone; our dust and ashes will not be aware of it. Man has come to realize this; hence the more pronounced religious unrest of our own times than that of any period in the past. We have found that the finest and highest things we can produce, still leave some of our wants unfulfilled and point beyond society for realization. *Permanence of life and the fullest possible completion of life* are the two boons which religion promises to man. Religion makes, thus, two substantial additions to the conceptions of the

individual furnished by biology, philosophy, and sociology.

The next step that has to be taken is to show how the individual develops, since only by an understanding of this process is it possible to comprehend the meaning of personality which is the main topic of this chapter.

2. *Growth of the Individual.*—The first and simplest form in which the mind manifests itself is through the activity of the physical organism. The internal or individual aspect of this, as of all activity, is feeling. Whether we think, will, or remember, attack, flee, or stand still, our action is always accompanied by some kind of feeling. It is the basic element of all consciousness and co-extensive with mental life. There is, in other words, no consciousness which is not in part at least *feeling*. The close interdependence between physical structure and function, on the one hand, and the quantity and quality of mental life on the other, need not concern us, since we are attempting to sketch only the psychical development of the individual.

The mental life of animals consists principally, if not exclusively, of feelings. In the higher species some forms of thinking by association take place. These are due to the remembrance of certain actions being accompanied by pain and others

by pleasure, and the animal never gets beyond the pleasure-pain complex. Feeling is the fundamental aspect of man's psychic life. The so-called organic feelings not only regulate all physical functions, but give color to our mental attitudes. Feeling is persistent and constant all through life, and survives all other mental faculties. The scientist and the philosopher may try to divest themselves of all feeling in the pursuit of truth, but they are always influenced in part at least by their moods, and long after the ability of reasoning is gone, feelings survive. Feeling is a guide to well-being. In the long stages of biological development animals experienced pleasure as a means to the furtherance of life, and pain to its hindrance; the experience finally crystallized in the form of instincts which prompted certain modes of behavior and prevented others.

Children and even adults are still largely controlled by the pleasure-pain complex. Much of the charm which certain people have is due to the vivacity of their feelings. They are animated in conversation and lively in their actions because they feel keenly. Carlyle's Dryasdust professor may have some weighty matters to discuss, but he does so to a handful of equally dryasdust students, while the more emotional lecturer attracts large audiences. Art and literature are inspired by

strong feelings. These may be crude and elemental, but they attract us and hold our attention, while the thoughtful but bone-dry poems of Matthew Arnold are read only by the specialist in English literature and the seeker of moral maxims. Feeling is, finally, the means of attaining self-consciousness. William James speaks of that pale thought of yours, and this warm thought of mine. Why? Thoughts do not float about ownerless; they are personal property. My thought appears warm to me because it is clothed, so to say, with a feeling of ownership; and your thought appears pale to me for lack of that feeling; and my thought appears pale to you for the same reason. James winds up his discussion of the ego with the words, "For this central part of the Self is *felt*."[7] Another psychologist concludes his discussion of the ego in a similar manner: "Amid the variations of composite and varying reality, the most fixed point of reference is now seen to be the feeling of self."[8]

Feeling is, then, the most basic aspect of our mental life. It will be necessary, before attempting to show how the other aspects of our consciousness develop out of feeling, to give a brief description of what that term implies. A definition is, by hypothesis, impossible, because feeling is a predominantly subjective experience. Those states

of consciousness which have a pleasure-pain quality, such as organic feelings, belong here and form the inner core. Around them are the less keen states of buoyancy, hopefulness, elation, etc., on the one hand, and depression, despair, pessimism, etc., on the other. At the outer rim are the sensations, which are almost, but not entirely, neutral in quality. They are on the borderland of feeling and knowledge, and have, consequently, been classified with either or both. The problem is now whether feelings are capable of expansion or conversion into cognitions and volitions.

Let us start with the organic feelings. The newborn babe has certain experiences. Some of these are unpleasant—*e.g.*, hunger, weariness, cold, uncomfortable position, etc. Other experiences are pleasant—*e.g.*, satiety, warmth, snuggling against the mother, and the well-functioning of the organism. The difference between the two states is merely felt, and the unpleasant states are expressed by the almost mechanical means of crying, while the pleasant ones manifest themselves by quietness and restful sleep. The difference may be said to be known, however, and not merely felt. We may infer this from the immediate reaction of certain stimuli. The baby will react favorably to the bottle when hungry, but will purse his lips and cry when a sour fruit is put

to his lips. The organic feelings are his only guide, and he instinctively makes a few distinctions.

Later, at the age of a month or two, he begins to take notice of the objective world not in immediate touch with his body. His eyes and ears begin to operate. He sees things, but they appear at first merely as a blur. Gradually he makes certain distinctions—*e.g.*, light and dark, white and black. He hears certain sounds, and learns to distinguish the voice of the mother from that of a dog. It is inevitable that these later experiences should be colored by the earlier ones with their pleasure-pain quality. The voice of the mother sounds agreeable, that of the dog disagreeable; a white object pleases, a black one displeases. In the course of time many experiences are made; their impressions linger in the memory, are compared, and under the guidance of his elders the child acquires knowledge by learning first the names of objects, then actions, later qualities, and finally modes.

Eventually the outer world occupies a larger share of the child's attention, and he uses his eyes and ears more than the organs of smell, taste, and touch. The organs of hearing and of sight procure a vast amount of information which is almost neutral in character because it is intended to

serve primarily the purpose of orientation and thus to aid the organism in adjusting itself to the outside world. In this process the pleasure-pain quality is gradually toned down, psychic energy is converted into knowledge, and information is acquired at less expense. In the lower organisms the organs of sensation have a short range; physical contact with objects is often necessary to produce a reaction, but that process is expensive because it is painful. With the longer range chiefly of eye and ear, information may be had more economically, danger is avoided, and possible advantages are made use of.

This information is, however, never entirely neutral, since it must be evaluated. That is done by the slight pleasure-pain quality of every sensation. Below the human realm that is the only means of evaluation. Even man has frequently no other criterion. In the choice of his food he is guided chiefly by the pleasant odor and taste and, not infrequently, by pleasing appearance. Foods which are unpleasant and disagreeable to one or all of the senses are seldom eaten. And justly so, since in the course of evolution pleasure has on the whole become associated with furtherance, and pain with the hindrance of life.

The conversion of feelings into cognitions may be illustrated in another way. When we are an-

gry we are swayed by a strong feeling. Our friends tell us to "cool off," to think the matter over. If we take their advice our anger subsides; the more we think about it the more quickly it passes. Why? Because a portion of the psychic energy used up in the feeling has been converted into thought or cognition. That all strong, especially negative, emotions consume much psychic and even physical energy has become a well-known medical principle. Many of the newer cults—*e.g.*, Christian Science and Couéism—are based almost exclusively on the practice of deflecting energy from wrong feelings into thought.

Only a few words are needed to show the conversion of feeling into volition. Strong feelings always produce immediate action. The organic feelings set the motor apparatus to work without any reflection on our part. Many of our actions are, however, mediated through the intellect, but a feeling is always back of it. We may see an object, but will do nothing unless a desire is aroused. If the object appeals to one of our emotions, we devise ways and means to obtain it, concentrate all of our psychic energy upon it, and take the necessary action to get it. Part of our psychic energy has gone into a volition.

The conversion of feeling into cognitions and volitions may become habitual and almost auto-

matic. Thinkers of every kind have acquired the habit to such an extent that they appear to the onlooker as if they had no emotions; most of their psychic energy has turned into thought. Underneath this smooth surface the emotions are, however, smoldering. Disturb the elaborately arranged material of the chemist, and a volcanic eruption is likely to take place, not in the retort, but in the mind of the scientist. Other men may have trained themselves or have been forced to act more or less habitually against their emotions, and we may praise them for their power of will. But sometimes, on perhaps a slight provocation, the balked emotions will break the dam, and "the state of that man will be worse than before." The order of nature cannot be broken; there must be feeling at the bottom, part of its energy must be converted into cognition and part into volition, and an emotion of at least slight pleasure must accompany these changes if a man is to develop normally.

The reasons for this conversion are easily discerned. The trend of life has always been toward higher forms. That was possible only through differentiation of structure in the physical organism, and the conversion of feeling into intellect and will. The organisms depending on feeling only, have a very limited life and a precarious ex-

istence. The amœba is not only exceedingly circumscribed as to length and breadth of life, but falls a prey to any more highly organized species. To make life more secure and satisfactory, a guide is needed; hence intelligence becomes higher as we rise in the order of life. The numerous obstacles in attaining what we desire demand that we focus our attention on the devising of ways and means to overcome them, and then to concentrate our energy upon the task. Where feeling is strong and normal, intelligence usually finds a way toward attaining the goal, and a concentration of psychic energy takes place. For activity is due to inner strains and stresses, and where they find a proper outlet through normal action we have a wholesome human being. A man without emotions becomes a Frankenstein monster.

A few words are needed here to explain why Schopenhauer's "universal will" is, by implication at least, rejected as a fundamental principle. The animal and the baby do not know anything about a universal will, but only about feelings and impulses. If we are to proceed scientifically we must start with facts, not with postulates as the volitionists demand.

We have tried to show what an individual is and how he develops; we must now show how he becomes a person.

3. *The Transition of the Individual to a Person.*—If what has been said in the preceding discussion is true, we have a key to the transition of the individual to a person. The means can only be one—consciousness of certain relations. My dog is an individual, a highly trained one at that. He performs a number of tricks when the proper stimuli are provided by certain associations. When they are absent he is just an ordinary dog and there is little difference between him and others. He does not, for instance, "lie awake o' nights" to think how to improve his tricks, and he certainly never offers any suggestions to his master how to do so. It took many hours, much patience, and numerous stimuli of both punishment and reward to drill him in those tricks.

A baby is an individual, but he, too, has to be trained along certain lines if he is to become a useful member of society and a self-respecting person. Where is the line of demarcation between the individual and the person? An individual makes a number of adjustments to meet immediate situations, and in many cases—*e.g.*, when led by instincts—they are made excellently, even perfectly. Beyond that sphere the mental life does not go. There is no capacity for abstract thought, and an absent situation is never presented to the mind. The dog and the baby do not differ in that

respect. Where they do differ is in the fact that the dog never passes that stage, whereas the baby sooner or later does. Just at what time he does so differs with different children. The law of the state has arbitrarily fixed a definite line for purposes of criminal procedure, and the suffrage at eighteen years for women and twenty-one for men. That age is supposed to be the time of full responsibility for one's actions.

What is responsibility? The ability to discern the consequences of one's actions. That is plainly an abstract situation, one which I can present to myself only by picturing or imagining what is not here and now. In criminal procedure the line of responsibility has been extended beyond the legal age in case of insane or degenerate individuals, just because they lack the ability to present to themselves an abstract situation and are prompted to act on immediate stimuli. In other words, the impulse acts as an immediate stimulus which cannot be inhibited by an absent situation. It may be said, of course, that a dog will not steal meat after he has been punished repeatedly for his misbehavior. That inhibition of his impulse is, however, based on a memory of the past, not on a projection into the future. The association of the whipping is strong enough to inhibit the impulse for eating. That is possible on one condition, that

the dog has had a normal amount of food and is not too hungry. In that case the impulse to eat is not very strong, anyway, since his instinct is normal. If he is very hungry the impulse to eat will override the memory of the past, and he will steal the meat, just as many children do. We have here, consequently, a remembered stimulus set over against a present one, and which one will win depends on the immediate pulling power of each. *It is the power to have an abstract—i.e., future—stimulus override a present one, that differentiates a person from an individual.* It is, in other words, the *significance* which the mind gives to a situation that counts.

This principle may be illustrated in another way. Sociologists lay great emphasis on blood relationship as a social bond. Is it? My dog has been the father of many puppies, but I never have known him to be any more friendly to any of them when he met them a month or so later than he was to any other puppies. The blood relationship is plainly there; the consciousness of that relation is lacking. It was the same way among primitive men. There were undoubtedly many blood relations existing, but they hardly ever went beyond the circle of the father and the mother of the child. And what care and sympathy they showed was instinctive. Only when the physical fact of

blood relationship through the mother was translated into a mental fact by giving it a certain value did it become a social bond. The significance lies in the recognition of the fact, not in the fact itself. Cases of a similar kind might be cited to any extent; they would merely add details without changing the argument.

Applying this principle to our particular inquiry, it means that a conscious and deliberate effort must be made by an individual if he is to become a person. All kinds of societies have existed in the past. They were based on common interests, blood relation, mere habit and custom, aggregation or juxtaposition, or any other dimly conceived motive. The same causes operated in producing animal societies, and, as in the latter, no fundamental changes were made in the early human groups unless a change in the environment forced a new adaptation to circumstances. Human society simply evolved just as those of animals had done and are still doing; slow, gradual, slight changes were made, hardly perceptible to the members of the group. They are called unconscious.

Some three or four thousand years ago a few men in Greece and Egypt and other countries along the shores of the Mediterranean began to inquire into the nature of human society and of

the relation of the individual to his group. The most important treatise left to us is Aristotle's *Politics*. Its significance is to be found not so much in the perfection of the principles discussed, as in the fact that the inquiry was undertaken at all. It tried to find a reason for what *was* at that time, and attempted to point out what *might* be. It broke the long period during which people had taken facts for granted or had carelessly assigned them to some god, and by this new attitude evolution was changed into progress. For, progress is nothing but evolution of which man has become conscious and which thereby is subject to man's direction and acceleration. From that time on social movements became more rapid and numerous. But again, it was a conscious effort resulting in deliberate action that was significant. And this change happened first of all in the consciousness of a few individuals from whom it spread to other members of the group. Whatever other results the change produced, it turned these individuals into persons.

In religion this need for conscious effort and deliberate action came much earlier than in society. There were several reasons for this.

Society was, in the first place, right there before your eyes. You grew up in it and unconsciously adapted yourself to its modes and customs. In

religion you had to make an effort to get into touch with the deity; it could not be seen, although it was supposed to manifest itself in various forms. Man had to exercise his ingenuity to form some more or less definite idea of its nature, and the numerous forms which the deities were supposed to assume in the long history of religious development are a striking illustration of the effort man had to make in order to get in touch with them.

2. Man could, in the second place, never be certain that he had the appropriate means to approach the deity. The very intangibility of that august being must always have left a doubt whether the sacrifice or offering was of the right kind. This doubt was often raised to a certainty when, notwithstanding the worshiper's best efforts, the result prayed for did not materialize, or when a least expected one surprised him. He had to make, consequently, new efforts all the time if he wanted to assure himself of the favor of his deity.

3. A new perplexity arose, in the third place, when the number of deities was multiplied owing to man's vain efforts to attain desired results from one. There might, after all, be different powers presiding over different phenomena, and he had to adjust himself to their whims and caprices. When this individualization of the invisible powers became fairly definite, as it did among the

Greeks, the perplexity increased, since the jealousy of the gods resulted in one deity hating and persecuting the worshipers of another deity. Man had thus to devise ways and means not only how to please his patron deity, but how to avoid the displeasure of those hostile to him. Many and serious efforts were required for finding ways how to steer clear of the Scylla and Charybdis.

Other reasons could be given why man was compelled to think more frequently and seriously in his religious relations than in his social. Those given will suffice to prove that man had many more occasions for conscious thinking and deliberate effort in religion than in society. This means that it was religion rather than society that was instrumental in transforming him from an individual into a person. For, *this transition means the deliberate assumption of definite relations to universal and social forces for the purpose of completion.* The implication that the more numerous and varied these relations are the higher must be the personality, is plain and needs no further elucidation here. The question, what a personality is, still needs to be answered.

4. *The Meaning of Personality.*—The deliberate assumption of relations to universal and social forces points to something deeper down in our consciousness. There must be something in

our mental make-up that permits, perhaps urges, the taking of this step. The idea of completion has been discussed in Chapter II as the essentially religious desire. We saw there that what was instinctive in every living organism came to be a conscious purpose in the human being. On the basis of its instinct, the animal is impelled to seek its own completion to the utmost of its own capacity. Since *the desire for completion becomes a conscious purpose in man, that impulsion is removed; necessity has given place to free choice; the mechanical has been supplanted or at least supplemented by the moral.* There is no possibility of deliberately assuming relations to universal and social forces except on the hypothesis of the freedom of the will, as the theologians say. But how can that be possible in view of the materialistic conception of science and of the deterministic view of the electionists? If I choose the right, is it not because, according to science, the long chain of antecedents left any other course impossible; or, according to the predestinarians, because God is working in me to that end? On the basis of mere intellectual acumen the free-willist and the electionist have an equal chance to prove their case just as Kant proved the existence or nonexistence of God with equally cogent reasons in his four antinomies. For a more satisfac-

tory answer we have to go deeper down to the basic aspect of our consciousness, namely our feelings. The reference is made here not to the organic feelings, but to the desires and emotions. What do we find there?

If a man wants a thing, even the philosopher steeped in the theory of materialism does feel free; there is apparently no impulsion from within or compulsion from without. There is a spontaneity about a desire which often surprises the scientist as well as the philosopher. The realization of the desire may depend on the ability of the intellect to devise the necessary ways and means, but the wish itself arises spontaneously and independently. Even when the realization is found to be impossible after weighing the pros and cons, there is no feeling of an external or internal power having frustrated me, but only a sense of regret concerning the inadequacy of my ability under the particular conditions. "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves, that we are underlings." Only the sophisticated and the weak will blame an adverse world-order for their failure to gratify their desires. An active, wholesome individual is a more reliable guide in these matters than the intellectual pessimist who is a perennial kill-joy.

What is true of desires is also true of the emo-

tions. Certain things give us pleasure, delight us, arouse our enthusiasm; others do not. There is no compulsion about it; enjoyment is spontaneous and largely individual. The keenness of the enjoyment may vary indefinitely according to our mental development and our physical condition, but we always have a sense of freedom about it. We feel, as a matter of fact, much more free—*e.g.*, in æsthetic enjoyment—than we do in the realm of the intellect where we have to observe the laws of logic and sequence. The result of this brief discussion is, then, a sense of freedom in the basic aspect of our mind. What bearing has it on personality?

There must be some aspect, be it ever so limited, in our consciousness which is exclusively our own, and which even God himself cannot or will not influence without our consent. If one could apply terms of physics to the mind, we might say that there is a very small realm in our consciousness which no one may enter without our permission. It is the very holy of holies, the innermost core of our personality. This aspect or core is not and cannot be anybody's but my own, since it constitutes the very essence of my personality. It is the center of the circle of what I am; and just as only one circle of a given size can be drawn from one particular center, so only one personality can

be the result of that particular core or aspect. That personality may have smaller or larger capacities; it may have qualities of this kind or that; it may by development gradually push out its periphery, just as a number of concentric circles may be drawn from the same center. We are speaking here, of course, of the ideal circle in geometry, which can be, strictly speaking, only one. In practice, several circles may be made from the same center, but these would differ, since theoretically even the point has extension and the geometrician could never hit the hypothetically identical spot twice with his crude instrument.

This impossibility may, however, illustrate the problem of heredity, since the children may be remarkably like the parents, but have at least slightly different qualities with distinct egos of their own. Any attempt to apply analogies from physics or mathematics must naturally enough fail to carry the full idea, but in an endeavor to describe the indescribable, resort to such an auxiliary may be excusable. Philosophical language does not fare much better when it tries to wrestle with this problem of conveying some idea of the meaning of personality. In speaking of the generic qualities which all men have in common, and their relation to the individual qualities, which only one person possesses, Royce makes the following remarks:

"Yet fear not in what manifold ways your life depends upon Nature and Society. It depends upon them for absolutely all of its *general* characters. That is, whatever character it shares with others, implies dependence upon others. If it did not so depend, it would have no intimate share in the common life. But its dependence means precisely that it derives from the other lives everything except its uniqueness—everything except its *individual fashion of acknowledging and taking interest in this its very dependence, and of responding thereto by its deeds.* When, as a man, you take your place amongst men, you thus derive all of your life from elsewhere, *except* in so far as your life becomes for you your own way of viewing your relation to the whole, and of actively expressing your own ideal regarding this relation. Thus *your own way of expressing God's will* is not derived. It is yourself. And it is yours because God worketh in you. The Spirit of God in its wholeness compels you—the individual, the Self, the unique personality—in the sense that it compels you to be an individual, and to be free. Or it compels your individual will only in so far as you consciously compel yourself."

Since the individual is free and unique, he has the opportunity, philosophically, and the obligation, morally, and the tendency, biologically, to

seek completion by consciously and deliberately assuming relations to the universal and social forces, and thus becoming a person. Personality depends, consequently, upon the free choice of the individual. Choices may, however, be of two kinds—those which increase a personality, and those which decrease it. There are integrating forces which increase life, and there are disintegrating forces which destroy it or at least diminish it. Free choice may be directed toward the former or the latter.

What are these forces? The "power that makes for righteousness," the devices which have built up civilization and have given us better social relations, the desire to improve the lot of our fellow men and to assist every person in directing his energies toward the development of his capacities to the fullest possible extent—these are life-giving forces. The revolt against the world-order, the machinations to interfere with the happiness of others, the desire to reap where one has not sown —these are destructive forces. Choosing the former tends toward the growth and expansion of personality; choosing the latter must diminish it and perhaps eventually destroy it. For no man can live by negations; life is a game of give-and-take, an exchange of constructive measures.

Owing to the uniqueness of the individual, his

growth must be along his own lines and his contributions to society and to the world-whole must be on the basis of his particular gifts. He cannot take the place of another, and no other can take his place. This gives him a unique position in space and time, and bestows a universal and eternal value upon him. It makes him indestructible. By deliberately planning to ally himself with the constructive forces, he fulfills his destiny and makes sure of his immortality. His unity with the permanent forces is not physical merely, but ethical and spiritual. By adopting the best means of which he knows for this highest end, he—this is said reverently—"increases in wisdom . . . and in favor with God and man."

One may, however, justly ask: What is the ultimate aim of this planning to ally one's self with the constructive forces? Can we in any shape or manner add to or subtract from the physical forces of the universe? Certainly not. But we may add to or subtract from the moral and spiritual forces. The growth of civilization is one continuous affirmation of this statement. At certain times there has been a phenomenal increase in spiritual goods; at others an apparent diminution. The sum total of civilization represents, nevertheless, a cumulative growth of these forces. There were certainly none on this globe in the times of the dino-

saur, few in those of the cave man, more in the period of Moses, a perceptible increase in the first century of our era, and a gradual extension of them later. Are these forces dissipated through the universe like the force of gravitation, or have they specific centers? This brings us face to face with the problem of the personality of God from a new angle.

5. *The Personality of God.*—If our attempt to describe a human personality has been successful, there can be only one answer as to the question of God—He must be personal. God can certainly not be less than we are, but must be greater, since we cannot find completion in a lesser, but only in a greater. Just because every person is unique he cannot find satisfaction in another unique human being, since each human personality is impenetrable to any other. This statement needs but little proof. No human being has as yet fully understood another. Between the closest friends, between the most loving and devoted husbands and wives, there is always a veil drawn which prevents full understanding and comprehension of the other. Every man must ultimately "tread the wine press alone." Yet, there is the craving for full companionship with some other person, the desire to be in full harmony with some one who understands us and sympathizes with our pe-

culiar point of view. We are incommensurable in each other and in society. Is there no one, then, in whom we may be commensurable and find complete expression? The answer can be found only in a personal God, since "self-consciousness can find satisfaction only in another self-consciousness," as Hegel said. On the basis of the preceding statements this "other self-consciousness" must be greater and more comprehensive than ours. Only with such a being is the deliberate assumption of relations fully possible, since human personalities frequently fail us. Joyful coöperation for increasing the sum total of moral and spiritual goods can be had only by "working together with God." And only in being a co-worker with Him can every person be sure of appreciation and reciprocation.

This idea was expressed by Royce in a similar way:

"But your purpose, your life-plan, just so far as it possesses true rationality of aim, is the purpose to find for yourself just your own place in God's world, and to fill that place as nobody else can fill it. Now this purpose, I maintain, is indeed your own. As nobody else can share it, so nobody else can create it, and from no source external to yourself have you derived it. And this I say on the sole ground that in you, *precisely as*

you know the world as one world, and intend your place in that one world to be unique, God's will is consciously expressed. And his will is one, and in that will every life finds its own unique meaning."[10]

These few remarks on the need for a personal God on the part of man should not be taken as an attempt of a philosophical proof; such a task is beyond the scope of this book. The problem has been solved or been left unsolved, according to one's point of view, by many philosophers and theologians. The solution lies ultimately in the problem of space and time, and that is still waiting for an Alexander to cut the Gordian knot. A hint at a solution may possibly be thrown out here. In his creative moments man seems to be oblivious of space and time. It is said that Mozart was warmly congratulated by an admirer after the performance of one of his symphonies as being the very perfection of music. "You call that music?" he replied. "You should have heard it when it first rushed through my mind all at once!" What had to be distributed over an hour or so took but a moment in the creator's mind to hear.

6. *What View of the Universe Does This Conception Give Us?*—Monism is out of the question, since it leads either to materialism or to pantheism. There is no need to criticize these two philosophies

on theoretical grounds; that would be an endless and a thankless task. It would, moreover, not be a scientific procedure to which we committed ourselves in the first chapter. Both of these philosophies may, however, be reviewed briefly on the basis of results. India is the land of classical pantheism. Owing to the constant denial of the permanence of personality, its effects have in the long run culminated in lethargy and the soporification of a once active and virile people. Whatever mental energy still exists among the Brahmins is employed in the justification of the negation of any value attaching to individuality. Indeed, individuality as such is regarded as a curse and the source of all evil. Hence the numerous methods to stifle natural impulses and to stunt individuality. If ideal existence consists in the lack of desires, whether good or bad, in the absence of any personal feelings, and in the merging of ourselves with the universal or the absolute, only one result can be expected—stagnation along every line. Change of any kind, even along the line of progress, will be unwelcome since it requires the putting forth of effort, and that would be an assertion of individuality or of the will-to-live, which is theoretically condemned. Such an attitude may be pleasing to Orientals, but it certainly is not to Occidentals who believe in exertion and develop-

ment. It may be said that climate was the original cause of the lethargy and aversion to activity of the Hindu people. That is undoubtedly true, but it is not the whole truth.[11] Wherever such a philosophy has taken hold it has, even in healthy countries, produced similar results. It creates an attitude which paralyzes every attempt to assert oneself and to make something of oneself. And that is not wholesome from the practical point of view, whatever theoretical arguments might be found for its justification by those inclined to accept it. For, ultimately, the philosophy one adopts is not so much a matter of reasoning as one of attitude and disposition, and whatever reasoning one indulges in will be for the purpose of fortifying one's attitude. We have here another of those circular movements which we meet so frequently in life. Conviction of the truth or falsity of a doctrine cannot be made through theoretical reasoning; the approach must be made through a change of the disposition.

A criticism of materialism may, likewise, be made on the basis of its results. There are, roughly speaking, only two forms of it which concern us—the theoretical and the practical. Theoretical materialism is akin to other forms of determinism, and has, wherever adopted, produced its baneful effects in crippling enterprise and the

Materialism

free development of personality. One may readily admit that a deterministic philosophy has developed some of the finest characters in human history; these were, however, exceptional men to start with, and their philosophy simply tended to strengthen and unify innate qualities. It is, nevertheless, true that there is something cold and unsympathetic about these Jovelike men; they have inspired more awe than devoted loyalty. The large number of theoretical materialists have felt the limitations to which their belief condemned them, and have taken a more or less stoical position toward the inevitable, with an attitude of resignation which hindered a free development.

Only a few words are needed concerning practical materialism. The industrial development of the nineteenth century has placed untold wealth at the disposal of many individuals in civilized countries. These men knew no other way of spending their wealth except through luxury and sensual indulgence. In our large cities we find the most wanton waste for the gratification of every whim which may obsess certain rich people who have never heard of materialism as a philosophy, but practice it to the utmost extent of their wealth. Their example is one of the most insidious and far-reaching causes of discontent in modern times, since side by side with this extravagance

there are the tragic cases of those innumerable men and women who earnestly strive to maintain high ideals but are finding it almost impossible to maintain decent standards of living. The strain on these men—ministers, teachers, physicians, employees—is becoming increasingly greater and often reaches the breaking point. Needless to say, a philosophy which, whether believed in as a theory or practiced without any theoretical background, clips the wings of exertion and encourages some of the worst features in man, is not one to be commended on the basis of its fruits.

The different systems of idealism need no comment, since they all proceed on *a priori* principles, and are, consequently, disbarred from consideration on the basis of the procedure to which we have committed ourselves. This remark is entirely apart from their theoretical merit which is undoubtedly considerable. The method which these philosophies pursue is, nevertheless, one that is no longer acceptable to the modern mind. It has, moreover, often left its proponents gasping in mid-air between heaven and earth, and has failed to explain either the *absolute* or the *relative*. The *Ding-an-sich* may or may not exist. What is certain is that by no stretch of the imagination can we know anything about it. This remark applies to other *a priori* conceptions of idealistic

philosophies. There remains, then, only the *a posteriori* or inductive method as a guide in our search.

The discussion in this chapter has brought out seven facts: (1) that there are definite concrete individuals; (2) that their organization is based on unity; (3) that they strive for completion or perfection each in its own way; (4) that this striving is based on impulses or feelings which are organized into instincts in animals; (5) that this striving becomes conscious in man; (6) that his completion can be consummated only in a personal God; and (7) that he becomes a personality by deliberately assuming relations to society and to God. The last two "facts" may be doubted and called assumptions by some men. That is a question of knowledge which will be discussed in the chapter following. All we need to say here is that many things are knowable, but few are demonstrable. The last "fact" is, however, not an assumption as far as the individual's relations to society are concerned. If there is any principle in psychology and sociology that is beyond question, it is the absolute dependence of the development of the individual on his contacts with other human beings. Where, owing either to isolation or to the defective structure of the organs of sensation, this contact is absent or inadequate, we have a biological

specimen—*e.g.*, an idiot—but no real human being. We may, consequently, proceed with our argument on the basis of the five indubitable and the two probable facts. What is the result? A plural system.

As far as we know, there are innumerable existences varying indefinitely in size, structure, behavior, vitality, mentality, and in many other ways. They are organized in more or less simple or complex ways, but always into unities. They seek satisfactions prompted by feelings and impulses, which serve to maintain and benefit the whole organism, whether the latter knows it or not. These satisfactions and the means to gratify them become clearly conscious in man; they are correlated on the basis of his mental unity, and he becomes self-conscious. He finds a high degree of satisfaction impossible except in association with his fellow men; but even here something is missing, and so he arrives at the conclusion that there must exist an all-comprehensive personality in whom alone he finds completion because it satisfies his demand for eternal and universal unity. By deliberately assuming relations to God, man connects himself with ultimate forces and secures his own immortality. This conception implies a self-imposed restriction of power on the part of God, so that he will not force any man into rela-

tions with Himself, while at the same time yearning for the assumption of conscious relations to Himself on the part of every person.

The unity of the divine and the human is, however, based on the deliberate action of God and man, each seeking the other. This implies ethical, not merely intellectual, relations. Hence, in striving for his own completion, man necessarily strives for the Good, and fulfills himself in the direction of his will. The *will* is not to be understood here in the sense in which Schopenhauer used the term, as a sort of universal and indefinite exercise of divine power of which the lower creatures do not know anything, as we have seen before; but in the sense of a call for mutual relations on the part of God and man. Only persons are able to assume such relations, since these are not instinctive but deliberate. The *will*, in this sense, is an ethical and not a mere intellectual aspect of consciousness; it implies mutual consent.

The exercise of man's will and intellect in seeking completion through the divine must necessarily produce joy and happiness, as every normal activity does. Growth, development, expansion of our personality are always accompanied with keen and permanent satisfactions. Seeking completion in the divine produces them to a greater extent than anything else can possibly do, just

because such a relation to God is the highest we know of, and because we are certain of the permanence of that relation. In its higher and purer aspects that relation is called Love.

Religion requires, consequently, the exercise of every aspect of our consciousness and benefits each one. Intellectual consent is not sufficient; mere conformity to the divine commands owing to fear and dread of God's power lacks spontaneity; the wallowing in emotions, as often happens with mystics, is ultimately only a form of cheap self-seeking, since it costs us nothing. "True religion and undefiled" means action—intellectual in seeking unity, volitional in conforming to God's will, emotional in enjoying what we do. A passive religion of resignation and mere sheeplike submission is not what God wants, since it is based on the conception of His omnipotence to the exclusion of His moral qualities. It is the old pagan doctrine of fear of a whimsical and arbitrary tyrant ruling over his people with an iron hand. The conception presented here is that of a deity who is moral as well as powerful and delights in the development of other personalities. This requires and produces joyful coöperation on our part and gives us a sense of worth and dignity, which nothing else can equal. It makes life a venture and gives zest to what we do. It helps us to overcome the

coward in every one of us, and turns faith into courage to believe that it is "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." Such a religion inspires a faith which is neither an addition to reason nor a substitute for it. "Faith is reason grown courageous, reason raised to its highest power, expanded to its widest vision."[12]

What such a world-view may be called matters little. Perhaps the name *theistic pluralism* might be given to this philosophy—if philosophy it be. Or, since the greatest stress has been placed on deliberate relations to God, the term *ethical monism* would do as well. Each of these names implies a plurality of permanent entities related to the one supreme personality.

7. *The Value of Personality.*—The attempt has been made in the preceding discussion to indicate what value we receive through our relation to God. Certain objections are raised to any permanent value of man. We know, of course, that in human history the one thing that has been of prime importance is personality. Men of insight and vision, of courage and good will, of aspiration and inspiration, have been the driving force in human affairs; they have raised mankind from the level of savagery where "man was wolf to man" to that of civilization where we make at least a pretense of being helpful to each other. It is these out-

standing persons who count chiefly as we look back upon the long course of history; lesser men have counted in the aggregate, although we know little about them. These aspects of history are of importance to the psychologist, the sociologist, the artist, and the theologian; and they cannot get along without them.

The astronomer and the geologist take a different view. To them human history is merely an incident, short at that, in a long cosmic evolution. When the astronomer deals in hundreds of light-years, the span of human history appears necessarily as a mere minute or second of time. And in the infinity of space which the light-years betray, our planet may appear but as the tiniest of tiny specks. Looking at man merely from the aspects of space and time, the scientist may be pardoned for thinking little of man. Nevertheless, he, as a human being, takes mighty good care that the scientist in him be not blotted out before his time is up; neither does he allow the scientist in him to interfere with his normal enjoyments, of which the measuring of stars is, after all, a subordinate part. Why not? Because he was a man many years before he became a scientist, and when his reasoning powers begin to fade, he may still enjoy life for a few years longer as a man. This may be an *argumentum ad hominem;* but it is useless to

talk about infinities of space and time, and we are certainly not interested in them as abstractions, but only in so far as they affect our present and future. The present is ours, and the immediate future is ours, too, since the astronomers have granted us a few million years' sunlight and warmth. It behooves us to act like men, even in the face of immediate catastrophes, not to mention far-distant ones. It is said "finally, that evolution itself is but a stage in the world-process to be succeeded by dissolution and the subsequent cooling of the earth and extinction of the sun itself. On the last point it may be replied that, if our views of the future of the solar system were as certain as they are in fact speculative, they might indeed affect our estimate of the relative value of different forms of human effort, but they would not destroy the basis of rational action. If we find ourselves in a sinking ship, we do not spend our last minutes, say, in studying the language of the country to which we are bound. This particular object has lost its value. But it remains worth while to maintain order, cheerfulness, and courage, and in a word to die like men. Similarly, if a geological cataclysm were anticipated, not within a million years, but within fifty, it would render nugatory all effort that could bear fruit only in the far future. Like any other condition of the environ-

ment, it would limit the possibilities of action and affect the direction of effort, but it would not impair the reasonableness of making life as good a thing as it could be made for the years remaining to the human race."[13]

Human personality may be destroyed, but while it lasts it is supreme over mere space and matter. Three illustrations may bring this point home. There is a story about R. W. Emerson that one day some pre-millenarians rushed through the streets of Concord, shouting, "The world is coming to an end!" They, on meeting him, directed the shouts to him. "Well, I am able to get along without it!" replied the sage, and passed quietly on. A somewhat similar event is told of Epictetus, the Roman philosopher. Some Christians, their faces suffused with fright, ran through the streets of Rome, shouting, "*Memento mori! Memento mori!*" "I know that I must die, and since I know it, why should I be a coward about it!" Perhaps nothing in history illustrates the power of man over his environment better than the death of Socrates. He was condemned to death, but allowed to see his friends. The cup of hemlock was discreetly placed in a corner by the jailer. Socrates discussed quietly all kinds of important matters with his friends. The idea of flight was suggested; preparations had been made, and the Athe-

nians would have been glad to get out of their predicament that easily. "Yes, but the laws of Athens must be obeyed!" replied the condemned philosopher. When he had nothing more to say to his friends, he looked for the cup, emptied it, and kept up conversation until he died. In the whole scene the one feature which stands out is the complete self-control of the man who faced death.

In an interesting as well as erudite book, Alfred Russell Wallace, the co-discoverer of the theory of evolution, speaks of the importance of man as compared with the material universe. The following quotation contains the gist of his opinion:[14]

"The other body (of scholars), and probably much the larger, would be represented by those who, holding that mind is essentially superior to matter and distinct from it, cannot believe that life, consciousness, mind, are products of matter. They hold that the marvelous complexity of forces which appear to control matter, if not actually to constitute it, are and must be mind-products; and when they see life and mind apparently arising out of matter and giving to its myriad forms an added complexity and unfathomable mystery, they see in this development an additional proof of the supremacy of mind. Such persons would be inclined to the belief of the great eighteenth-century

scholar, Dr. Bentley, that the soul of one virtuous man is of greater worth and excellency than the sun and all his planets and all the stars in the heavens; and when they are shown that there are strong reasons for thinking that man *is* the unique and supreme product of this vast universe, they will see no difficulty in going a little further and believing that the universe was actually brought into existence for this very purpose."

Only a few words need be said in conclusion. The attempt has been made to show how personality arises, what it is, and what value it has. Around this central theme hang all the philosophies and sciences. The philosopher wants to find out what it is, the scientist how to serve it. Ultimately even the latter has an interest in personality, since he searches the heavens and the earth and things under the earth to give us at least some new knowledge and thus to enlarge his and our personality. When the scientist turns philosopher—and he often is prompted to do so because he is a human being under his skin—he frequently reaches conclusions similar to those of religious thinkers. When, on the other hand, he fails to take account of his humanity and looks upon man merely as a fortuitous coincidence, we should realize that science occupies, after all, only one field of knowledge, and that men in other fields are en-

titled to a hearing, as we shall see in the next chapter.

[1] Professor Conklin refers here to physical, not mental likeness.

[2] E. D. Conklin, *Heredity and Environment in the Development of Men*, p. 213. 1915.

[3] William Forbes Cooley, *The Individual: A Metaphysical Inquiry*, p. 20. 1909.

[4] *Critique of the Judgment*, §§ 62-67, quoted by Cooley, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[5] *Conception of Immortality*, p. 8.

[6] *Principles of Biology*, i, p. 207.

[7] *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, p. 298.

[8] J. M. Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology; Feeling and Will*, p. 170.

[9] Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual*, vol. ii, p. 293.

[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 294.

[11] See the author's *Health and Social Progress*, chap. x, on this problem.

[12] L. P. Jacks, *Religious Perplexities*, p. 19. 1923.

[13] L. T. Hobhouse, *The Rational Good*, p. 231. 1921.

[14] *Man's Place in the Universe*, p. 315. 1903.

IV

The Nature of Art, Science, and Religion

1. *The Problem of Knowledge.*—Science has made such tremendous strides and has conferred so many benefits upon man, that its methods have been generally adopted in other fields of knowledge. To be considered unscientific is the one unpardonable sin among scholars today. Even the "man in the street" is able to appreciate the applications of science in the form of many inventions, and hastily jumps to the conclusion that any kind of knowledge, not arrived at by scientific methods, is for that very reason invalid. Science is, indeed, held in such high esteem that its statements are considered valid even outside its own particular field, and many men have turned from religion because they are asking for scientific proof where it can plainly not be furnished. A brief discussion of the relation of science to art and religion will, therefore, be necessary before we proceed.

Science proceeds by induction. It observes facts, classifies them, notices the differences and similarities between them, arrives at hypotheses which are

turned into theories if further observation and experimentation bear out the tentative conclusion. In these ways science has built up a structure of knowledge which is a monument to human ingenuity. The true scientist is, however, always aware of the fact that his conclusions are valid only as far as observation goes. A fact may be discovered tomorrow which will throw an entirely new light on his theory, and he will have to adjust it to the fact. Science is, thus, constantly restating its theories. These changes have been considered a reproach to science, but they should rather be considered its greatest glory, since the frank acceptance of facts and the willingness to adapt theories to them have been responsible for the rapid extension of our knowledge along many lines. The only exception to changes have been mathematical axioms which are true eternally and universally, since we cannot conceive of any conditions under which the sum of angles of a plane triangle can be greater or less than equal to two right angles.

Owing to its methods of observation and experimentation, science has, almost literally speaking, transformed modern life in many respects. Even the greatest scientist of a century ago would stand aghast if he could be resurrected and placed in one of our modern cities. And almost incredible patience and courage have often been exhibited by

scientists in the pursuit of some discoveries. The case of Charles Darwin is well known. For twenty years he labored by observing, comparing, reflecting; many a time he was discouraged by conflicting evidence, and frequently the vastness of the task undertaken seemed more than any one man could master. It is said that he examined about 22,000 species and specimens before he reached the one conclusion concerning the evolution of the species. More modern instances of similar endurance are not wanting. What is known now as "salvarsan" was originally called "606" by its discoverer, because 605 carefully planned experiments extending over years did not yield the desired result.

One of the most notable achievements in practical medicine was the announcement at the meeting of the American Medical Association in 1924 by Drs. George and Gladys Dick that they had discovered a serum against scarlet fever. Back of it were ten years of research carried on by these two physicians at the McCormick Institute for Infectious Diseases in Chicago. As early as 1796, when Jenner was making his fertile observations on smallpox, Erasmus Darwin exhorted the medical scientists of his day to make experiments with scarlet fever in the hope that the dreaded disease might eventually be controlled. Little could be done at the time, owing to a lack of knowledge

of bacteria. After Pasteur's many discoveries and Koch's elaboration of bacteriology, vast possibilities in the control of disease loomed up, and many forms of it were mastered. In 1885 Klein reported that he suspected the "streptococcus conglomeratus" as the cause of scarlet fever. Meanwhile the antitoxins for typhoid, diphtheria, and other diseases were discovered, but scarlet fever remained unconquerable. In 1914 Dr. George Dick took up the various hints which had been given by previous investigators. The details need not be recounted here, excepting the fact that forty-four different organisms were found in the throats of scarlet-fever patients. The problems were to find out which one of them was responsible for the disease, how to isolate it, and how to prepare an antitoxin which would be fully effective without injuring the patient. Volunteers were called for and they appeared. The long labor was at last crowned by success and a threefold discovery has been made—a test for susceptibility, a toxin to produce immunity by vaccination, and an antitoxin which may prove invaluable in the treatment of the disease. The laboratory has thus revealed a new secret of nature, and experimentation has made another contribution to human welfare.

The few discoverers mentioned have been referred to in order to show how slow and laborious

scientific investigations often are and how striking their results. It is small wonder that science is regarded by many people as the last word in every domain of human affairs, because it produces effects which are demonstrable even to the man of mere common sense. That is, however, one thing; it is quite another to take science as arbiter in every field of knowledge, or to consider it as having attained absolute certainty even in its own field when it passes beyond observation and experimentation. *Many things are knowable; few are demonstrable.* There is a great difference between knowability and demonstrability. Many men confuse or identify the two to the detriment of science on the one hand, and that of art and religion on the other. What we have to show now are the following points: (1) that there exists valid knowledge not obtained by scientific methods; (2) that science, when passing beyond immediate facts, becomes a philosophy and loses its attribute of precision; (3) that nonscientific knowledge is as valuable, if not more so, as scientific; (4) that religion, as far as knowledge is concerned, is intermediate between science and the arts. Only a brief discussion of each proposition is possible here.

2. *The Criterion of Objective or Positive Knowledge Is Communicability.* — The arts in their various forms—music, painting, sculpture,

poetry, literature, etc.—cannot be taught by scientific methods. The artist has a peculiar subjectivity which seeks expression along a certain line. The impelling force is often so strong that he forgets his surroundings and devotes himself to the release of the strains and stresses within his mind. This was the reason why he was looked upon as inspired or possessed by a spirit in the not long distant past. This does not mean that the artist was necessarily ignorant; he was, as a matter of fact, usually filled with the social spirit of his time, and became the spokesman of his contemporaries. But he never acquired his motives, his ability to express himself, and his visions by scientific methods. What made him the exponent of the aspirations of his time was a peculiar structure of his individuality. His uniqueness took the artistic turn, just as that of another man sought expression in business or statecraft. His type of mind was more subjective than objective; he could assimilate more of the spirit of his time and endow it with more life and beauty and significance than anyone else. This truth has long since been expressed in the statement that the poet is born, not made. Examples of men who became well-known artists without much training will readily suggest themselves. Of writers who have recently passed away, Jack London and Joseph Conrad are well

known. Conrad is very conspicuous because the medium of his art—the English language—was acquired only after he was full grown. And even then he had practically no school training; yet he mastered English as few natives of the Anglo-Saxon race with illustrious ancestry and excellent education have done, and, although born and reared in the hinterland, he depicted sea life with greater force and vividness than writers who were, so to say, born on the sea. Nothing but an inherent capacity could have enabled him to achieve so much, just as Shakespeare owed little to training, scientific or literary.

The objection will be raised that most of our modern artists have had training. There are schools for painters, sculptors, musicians, poets, dramatists, etc. These schools undoubtedly perform a useful function. But it is chiefly negative and time-saving. The student can be taught what to avoid so as to save time and energy; he may even learn a useful technique which will enable him to express himself better than he could without it. That is, however, all his masters can teach him. The vision, the aspiration, the peculiar mental attitude, the intense craving for expressing himself, are matters of individuality which cannot be reduced to rules of thumb. Thousands of students have attended various schools of art; a few

only have developed into artists. Why? Because these few had the peculiar mental structure which is called artistic capacity. If this ability was considerable, they did not follow the steps of their masters long, but discovered or invented new methods which suited their own particular individuality and unique talent. A course in dramatic composition has been given for a number of years in one of our foremost universities, and several hundred students have taken it. The "great American drama" has not yet appeared, notwithstanding the hundreds of plays written by members of the class. On the other hand, we hear at least occasionally of an untutored fellow from the provinces who has the knack of dramatic writing, making a success with a play. Such cases could be multiplied indefinitely, but they would prove only that art cannot be taught. A good craftsman may be developed by rules out of suitable material, occasionally a good dauber or rhymester, but never a high-class artist. Faultless diction may be taught; life and color, force and structure, must come from within.

These statements should not be understood to mean that artistic composition is something arbitrary; it certainly follows definite rules; but they are made by the artist himself. The art critics are the scientists of art, and they try to apply their

rule-of-thumb to any new production. When a man like Richard Wagner produces an opera in which he combines several arts, the critics howl him down and he has to flee the country. Years afterward, the critics realize that he who can create is greater than he who can apply hoary rules.

Various attempts have been made to reduce artistic composition to the underlying scientific principles. The best known is by the famous German physicist, H. Helmholtz,[1] in a book which attempts to furnish a physical and physiological basis for the theory of music. It is a large and learned book, which went through three editions in eight years. It explains exactly what different length of sound-waves and how many vibrations are necessary to produce tones of a certain quality and quantity, how to produce rhythm and certain effects. But he confesses at the end that the real difficulty of composition lies in the complexity of psychic motives, or, in plain language, in the peculiar mental structure of the composer. This statement applies not only to the composer, but to the listener, since he states expressly that the same tune may produce joy in one man and melancholy in another. At any rate, the world is still waiting for the man who has, after mastering the many complex algebraic formulæ of the book, suc-

ceeded in turning out a piece of music worth hearing. Briefly, the fine arts cannot be taught.

Science can be taught. It follows a certain method. Any man of good intelligence can master the method and attain the same results as the scientist. This is strikingly illustrated by the numerous amateurs, often mere boys, who have built radio sets for their own use and are communicating with far-away places. What was an exceptional feat in 1910 had become a commonplace in 1924. Even in the higher realms of science, such as those of salvarsan and the discovery of the serum against scarlet fever, it is chiefly a matter of following a method and trying again and again. The method of trial and error or the process of elimination is the principal feature. Hence it has often happened that the inventor of a method has set a young but trained man to work on a problem which the latter solved, although he had no conspicuous ability. The typhus germ was discovered in May, 1914, by a young man, Dr. Harry Klotz, by following the method devised by Dr. Koch of Berlin years before, and Dr. Dick applied the same features in his search for the specific germ of scarlet fever. This practice has now become so common that it has been commercialized by large manufacturers who engage well-trained chemists, physicists, and physiologists at good salaries in the

expectation that they will discover or invent something useful, and their expectation is usually realized. The standardization of the methods of science is so well established that the late Lester F. Ward — scientist and sociologist — proposed as early as 1903 the teaching of the principles of invention in special schools.

This emphasis and dependence on method may be illustrated in another way. Science moves, so to say, by broad frontal attacks, with a far-flung battle line in which every soldier is aware of the objective and conversant with the means of conquering it. Hence the at least occasional simultaneous, but independent, discovery of new principles by different investigators—*e.g.*, the differential calculus by Newton and Leibnitz. Science has little respect for the knight errant. The best known modern case is that of Johann Gregor Mendel, who began some investigations into heredity in 1858. For eight years he experimented, and finally submitted his results to the most celebrated naturalist of the University of Vienna, who failed to see the significance of the discovery. Mendel succeeded in getting his paper printed in the *Proceedings* of the obscure scientific society of Brünn in 1866, where it rested unknown for thirty-four years. By 1900 biology had advanced sufficiently to be confronted with the problem which Mendel

had solved. It was attacked all along the line, with the result that three men—DeVries in Holland, Correns in Germany, and Tschermak in Austria—discovered the theory of mutations simultaneously but independently in that year. It gratifies our sense of poetic justice that today the rediscovered law bears the name of the original discoverer and is known as Mendelism.

These statements are not intended to detract from the glory of science. A great scientist often needs as much creative power and truly artistic imagination as the poet or the painter. The only purpose of this brief discussion is to show that valuable knowledge may be obtained without the employment of scientific methods. To put the difference briefly: In art, technique is individual; in science, it is general; or, in art native endowment counts most; in science training predominates. If two or more artists treat the same subject, the product is and should be different; if two or more scientists try to solve the same problem, the solution is and must be the same.

3. *Science, When Passing Beyond Facts, Becomes a Philosophy and Loses the Quality of Certainty.*—A few statements have been made to prove the wonderful changes which science has produced in modern life. Science, by sticking to facts or phenomena, has, moreover, acquired a

degree of certitude which is rare in other fields of knowledge. We should notice, however, that accuracy and exactness are in a constantly decreasing ratio as science proceeds from the simple to the complex or from the inorganic to the organic. The general hierarchy of the sciences as arranged by Auguste Comte nearly a century ago, still holds, with but few modifications. He placed mathematics at the head as the most exact science; next in order of exactness come astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology. Comte was right in declaring that this ascending series presented an increasingly greater complexity and utility, but for that very reason a lesser exactness. Why should that be so? In mathematics all the factors to be considered are under the control of reason, and all the mathematician has to do is to apply the rules of logic to his material. When the astronomer applies these rules to inert matter, he cannot be as certain of their validity, even though the relations between different kinds of matter are comparatively few and simple, because the stars are out there in space and not under his control. Yet, he makes comparatively few mistakes, since he still employs chiefly mathematical formulæ. The physicist, in applying these rules to definite parts of matter, as is done in mechanics, has a reasonable certainty that a steel beam, for

instance, put in a bridge, will support a certain weight; but he allows a margin of safety by making it stronger than need be, since, notwithstanding all his tests, he can never be absolutely sure that it has the requisite strength. Inorganic chemistry deals with few and simple relations, and its calculations are generally correct. Organic chemistry deals with much more complicated matter, and is less exact; it has, for instance, never succeeded in fully analyzing an organic substance so as to create a living cell by synthesis. There is the artificial egg with all its nutritive qualities, but it will not hatch. Whether this failure is due to incomplete analysis or to inability to find that subtle and intangible something called life, does not concern us. Biology deals with the combination of hundreds and thousands of living cells organized into a unity, and is necessarily less exact. The theory of evolution is still far from a full explanation of all the details; even in its general outlines it is a statement of fact that the fittest survive, rather than a clear evidence of causation. This theory is, as a matter of fact, a philosophical hypothesis and not a scientific law like that of gravitation. Psychology deals with infinitely more complex material, since psychic phenomena are added to those of physiology, and the constant shifting of emphasis, now on the outside stimuli and then

on the inner, is sufficient proof that it has not yet found a firm basis. The present generation has witnessed a transition from experimental to physiological and finally to behavioristic psychology. Sociology has made brave attempts to adopt scientific methods, and has succeeded in producing many useful theories; but the more intelligent sociologists realize that the extremely complicated material which they have to handle will keep them for a long time in the realm of hypotheses and conjectures.

Two remarks will be in place here to prevent misunderstanding. The statements just made are not derogatory to science; they are simply a statement of the *status quo*. The younger sciences—*e.g.*, biology and psychology—may justly plead that, if given more time, they will be able to clear up many lacunæ in their fields and establish a coherent system of knowledge. Let us hope that they will succeed. In the meanwhile they have no right to try to make us believe that all phenomena still to be discovered will necessarily fall under the sway of the few principles already established. To say that such phenomena will either fall under the category of already known laws or fail to be recognized, is a presumption assuming that no further extension of scientific method is possible. The second remark concerns predicta-

bility. In the mathematical and allied sciences prediction is possible owing to the simplicity and regularity of the phenomena. In biology and psychology that is impossible. The same stimulus will produce different responses in different individuals. The "association tests" are comparatively simple. Yet, the word "table," for instance, will suggest *eating* to one person, *wood* to another, *writing* to a third, *card-playing* to a fourth, etc. Prediction of response is simply impossible even with a simple stimulus. The fact that maybe seventy-five per cent out of a thousand or a million individuals associate table with eating may warrant the conclusion that the mythical average man thinks of eating when table is mentioned. Unfortunately, social life is made up of concrete individuals, and what we need to know is what the particular man before us will do under specific circumstances. The innumerable psychological tests give and can give no answer to that question, and the millions of experiments in psychological laboratories have only confirmed what was known long before, namely, that on the basis of our generic nature, men are bound to react similarly, although not identically, to the same stimulus, as shown in Chapter III. This means that psychology may be a science with hypothetical or average persons living under assumed ideal conditions; but in deal-

ing with men and women as they are, it is an art, and comes as such under the peculiar mental structure of the artist discussed before.

When we speak, then, of science we should be careful to specify which kind we have in mind, an exact science or one dealing with possibilities and probabilities. The difference is considerable. When the physicist tells me that the law of gravitation applies to saint and sinner alike, I will avoid stepping over the precipice and not trust in my guardian angel to work a miracle in my behalf. When the psychologist tells me that a hysterical wife can be calmed with a box of candy, and I keep one ready for emergencies, only to be met with the indignant cry: "Oh! candy! How I hate it! I want a new hat!" I realize that he may possibly know what his wife wanted on one occasion, but he certainly does not know much about mine. Again, when he tells me that all he needs to assume is a "stream of consciousness and stimulation and response" to account for the behavior of men and women, I begin to wonder why that same entity reacts so very differently to even ordinary situations, let alone unusual ones. Then the suspicion dawns on me that a branch of knowledge which has to grant an exception in nearly every case when its rules are applied is not a science, in spite of the large literature which has been accumulated

under that title. The only law which really holds as we pass from mathematics through the various sciences is that of inverse or diminishing accuracy.

Let us go back, though, to the exact sciences for a moment. The laws of physics, chemistry, and astronomy are demonstrable; at least they *work*, in the language of pragmatism. But when the students in these respective fields of knowledge try to go beyond the demonstrable, they do not even have the knowable, such as the artist has; they simply speculate. Two quotations will make this clear. In the preface to the *Principles of Science* Professor Jevons says:

"I fear that I have very imperfectly succeeded in expressing my strong conviction that before a rigorous logical scrutiny the Reign of Law will prove to be an unverified hypothesis, the Uniformity of Nature an ambiguous expression, the certainty of our scientific inferences to a great extent a delusion. The value of science is, of course, very high, while the conclusions are kept well within the limits of the data on which they are founded, but it is pointed out that our experience is of the most limited character compared with what there is to learn, while our mental powers seem to fall infinitely short of the task of comprehending and explaining fully the nature of any one object. I draw the conclusion that we must interpret the re-

sults of Scientific Method in an affirmative sense only. Ours must be a truly positive philosophy, not that false negative philosophy which, building on a few material facts, presumes to assert that it has compassed the bounds of existence, while it nevertheless ignores the most unquestionable phenomena of the human mind and feelings."[2]

"The truths of science are admirable and quite real, but there is nothing ultimate about them. They are stages on the road toward achievement—a difficult and infinite road. Science aims at reality; it is an ambitious quest, for absolute reality can hardly be knowable by us; but we aim at it and get towards it by steps. The intermediate steps, however, are likely to be imperfect, and at the best they are but steps. They may in themselves be less satisfactory than the stages or landings from which they lead up."[3]

We find, then, that science loses accuracy in proportion as it changes from the manipulation of simple phenomena to that of the more complex. The question whether scientific knowledge is the most valuable, must be answered next.

4. *The Value of Nonscientific Knowledge.*—We have pointed out what the term "nonscientific" means, *viz.*, that kind of knowledge which cannot be readily communicated because it is largely subjective—*e.g.*, in the various arts. What

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is the value of such knowledge? Opinions must necessarily differ on this point, and the point of view is determined chiefly by one's attitude toward life and the world. Any argument for one view or the other is purely relative and will have weight in proportion to a man's predilections. We meet here a similar situation to that of pessimism and optimism. You cannot convince a man whose life is one continuous series of failure, misery, and poor health, that there is more joy in the world than sorrow; that may be true in a general way, but it is not true in his case; and he will necessarily apply his own standard in the discussion. *Per contra*, a young, vigorous, successful person to whom merely to breathe is a pleasure is not likely to be persuaded that life is a vale of tears, which he must leave as quickly as possible. Abstract arguments will make no appeal in either case, because the matter is settled by one's personal attitude. Similarly, whether scientific or artistic knowledge is more valuable cannot be settled by *a priori* or *a posteriori* argument. It is a matter chiefly of the *zeitgeist* or social atmosphere. We meet with a strange paradox here.

In the past, when the world was poor in economic goods, many artistic goods were produced; now, when the world is rich in economic goods, there seems to be little demand for the fine arts.

The people of the past realized perhaps that the conquest of nature was impossible for them, and they sought compensation in the enrichment of their lives by cultivating the arts; while we, in extending our power over nature by new conquests, are satisfied to consume the artistic goods of the past. Our literature, pictures, statues, morality, political and social conceptions, are largely inherited from the past; we have changed them only as new economic developments have compelled us to adapt them to our own conditions.

The problem of the greater importance of scientific knowledge, compared with artistic, is one of values. This term—to be more fully discussed later—needs for the present to be understood only in two ways: the enrichment of personality on the one hand, and power over nature on the other. By enrichment of personality or the augmentation of life we mean appreciation of the beautiful in its different forms, the increase in the sentiments of good will, the satisfaction which comes from the development of one's capacity. By power over nature we mean the ability to acquire economic goods of different kinds—*e.g.*, choice food, clothes, well-furnished houses, travel, and plenty of leisure. It is the difference between internal and external goods. An illustration will make the case clearer than a long discussion.

Here is a teacher. His salary just suffices to enable him to have a suitable house in a respectable neighborhood, to buy proper food and clothes for his family of four, to provide books not only of a professional character but of literary merit, to enjoy an occasional visit to the concert or to the theater, to educate his children, and to live fairly comfortably in every way. He is loved by many people and respected by all.

It is a Sunday afternoon. He has been to church, taught a class in Sunday school, and is enjoying the leisure with his family on the front porch, since he is unable to buy an automobile. That does not trouble him much because he lives a rich and a full life. As he glances at the passing automobiles, a plumber and family pass by in an expensive machine, waving their hands in friendly greeting. The teacher has just paid him a bill which should have been fifty per cent lower, so the plumber is naturally well disposed toward him. But otherwise the plumber, while a good man in his way, lacks culture and lays stress on the things which money can buy. He controls nature—by proxy, to be sure—because modern industrialism gives him the power to exploit his fellow men. The teacher's face is clouded for a moment; then he turns to his wife with a laugh: "Well, what's next?" She joins in it, saying, "How much richer

we are, after all, than that fellow!" They have something which no money can buy, since culture and happiness are products of constant exertion and development. The plumber is poor because all his enjoyments have to be paid for in cash.

This contrast between the value of science and the arts is, of course, not perennial; it happens that at the present, which is a period of transition, the emphasis is placed on scientific knowledge. To a full civilization both are indispensable, since each meets a need for a fuller life.

"We are bound to give the reason and the understanding full sway in their own proper fields. In subduing and in utilizing this world, or adjusting ourselves to it, we have no guide but science. Yet science is not the main part of life, notwithstanding all the noise it is making in the world. Science is making a great noise in the world because it is doing a great work. Literature, art, religion, speculation, have had their day; that is, the highest achievements of which they are capable are undoubtedly of the past. But science is young; it is now probably only in the heat of its forenoon work. It is a little curious that man's knowing facilities, the first to be appealed to, should be the latest in maturing; that he should worship so profoundly, admire so justly, act so wisely and heroically, while he yet knew so little accurately of the

world in which he was placed. Does not this fact point to the conclusion that science is not the main part of life?"[4]

"How little, how restricted, seem the explanations of the mechanist-biologists and the behavioristic psychologists of some of the simpler phases of human physiology and psychology, in the face of the glorified capacities of mankind in the fields of societal organization, of art and literature and mathematics and logic and religion! It is in the realm of what science doesn't know that lie all these human capacities which really distinguish and define the very thing that humanness is. It is not being a vertebrate and a mammal and a primate; it is not his zoölogical characteristics and classification, known to science, that define man—they tell where he came from and who or what are his animal cousins—but it is his attributes that science doesn't know about that really make man man."[4a]

The discussion of the problem of knowledge started with the statement that many things were knowable but few were demonstrable. On this basis we have tried to show that knowledge of the arts is not demonstrable in the scientific sense, that science becomes speculative when it passes beyond phenomena, and that knowledge obtained by nonscientific means is as valuable as that ac-

quired by scientific methods. Let us now see what bearing this has on religion, or rather on the problem of making a fuller personality.

5. *Religion Occupies, as Far as Knowledge Is Concerned, an Intermediate Position between Science and the Arts.*—In the second chapter the desire for completion was given as the specific motive of religion, and in the third chapter this motive was seen to express itself in the deliberate assumption of definite relations to God. This turning of the mind toward the divine can plainly have only one purpose—the attainment of a richer and more complete life. Every religion has attempted to minister to that, most of all that of Jesus. The general consensus on this matter seems to settle one of the long outstanding discussions, *viz.*, whether religion is a life or a dogma. In the age of Rationalism during the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth, the intellectual aspect of religion was inevitably stressed too much, and dogma came to the front. This was an almost necessary reaction against the unenlightened Pietism of Francke and Spener. Neither of these movements proved satisfactory, because pietism laid too much emphasis on the emotions, and rationalism too much on the intellect. An adjustment had to be made between the two, and the pendulum swung to another extreme by overemphasizing

the will through the so-called social work of the later nineteenth century. The advance of science, especially the emphasis on physiological psychology, within the last half century has brought the problem of knowledge again to the fore.

This pressure from without has always been met by one from within, since Christianity, like any other religion, had to justify itself not only against attacks from enemies, but to its own adherents. It had to be a philosophy of life, since man absolutely needs one; and it had to adjust itself to the prevailing tendency of the time in each period of history. These changes do not concern us here, since our problem is that of finding a theoretical basis for religion. The argument under the preceding sections has furnished a clue.

Religion is a life—a new and richer life. Hence religion, at least Christianity, cannot be produced by teaching—that is, the mere communication of knowledge. It has to spring from another life; it has to be generated out of a certain atmosphere which surrounds every truly religious person. The halo in pictures of the saints is a symbolic expression of this fact. It is something intangible to the mere intellect, just as "the peace of God passeth understanding." Yet, it is there with all its warmth and kindness, its aspiration and "other-worldliness." The closest logical analysis cannot

dissolve it into its parts just as physical life cannot be dissolved into its component parts, although we do know the chemical elements which are necessary for its maintenance. It is like the musical composition which may be analyzed as so many vibrations of such lengths or such a *timbre*, but—the melody is gone. It is not the mere summation of its parts; it is a whole because it is the creation of a mind which is a unity. So is spiritual life. It must come from a person who has that life, and be passed on to other persons. The "laying on of hands" in ordination and confirmation, and the figure of Ritschl that Christians are torch bearers handing down the light and life from one generation to another, are symbols of this idea. The great number and variety of symbols employed by the more advanced religions are plain indications of the inability to express the life within by intellectual terms. We moderns may rationalize these symbols, but the mystery still remains. Take a Gothic cathedral as an illustration. It is one thing for a preacher to say in a building which resembles a square box, "Lift up your hearts." It is a very different thing to say those words in a building where every line and combination of lines point upward. You have in the one case the words; you have the words plus an impressive symbol in the other. The effect must necessarily be different,

since there is a double appeal in the latter case. Do what we may, we can never express religious life fully in terms of the intellect, just as art cannot be expressed that way.

These statements simply refer to a fact which has long since been obvious—*i.e.*, the inner unity of the religious life in different denominations and even religions. The disagreements between religious organizations are based principally on differences in philosophy—*i.e.*, theology and ecclesiastical policy—devised by the reason; the agreements are based on the universal desire of all religious people to amplify and complete their lives. So the Roman Catholic will joyfully sing the hymn of the Unitarian, and the Unitarian will do the same with the hymn of the Roman Catholic, since both "Nearer, My God, to Thee" and "Lead, Kindly Light" express that universal longing of man's mind for union with the divine. Theologically, the authors of these two hymns were far apart; they were in harmony concerning the real meaning of religion. The time may not be far when some of the hymns of ancient Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, and India will be used in Christian churches after having been stripped of their pagan philosophy. We have already adapted and outright adopted many ethical teachings of non-Christians, especially of the Greeks, and we may profit

perhaps from the devotional attitude of other peoples of antiquity.

Is religion, then, irrational? Is it super-rational? It is neither. It is simply the manifestation of the deepest and most permanent longing of the human heart; it always comes *de profundis* when it is genuine. That is the very reason, though, why it wants to reach the heights. But the heights can be reached only in two ways—by mysticism and by philosophy. The former abandons reason and becomes ineffective; the latter overemphasizes reason and discredits religion by attempting to make it a matter of the intellect only and to explain what defies explanation. We have to come back, then, to our proposition that religion stands midway between the arts and sciences as far as knowledge is concerned.

Proof has already been given in this discussion that certain aspects of art, especially the creative aspect, cannot be explained scientifically, and that science must keep within certain limits if it does not wish to leave the realm of the demonstrable. Religion lies midway between the two. It cannot be taught, like physics or chemistry, to any intelligent person and at once meet with unanimous consent. When science keeps within the limits of the demonstrable, it deals with *thought-necessities* which any sane man has to accept or lose life and

reason. Religion cannot produce as cogent arguments for its theories through its theology, because it always must point toward the heights, and these are inaccessible, owing to the fact that our knowledge can never be complete. Christianity, and other religions to a lesser extent, may, however, justly point to certain products of its teaching, or rather fruits of its life. Only a few of these need be mentioned.

We have, to begin with, the fact that the people of Israel had a remarkably high morality compared with their contemporaries—*e.g.*, the family life was comparatively pure; slavery was benevolent and never considerable in extent; the conception of God was high and lofty; political life previous to Solomon was free; the prophets preached high ethical and spiritual ideals. We have, in Christianity, the proclamation of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man long before political democracy was discovered, the higher estimation of human life and the more favorable position of woman, the extensive charities, the greater security of life and property, the truly Christ-like lives of many men and women. The opponent may, of course, resort to the argument that all these things are the products of civilization, of which religion itself is one. The discussion may thus go to and fro without hope of an

agreement being reached. We must, therefore, approach the problem from a different angle—that of values.

We defined religion as a search for completion through powers with whom man cannot deal by ordinary means (Chapter II, 3). We added in the third chapter that the individual becomes a person by deliberately assuming relations to God. Why should that be? Man plainly values himself, else he would not try to call in forces which he cannot control by the ordinary means at his disposal; neither would he go to the trouble—and often very great trouble, at that—of assuming relations to God. On this basis of valuing himself, man has, in the course of time, built up many other values. Those of science belong here, since every new tool or method which he invented or discovered to make life easier, was greatly appreciated. Artistic values were added to those of science, for as he gradually increased his power to present the ideal by word or picture, his delight became greater. And so he acquired social, political, and economic values. But underlying these various kinds of values, and more highly esteemed than any, were those connected with religion. The reason for this is obvious.

A thing is prized in proportion to its rarity and to its real or alleged power. The gods of

antiquity and of primitive times were sufficiently numerous—there were some 60,000 major and minor deities among the Assyro-Babylonians alone —to rule out the element of scarcity; hence that of power alone remains to be considered. We have seen that man even in primitive times could deal with everyday occurrences fairly adequately for his limited purposes, and hence his valuation of his own achievements was most likely to be moderate, simply because after, *e.g.*, one flint had been sharpened, hundreds of others would be subjected to the same process. It is the same way with us; in 1900 the owner of an automobile was envied as a very rich man; nowadays many people believe that it is more of a nuisance than a blessing. There were, however, powers with whom man never knew exactly how to deal; they might bless you today and slay you tomorrow; they might crown your efforts with a rich harvest or make them of no avail. Hence valuations arising out of religion, were underlying all others. And they were for that very reason more precious. If you have succeeded in bending an extraordinary power to your will, you feel naturally more elated than in achieving something which everybody else will be able to do sooner or later. But, we have spoken of values as if they already existed. It

may be necessary to show how they came into existence.

Just put yourself in the place of primitive man for a moment. You were able to do the ordinary things of life with a fair degree of success. If you hit upon something new either accidentally or intentionally, your fellows could repeat the performance after you had shown them how the trick was turned. At any rate, the new knowledge was always connected with the old, and the law of cause and effect was conceived in a crude way. That could never happen in your dealing with the unseen powers. Their behavior was whimsical and their treatment of you arbitrary. Success in dealing with them was always doubtful. But doubt has ever been the father of speculation. You wanted a certain thing, and you would naturally begin to cast about for ways and means to get it. Your ordinary methods of getting it had been exhausted. So what were you going to do? Think and speculate how to bend those unseen powers to your will. You might fail repeatedly, but you valued your life too highly not to try again. Uncertainty would simply spur you on to new efforts. It was this doubt and this uncertainty which became the means of developing man's intelligence.

The Darwinians tell us that man developed in response to changes in the environment. He un-

doubtedly did. Those changes happened, however, not frequently enough and were rarely of a sufficiently radical character to serve as stimuli for development. If they were radical, only those men survived them who had employed their limited mentality in speculation in response to inner needs and stimuli during the intervals. Hundreds of races have perished, because for one reason or another the zest of life was not strong in them; they vegetated and adapted themselves to the environment as it was, and when a change came they had no resources to meet it. Those men, on the other hand, who *wanted* something and exerted themselves to get it, developed versatility and resourcefulness to meet the new situation. One of the strongest motives for this development was the uncertainty in man's dealing with the unseen powers. Three most important results followed from it—the feeling of *ought*, the extension of the power of the deity, and the ascription of divine attributes to men who had rendered signal services to man in spheres where he had felt himself competent up to that time.

After a number of successes and failures in his relations to the deity, man eventually thought out a method which appeared to him successful. Owing to his capacity to form abstract ideas or general notions in a crude way, he soon learned that

certain actions were usually followed by success and others by failure. Hence the idea arose in his mind that certain things should be done, others should not. Gradually, by means of the power of re-presenting many absent situations, the idea of the *ought* was formed. The *ideal* in its simplest form was born.

Sociologists are inclined to attribute the origin of this idea to what was socially injurious. They base their argument on the fact that most of the primitive laws are put in the negative form, and that the "don'ts" still predominate in modern legislation and ethics. This contention is entirely true as far as it goes. They overlook, though, two important facts. The first is that men could not always live in a negative sphere, so to say; they had to live by affirmatives; and the ideal of serving the deity and making it that way subservient to one's own will met that purpose much better, since the deity—whatever its character might be—not only forbade certain things, but demanded many things to be done as a price for its aid. Man had thus a much larger scope for his activity and many more incentives for thinking and acting. The sociologists overlook, in the second place, the important fact that the most simple and smallest social organizations of which we know have some sort of religion which dominates not only their

religious and moral relations, but their whole life. In other words, the idea of blood kinship, the earliest social bond of which we know, was religious in character and became the means of the formation of that small group, not *vice versa*. The family in its simplest form of "temporary pairing" must already have had some crude religious ideas, if we are to credit its members with any intelligence at all; these were then extended to the horde, but never originated by it. Some of the earliest religious practices center around the totem and the taboo, which get their significance from the claim that man has descended from some animal or plant.

The extension of the power of the deity was the other result of this uncertainty in dealing with the unseen powers. If certain activities of man depended for their success on the deity, the question would soon arise: Why should the god be competent only in great affairs, and not in little ones? Man must often have failed even in undertakings in which he was fairly competent. He had already formed the habit of looking to a deity in extraordinary cases. It was inevitable that he should infer sooner or later that his failure in smaller affairs was due to the withholding of divine favor. It must have taken man a comparatively short time to reach the conclusion that *all*

things depended for their success or failure on the deity. The whole of life was thus put under divine auspices. The story of Jacob with his cunning, his successes, his failures, and finally the abject surrender of his whole life, gives an interesting illustration of this transition.

The third result is illustrated by the frequent raising to the rank of demigods of persons who had rendered some conspicuous service to man. Hercules and Prometheus are among the best known cases, but all peoples of antiquity resorted to the same practice. The idea underlying it was that only persons whose ability was at least somewhat higher than the ordinary man's could perform these feats, and deification after death was the inevitable result. A new philosophy of life was thus born.

Doubt and uncertainty were not removed, though, by these steps; they became rather intensified. For, in the course of time, a small group of men would, with their god, be assimilated with another group of men and later with still another; none of these constituent elements of the larger group thus formed would be willing to give up its god; the result would be a plurality of gods. The composite totems are a proof of this statement. There was another reason for the multiplication of deities. Specialization took place among

the gods on the basis partly of the amalgamation of smaller groups into larger ones, partly on that of an alleged inability of one deity to look after every aspect of a large group, notwithstanding the extension of its power already referred to. It was too much of a strain on man's imagination to believe that all things could be managed by one deity. A division of labor took place according to locality, occupation, etc. This only increased uncertainty, since every man had to deal now with a number of deities, and he must try to please all of them. Hence speculation received a new impetus, and he was obliged to devise ways and means to please each. The numerous results of this step will be discussed in the sixth chapter.

Practically all nations of antiquity were in this particular stage of development when they appeared on the stage of history. Now, one of the remarkable things that have always been noted is the very high development of the arts at this stage of civilization. Speculation took the form of praising and imploring the gods by singing and depicting their deeds. The Greeks furnish a good illustration. The Odyssey, the Iliad, the great tragedies of Sophocles and Æschylus, deal with the gods rather than with men. Their sculpture depicts chiefly the deities who were influencing life in some way. The same situation is found in the

literature of the ancient Hindus, the Norsemen, the Finns, and the Chinese. May this high development not be due to the fact that man's speculation sought this particular form of expression because he was puzzled about his deities, and, in his anxiety to please all the gods, concentrated his efforts on what he considered to be acceptable to them? Men always render their best services where their greatest interest lies. It was art in praise of the gods during antiquity; it was scholasticism in defense of God during the Middle Ages; it is today —let us hope—wealth in the service of man.

This excursus into the origin of values was necessary to show why originally there were two principles of valuation, and how they were combined into one later. Religion has, thus, been the means to aid man in the development of values. The opposite movement, in the direction of decentralization, has taken place within later historic times, especially the last three centuries, and need not be discussed here. It was inevitable that this movement should be opposed by the ecclesiastical organizations, since no man willingly gives up power which he has wielded for a long time, and priests have always been human, sometimes too much so. Needless to say that we have returned to the original situation which implied two sources for the formation of values, one religious, the other

scientific in the general sense of man doing things for himself. But the situation is changing again; it is science now which tries to crowd out religion, just as during the Middle Ages religion tried to keep science down. This zigzag movement has always been going on underneath, but only the more striking advances of one or the other have become known in history. Just now science is in the lead, and one of the most important points at issue is that of values.

Value

What do we mean by value? Briefly, it means identity of repeated experiences. Isolated experiences, occurring only once, have no value because they cannot be identified and are forgotten.

"Every instant of our experience is in itself without any value; it is just a flash of life, a momentary thrill of consciousness. If life were nothing but such a momentary flash, if no instant referred beyond itself, if no content remained beyond the flying experience, life would have no meaning and we should have nothing which we might call a world. To hold this experience when a new pulse beat of life comes with its new situation and its new needs, and to find in it once more the identical content, is the one fundamental demand which liberates us from the flashlike character of life. We seek the identical content once more, and if we find it we have a bit of a world.

And because to have a world means thus to secure in the new experience identical content with the old, such a world gives us exactly that which we have recognized as the condition for every satisfaction; that means, it is valuable. In short, whatever secures us a world—that is, whatever allows us to transcend the isolated flashlike experience, must be valuable to us." [5]

Without going into details, we may state that in the course of history man has, according to Professor Münsterberg, developed three kinds of values: (a) Those dealing with the sequence of events in space and time and referring to existence; these are grasped by our knowledge, chiefly science. (b) Those dealing with the agreement of the manifold in unity and referring to the æsthetic; these are reached by devotion. (c) Those dealing with self-realization through development and achievement and referring to morality; these demand our esteem. Between the three kinds of value there is more or less of a conflict, and our "world" would still be incomplete if they could not be harmonized. This harmonization takes place by means of the metaphysical values of religion and philosophy. Religion belongs to the immediate values of life and reaches a harmonization without conscious or systematic knowledge of the ultimate purpose by following the feelings and emotions. Philoso-

phy is the conscious and deliberate effort made toward the attainment of unity.[6]

The extensive investigation of values, by Professor Münsterberg, tallies in a general way with what we have stated previously, and we may proceed with the argument. The danger at the present time is that purely cognitive or scientific values are overrated; the demonstrable, according to the general trend of science, is held to be the only tenable in theory or to constitute valid knowledge. That is obviously untrue, as has already been shown. When the scientist passes beyond the demonstrable he becomes a philosopher; his unity of the universe, his finiteness or infinity of space, his point moving along a perfectly straight line toward the west through infinite space coming back to the same point—are hypotheses which may be parts of knowledge, but certainly not of demonstrable knowledge. There are, in other words, values besides those of science, and we have a perfect right to hold on to them. The philosopher and the theologian have the duty as well as the privilege to investigate phenomena within their own sphere, and to supplement their knowledge derived from them by hypotheses so as to satisfy that craving for unity and completion which every normal being has. This procedure is truly scientific.

"Among the most unquestionable rules of scientific method is that first law *whatever phenomenon is*, is. We must ignore no existence whatever; we may variously interpret or explain its meaning and origin, but, if a phenomenon does exist, it demands some kind of explanation. If then there is to be competition for scientific recognition, the world without us must yield to the undoubted existence of the spirit within. Our own hopes and wishes and determinations are the most undoubted phenomena within the sphere of consciousness. If men do not act, feel, and live as if they were not merely the brief products of a casual conjunction of atoms, but the instruments of a far-reaching purpose, are we to record all other phenomena and pass over these? We investigate the instincts of the ant and the bee and the beaver, and discover that they are led by an inscrutable agency to work toward a distant purpose. Let us be faithful to our scientific method, and investigate also those instincts of the human mind by which man is led as if the approval of a Higher Being were the aim of life."[7]

These inner facts of life cannot be investigated by the crude methods of demonstrable science; they cannot be weighed, measured, or compounded in the laboratory; neither can they be dissolved into so many simple and compound physiological

reactions. "If theology is ever to find out," writes a psychologist,[8] "what beliefs work best towards self-realization and happiness, it will have to deal with inner experience according to the best scientific methods. Until it does so, it cannot make any claim to serious consideration. And when it does so, it will have become a branch of psychology." Precisely so, "the best scientific methods." These still have to be discovered; they are not, at any rate, in the possession of the crude experimentalist. Meanwhile, another psychologist asks:

"But is it possible that physics and psychology are ever the last word for the thinking spirit? Can we ever acknowledge the world which is conceived as mere nature, as a totality in which our real life is moving? Yes, would it even be possible to have the science of physics and the science of psychology, as such, if the physical universe and the psychical content of consciousness were the totality of the real—that is, if there were only objects for a passive spectator? Are not these judgments of the physicist and psychologist themselves demonstration of the one-sidedness of such an aspect?"[9]

And, in summing up his whole book, Münsterberg answers his own questions:

"That this over-self (God) is real, and that its will really and unchangeably binds our world of values, and that our loyal life is therefore end-

lessly valuable, no knowledge can teach us. No knowledge could be sufficient. This certainty is founded on the rock of conviction, and on conviction, therefore, is based every value of truth, of unity, of realization, of completion. But this conviction itself is ultimately our own deed. We cannot leave this deed undone unless we are to sacrifice ourselves, as only through this deed our total world of willing is formed into a unity. But it remains our own deed. In the will toward the unity of our own willing the world-deed is closed, in which every demand is satisfied, every question answered, every striving fulfilled. To be faithful to ourselves in eternity—in such a deed all values of the world are safely harbored." [10]

The scientist has to assume knowledge beyond the demonstrable; otherwise his whole system would fall to pieces. If religion is, as we have insisted, a life and not a dogma, the professional theorist of this life—*i.e.*, the theologian—need not concern himself as much about erecting an impregnable fortress of demonstrable knowledge as he has done in the past. Life somehow always takes care of itself; spiritual life certainly does. The question is, whether the claim to intimacy with omniscience which some theologians have made has not done more harm than good? As the principal of Manchester College, England, puts it: "Reli-

gion is one of those high things, and there are many such in life, which lose their meaning when they are overdefended or overexplained. In explaining them we are apt to explain them away, and without being aware that we are doing so. Whenever the truths of religion are too much defended they are cheapened; and when cheapened they become incredible. Like the love of a man and a woman, or the belief we have in the loyalty of our dearest friends, or the joy we feel in the presence of beauty, or the grief of a broken heart, they resent being made into mere topics for discussion. For this reason religion has suffered as much from its would-be friends as from its avowed enemies. To official Defenders of the Faith, crowned, mitered or wigged, the Faith owes less than the Defenders in question have been wont to claim. I have even heard it suggested by extremists, that there would be more believers in God if all the theologians would take themselves off."[11]

Yet, the intellectual demand for some kind of a philosophy of the spiritual life will not be stifled. It is a demand of our intellectual nature just as much as that of our will and emotions, for unique satisfaction in a divine personality. Science demands this intellectual unity as much as religion. Systems are bound to arise, therefore, whether we

want them or not. What is, or rather what should be, the relation of these philosophies of religion to religion itself?

6. *Life and Dogma.*—We have seen that religion is life rather than theory, and that this life expresses itself in hymns which appeal with equal force to those widely separated theologically. We must now look at another angle of the same problem—*i.e.*, men of different theological views have been equally zealous in service to man. A few remarks concerning recent times will suffice; a description from the historical point would be a work of supererogation. Charles Kingsley, a canon of Westminster with liberal views, denounced child labor and the miserable housing conditions of British agricultural laborers. The Earl of Shaftesbury, an evangelical of evangelicals—in modern parlance, a Fundamentalist—persuaded Parliament to stop child labor and to improve the condition of English factory workers; in these endeavors he incurred much ill will and had to forego political preferment. Westcott, the Bishop of Durham, settled the greatest coal strike of his time. At the other extreme we find the Salvationist, William Booth, who illuminated "darkest England." Hugh Price Hughes, the Wesleyan preacher, saved thousands of men and women from an evil life in Piccadilly. George Cadbury,

the evangelical Quaker, built garden cities and villages. In America there has arisen a combination of religious forces, embracing not only the various Protestant Churches, but the Roman Catholic and the Jewish synagogue, for the eradication of social evils. "He judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well with him; was not this to know me? saith the Lord."[12]

Perhaps few men have the opportunity to do things which stand out as those referred to. But in a smaller sphere every Christian has an opportunity to render similar services. The following report of a young minister from a small manufacturing town to his superior is full of interest, and is inserted here without change. He must remain anonymous.

"Today, for instance, a fellow was staying with me who has been a missionary, and we talked at breakfast. Got to my letters at 8:45 in the morning. Accumulation from the day before cleared up by 9:20, but not answered. Went over to a parishioner's whose wife had just died. Got flowers to take to sick. Made two sick calls on my way back, also a call on the wife of a man who had died that morning, and she was left alone, no blood relatives in the country. Home. Dictated. Tried to make up my parish paper. Lunch. Caller from the Canadian veterans for names to solicit

contributions from. Studied out a little story to give to the children. Out in my machine. Four more sick calls, each interesting, with real human problems. Meeting of a publicity committee. Committee of the Associated Charities. Service at the mission in the afternoon with forty-three eager children, to whom I told my story. To the hospital, and four more sick. Supper. Boys' meeting started. School committee until half past ten. Signed and wrote letters till 11:30.

"This week I had several committee meetings, a boys' club meeting, Associated Charities, schoolboys, religious education, eight mid-week services, two out-of-town addresses, on the committee on study of week-day religious education, three funerals, one wedding, three baptisms of boys, thirteen, fourteen years old. Sunday I had ten services and eight addresses. Had to cancel one of each on account of my voice.

"Of course the human problems are the interesting thing. Within the last two weeks I have had two men in their early twenties, total strangers, walk in and say they wanted to join the church. One girl, married eight months, about to go to the hospital (maternity), whose husband died overnight. Another girl assaulted by a man in a lonely house, mother of seven children died of heart failure in five minutes, boy writing of

decision to enter the ministry, etc. You know how it is, so much to do. A challenge is on every side. And all the way along it is an inspiration to see how fine human nature is."

If one had sufficient imagination, the voice of the master might be heard saying to this young man, "Well done, thou good and faithful servant!"

These cases of practical religion bring us back to the suggestion made in another section of this chapter, *viz.*, that the Christian life is kindled from another Christian life. This statement is abundantly borne out in the life of the founder of Christianity. When John the Baptist sent his disciples to Jesus with the question whether he was "he that should come,"[13] the only answer was, "Tell John what things ye have seen and heard!" The recruiting of the first few disciples is most instructive on this point. Two of the Baptist's followers went to Jesus because they saw Jesus and were attracted to him; one of these, Andrew, brought his brother, Peter; the day after Philip followed Jesus because he was attracted, and overcame Nathanael's scepticism with the words, "Come and see."[14] It is the person of Jesus, "full of grace and truth," that attracts and holds. In the Synoptic Gospels there is very little dogma, but there is an abundance of living touch between

the Master and all sorts of men. One may easily imagine that if the Pharisees and the Sadducees and the Essenes could have laid aside their theological prejudices and allowed their emotions full sway, they might, like Nicodemus, have become followers. It is difficult to imagine that this one Pharisee should have been converted by that conversation reported in the third chapter of St. John; the person, the attitude, the loving-kindness of Christ had undoubtedly more to do with his becoming a follower of Jesus than the arguments presented.

And it has always been thus. Our theories about religion separate us and hold us apart; it is life alone that can unite us. In the history of the Church there is not a single instance where a truly Christian living has given any trouble; men of different views could always join hands as long as they looked upon their theories as secondary to life. When men considered theories and ecclesiastical policies as the primary element in religion, there was trouble, because no finite mind can fully comprehend the infinite. The "pride of the intellect" has, in the better moments of the Church, always been considered one of the deadly sins; but she usually succeeded in convincing herself that she was practicing humility and that the persecuted party was guilty of that crime. In other

words, the party in control, whether Roman or Protestant, was always "obedient to the will of God" as interpreted by itself; the weaker party "rebelled against the plain word of God" and must be punished.

If, then, we must theorize, we should do it humbly, always realizing that we "know in part" and "see through a glass, darkly." It is love, kindness, forbearance, helpfulness, that have overcome the world, not our alleged knowledge of the Infinite.

Recapitulating, we have the following points: the problem of knowledge has always been serious in religion; there is valuable knowledge that is not demonstrable, *e.g.*, in the arts; science becomes undemonstrable when it passes beyond physical phenomena; religion, being a new life, lies somewhere between the arts and science as far as knowledge is concerned.

Knowledge is, however, not the only relation of these three aspects of life. Art, science, and religion have each a specific function in life, and each is necessary for the completion of man and the development of a full personality.

[1] *Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen als physiologische Grundlage für die Theorie der Musik.*

[2] W. Stanley Jevons, *Principles of Science,* Preface, pp. xi and xii. 1907.

[3] Sir Oliver Lodge, *Reason and Belief,* p. 77. 1910.

[4] John Burroughs, *The Light of Day,* pp. 97 and 98. 1900.
[4a] Vernon Kellogg, "Some Things Science Doesn't Know," in *World's Work,* March, 1926, p. 527.
[5] Hugo Münsterberg, *The Eternal Values,* p. 75. 1909.
[6] Münsterberg, *ibid,* pp. 349, 354, 356.
[7] W. Stanley Jevons, *The Principles of Science,* p. 769.
[8] James H. Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion,* p. 277. 1912.
[9] Hugo Münsterberg, *The Eternal Values,* p. 22.
[10] *Ibid,* p. 430.
[11] L. P. Jacks, *Religious Perplexities,* pp. 35f. 1923.
[12] Jer. xxii: 16.
[13] Luke vii: 19.
[14] John i: 35-51.

Note: *Science, The False Messiah,* 1927, by C. E. Ayres came to the author's notice too late to be used, since this book was already in page form.

The Function of Art, Science, and Religion

1. *The Function of Science.*—Ever since man acquired some kind of intelligence, he began to reason in a crudely scientific way as to cause and effect, and that way began his upward march toward civilization. All the tools of one kind and another, the simple solutions he found for the problems of life, and the forward look he developed, bear witness to this statement. His reasoning was often faulty, and he had to pay the price by disease or death. The long process of this development to higher forms of reasoning cannot be followed here, since we must confine ourselves to the function of science in the making of personalities in our own times.

The first function of science consists in making life easier so that every man may have a chance for a fuller development. The term "science" is taken here in the broadest possible sense, since every application of the law of cause and effect which man has made or makes now intelligently should be considered a scientific procedure. Amer-

icans have, as a rule, no idea of the extreme poverty still prevailing in most parts of Asia, Africa, South America, and eastern Europe. This statement does not refer to the Europe of to-day, since the World War has changed many conditions for the worse. Even before this catastrophe happened, there was much extreme poverty in Spain, Russia, the Balkans, and other countries where modern scientific methods of production were not applied. The objection may, of course, be raised that righteousness and religiousness need few temporal goods. Some people have indeed gone so far as to imagine that even a moderate amount of affluence is an obstacle to inheriting the kingdom of God. The parable of Dives and Lazarus and the figure of the camel and the needle's eye have done much mischief in perverting a true view of wealth. The mendicant orders of the Roman Catholic Church and the demand for poverty on the part of monks and nuns are striking cases of this perversion. The denunciation of the rich was perhaps justified because in the days when *manu-facture* had to be taken literally as making with the hand, there was so little produced that wealth on the part of any man usually represented exploitation of the many. With the advance of *machino-facture* a very much greater amount of goods could be produced, and comforts as well as necessaries

came within reach of the masses. Europeans traveling in our country have often been surprised at the much higher standard of living among American workingmen compared with those of other countries. Be that as it may, the fact stands that a larger amount of natural wealth makes distinct contributions to a higher manhood.

To begin with, no man whose whole time and energy are consumed in the everlasting pursuit of mere economic necessities can give much or any time to the development of other qualities than those of the body. There is neither time nor energy left. Any pleasures such people can enjoy are usually of the grossest kind—food and sex. Much of the gross immorality among barbarians and savages is due to this lack of ability to respond to any other stimuli than those of the "flesh." This poverty is accurately reflected in the Mohammedan conception of paradise as a place where *cibus et libido* had ample opportunity for satisfaction. Arabia was a poor country, and heaven was naturally conceived as a place of pleasure within the comprehension of a poor man. Among all peoples living under high economic pressure, as all savages and barbarians do, similar views prevail concerning the hereafter.

Again, general education is impossible without at least a fair amount of wealth. We are often

surprised at the illiteracy in, *e.g.*, Spain and Russia, running up to seventy-five per cent of the adult population. The reason is plain. Those peoples are unable to maintain schools, and every boy and girl is needed in the field or in the house to help make a living. The introduction of modern means of production, based on science, has everywhere been accompanied by the extension of education, owing to an increase of wealth.

Then again, peoples who have only the primitive means of communication—*e.g.*, by word of mouth, signals by means of fire, simple semaphores —are shut in among themselves and become the victims of their own narrow ideas. Prejudice against and hatred of other people are common. This is the situation of the Chinese in the interior provinces at the present time, and ignorance among the masses in the maritime provinces was the cause of the Boxer Rebellion at least to a considerable extent. We hear much of the mysterious rapidity with which news spreads in the Orient, especially in India. Much of that claim is exaggerated, some of it is without basis, and what is true in it is confined to Indian news. In modern times the railway, the telegraph, and the "wireless" undoubtedly play a rôle in the dissemination of news.

We may refer, finally, to certain crimes which are the direct result of poverty. The exposing

of children, the neglect of the sick, and the abandoning of the aged are practiced by many peoples on the lower levels of civilization as soon as the food supply becomes scarcer than usual. We often accuse these men of cruelty, but they simply follow a law of nature; they are kind when food is sufficient, and become hard when hunger drives them to adopt extreme measures. Cannibalism originated under conditions of this kind just as marooned sailors and people in besieged cities have until comparatively modern times resorted to it when in desperation.

It stands to reason that under great economic stress men cannot develop so fully as they should and might. This is well illustrated by the facts that from peoples whose national wealth is very low few men of prominence have arisen, and that from the poor classes of the population in a moderately well-to-do nation the number of such men has been small compared with that coming from the economically better situated classes. Where, on the other hand, national wealth is considerable, the individual may be poor, but he has the chance to avail himself of the facilities provided by society, and advance himself and develop in every way. Our country is a striking illustration of this fact. We have self-made men from presidents

of the country to presidents of banks and railroads down to physicians and college professors.

To furnish an opportunity for men to live more easily seems a small rôle for science, but that has been its chief mission in history and is so today, as anyone may verify by looking at the dependence of our industries, agriculture, means of communication on applied and pure science. But that is not its sole function, not even the highest.

The second function of science is the enlargement of the intellectual horizon. Next to religion, science—including philosophy in this case—has been of the greatest possible service to man in teaching him to think on a broad scale; unlike religion, it has taught him to think accurately within the realm of phenomena. One of the most fascinating studies consists in the history of the gradual penetration of the human intellect into apparently inert matter, into distant space and infinite time.

The most striking results along this line have been obtained by mathematics and its twin sister, astronomy. As was stated in the preceding chapter, pure mathematics controls all the factors employed in its reasoning, since they are mental. The development of this study depends, consequently, on an increasing power of reasoning. Animals have none of it; man began his career with faint

traces of it, but he had the desire to know. Inch by inch the inquiry into the relation of things has been pushed further back into time by geology, and further out into space by astronomy. Our distant ancestors knew time only as day and night, and space only as they traveled through the forests with their weary feet. They could count only on their fingers a few centuries later, and some of our contemporary savages have not advanced beyond that stage. In time there came the new discoveries of Euclid, Pythagoras, and Archimedes; then followed Newton's and Leibnitz's calculus, John Napier's logarithm, Hamilton's quaternions, then Clifford's, Cayley's and other men's contributions—all of which have made possible computations deemed impossible, perhaps not dreamed of even by the Greeks. These inquiries have opened up new worlds for speculation, but —they *work* when applied to physical facts. Modern seamanship depends to a considerable extent on the logarithms which enable the mariner to find his position in any part of the seven seas, and the complicated bridges of today would be impossible without higher mathematics. The surprising fact is that most of these mathematical laws were discovered before the days of experimentation had begun; they are the result of pure reason and represent a penetration of the intellect

into the unknown qualities of matter, for "the nature of gravitational attraction remains a mystery still."[1] Three of the striking cases of exact predictions on the basis of mathematical calculations may be mentioned.

The planet Neptune was discovered by calculations near the place where it was observed several weeks later in 1846. That Sirius is a double star, one bright and one dark, was not known until 1844, when Bessel accounted for the apparent anomaly of its movements on that theory. The discovery seemed incredible at the time, but twenty years later the faint or dark star was observed and Bessel's theory confirmed. Bessel made a similar discovery in 1846 concerning a dark companion of Procyon, but this time the confirmation of the theory had to wait for half a century, in 1896. It seems, then, that matter obeys laws which are discovered deductively by reason, and indorsed inductively by experiment or observation.

Does this fact not point to a suggestion, namely, that human intelligence has discovered some laws by which divine intelligence controls matter? Intelligence seems plainly to have met intelligence. This nonhuman knowledge cannot be that of matter; hence, it must be that of the "divine architect." For, if these laws had been found by experimentation—*i.e.*, the gradual piling up of

evidence "line upon line"—we might infer that they were merely man's ideas projected into matter; since they were discovered by pure reasoning and are found to work when applied to matter, there seems no other conclusion possible than the one stated, *viz.*, that man's intelligence has met another—*i.e.*, a divine intelligence.

This conclusion may seem unwarranted to many scientists, but some of them have drawn it. Romanes has already been quoted to the effect of his belief in theism (Chapter II, 1). Another well-known scientist writes:

"We are rising to the conviction that we are a part of nature, and so a part of God; that the whole creation—the One and the Many and All-One—is travailing together to some great end; and that now, after ages of development, we have at length become conscious portions of the great scheme, and can coöperate in it with knowledge and joy."[2]

These words were written long before the death of his son Raymond prompted Sir Oliver to pay more personal attention to religion. This bereavement induced him to come out more plainly in defense of the immortality of man. Speaking of the immensity of the universe in comparison to the earth and man, he writes:

"Yet, for true interpretation, the infinite worth

and vital importance of each individual human soul must be apprehended, too. And that is another momentous fact, which, so far from restricting the potentialities of existence, by implication still further enlarges them. The multiplicity, the many-sidedness, the magnificence, of material existence does not dwarf the human soul; far otherwise, it illumines and expands the stage upon which the human drama is being played, and ought to make us ready to perceive how far greater still may be the possibilities—nay, the actualities—before it, in its infinite unending progress."[3]

The list of scientists whose mental horizon extended not only into space and time, but into eternity, and who included the worth of man in their thinking, is a fairly long one; the two cases cited will, however, suffice to show that a higher science and a better religion are not opposites, but may dwell harmoniously in the same mind.

The third function—intrinsically the first but historically the third—is the search for truth. The typical scientist has, as far as that is possible for a human being, no prejudices nor predilections; he merely wants to study facts so as to find out what is, has been, and is likely to be. On the basis of his investigations he often makes a contribution to extant knowledge—an important one if with the scientific method he combines imagination; a small

one if he is merely well trained in that method. Here is the difference between science and scholarship. The scholar wants to preserve the knowledge handed down, just as the theologian is anxious to preserve "the faith once delivered to the saints." Hence "scholarly" books are amply documented by numerous quotations and are fine exhibitions of patient research and of tenacious and comprehensive memories. The scientist does not merely wish to preserve; he wants to increase knowledge if the facts warrant it. Since facts are endless in number and since nature is still engaged in making numerous changes, the serious scientist does not need to look far for new discoveries; they thrust themselves upon him. This tendency "to see things as they are and to face them frankly," and then to give an explanation of them in terms of reason, has become the occasion for the "warfare between science and religion." It was, however, the warfare between a new science and an *old* science which had become a part of theological thinking, since theology dominated the whole of man's thinking in the past, and many theories were then looked upon as scientific which were far from being so in the light of later development. The scientist devoted to the study of facts followed, and was bound to follow, the new light; the pseudo-scientist devoted to the maintenance of

tradition objected to any change in the knowledge handed down. A clash between the two views was inevitable, and history records many tragedies resulting from it. To the honor of scientists it may be said that they have frequently shown a truly religious ardor in defending their theories and in discovering new truths.

And this conflict between pseudo-science masquerading in the guise of religion is still with us and will stay with us as long as superstition clogs the wheels of the progress of religion itself. What horrible and unspeakable practices have been perpetrated in the past in the name of various theologies which claimed to be inspired by some deity, need not even be mentioned here. That the cleansing and disinfecting hand of science is still necessary may be illustrated by two modern experiences which, while disgusting, are less revolting than others that might be cited. W. G. Tinckom-Fernandez in an article describing his experiences of a trip through India in 1921-22, says:[4]

"The student of Oriental religions has learned from missionaries and casual travelers in India of the profound aversion that Hinduism and its sister creed, Jainism, maintain toward the taking of animal life. The fundamental doctrine of transmigration shared by the Hindu and Jain, whereby the soul at death takes up its residence in some

form of animal life, a high or low form according to the merit obtained by good deeds before death, governs the daily, even the hourly, life of every devout Hindu or Jain.

"The Jain is particularly mindful. Drinking water is carefully strained, the nose and mouth protected, lest some minute, living animal matter suffer extinction. During periods of famine I have seen zealous Jains, who are usually bankers and merchants and form a rich religious community, feeding ants with flour or sugar. Pigeons are fed twice a day with a liberal largess of precious grain. The approaches to all Jain temples are carefully swept so that worshipers will not inadvertently tread upon some unseen insect and thus take the life of one whose soul was residing in it by transmigration.

"Not so familiar, however, to the average resident or visitor in India is the fact that the Jains maintain animal hospitals known as pinjrapols, where sick or maimed animals, birds and insects, may find refuge. Many a wily Mohammedan has driven his sick horse or cow past a rich Jain that the latter might be prompted to buy the beast and send it to live in luxury at the pinjrapol.

"The extent to which this fantastical observance is carried when it comes to vermin is illustrated by the following custom: At every Jain pinjrapol

are devoutly included a number of charpoys, or Indian frame cots strung with hemp. These are infested with vermin, and at regular intervals pariahs, or any poor low-caste persons, are hired to lie on these charpoys, so that the vermin may feed.

"I shall never forget the shocked feelings of a Hindu station master at a little railroad depot in central India who, while he was making up my ticket, was reminded by me that a bedbug was traversing his coat collar. The Hindu official quietly removed the insect, perhaps more to please me, and carefully placed it on his desk. When I promptly seized one of his railway ledgers and basted it his expression of consternation and disgust at what was tantamount to the crime of murder, or, indeed, murdering a soul and interfering with the endless chain of transmigration to which it was predestined, might be paralleled by that of a New Yorker who witnessed a cold-blooded murder in Broadway."

Such occurrences may seem absurd to an Occidental; they are, however, based on the science of the Hindus as expounded in their theology. "In the vast Brahmin-wheel, the source and support of all Jîvas, the Hamsa (the individual) is made to wander, thinking himself and the Ruler different. United with Him, he obtains immortality."[5]

A missionary who has spent many years in Ara-

bia reports the following cases on the authority of Doughty:

"A young mother, yet a slender girl, brought her wretched babe and bade me spit upon the child's sore eyes. This ancient Semitic opinion and custom I have afterward found wherever I came in Arabia. Meteyr nomads in El-Kasin have brought me, some of them bread and some salt, that I should spit in it for their sick friends. Their gossips followed to make this request with them, and when I blamed their superstition they answered simply that 'such was the custom here from time out of mind.'"[6]

Such practices may not have a warrant in the Koran; they prove, though, that Mohammedanism has not, except in very modern Turkey since the World War, permitted science to banish gross superstition. Are we, however, so clean that we may cast stones upon these people? Down to 1900 many of our churches maintained public drinking fountains where the weary traveler might acquire an assortment of contagious diseases under the guise of charity. It was medical science which taught us to avoid that cup of iniquity. Do we not find today in our metropolitan cities hundreds and thousands of people venerating some alleged relic of a saint in the belief that it will cure them from disease? And if kissing of the bone or hair is

permitted, do not rich and poor, well and sick alike perform that ceremony of love and respect, without any regard to the consequences of infection? Sanitation has not been permitted to invade these holy precincts, because they are supposed to be immune through supernatural means.

In the past many transmissible diseases have been spread over many parts of the globe from Mecca and other "holy places" where contact between people was close and promiscuous. And then the disaster was ascribed to the inscrutable decree of the Almighty who visited the people for their sins. It was ignorance pure and simple that caused the havoc, and it was encouraged by theological pseudo-science. Yet, science will have its way in spite of religious prejudices, and the Churches are beginning to realize that in its own sphere the physical law of cause and effect has full sway. The individual communion cup now used in hundreds of churches is but one indication out of many to prove that religious people are paying heed to the teachings of science. Much as we owe, though, to science, our most important questions are still unanswered.

"Science has not enlightened me to any satisfactory degree about my consciousness or my conscience; has not told me why I can compose or play or deeply enjoy music—except that it says

part of the reason is that my father or mother or other ancestors could—that is, that I inherit this capacity—which is only pushing the original question back to be asked about the musical ancestor. Science has not told me why I love my little girl so extravagantly, nor why I can write poetry—if I can; nor, and perhaps this is the question I put to it most often and most insistently and most want answered, whether I have an immortal soul or not." [6a]

Knowledge, even if it were complete, is, however, not the only thing in life, just because we are not purely intellectual beings. Science means compulsion; it says, Do this or die. All through the ages man has fought against that ironclad necessity which natural law imposes. He wanted to be free as well as knowing. Here is the real cause of the age-long conflict between science on the one hand and art and religion on the other. It is a conflict imposed from within, and is due to the fact that man must *know* or perish while he wants at the same time to be free. There is something terribly frigid, even horrifying, about mere knowledge. The ancients described this in many ways. One of the most striking allegories is that of the veiled picture of Saïs. It was, according to Schiller's poem, the presentation of full knowledge, and death was supposed to be the result of lifting the

veil. One venturesome youth dared to lift it and was found dead before a statue of absolute and hideous blackness. And is not the story of the fall of man connected with the same subject? "Your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil."

One of the most graphic pictures in modern times of this problem is that of Leonid Andreyef in his story of *Lazarus*. He had been gone for three days and nights in the timeless unknown. Out of his eyes the awful eternity gazed upon mankind. Priests, philosophers, merchants, and youthful lovers, all alike shrank from the unfathomable mystery of that gaze to find everything they had loved and cherished turned into dust and ashes.

"There was no more a sense of time; the beginning of all things and their end merged into one. In the very moment when a building was being erected and one could hear the builders striking with their hammers, one seemed already to see the ruins and then emptiness where the ruins were.

"A man was just born and funeral candles were already lighted at his head, and then were extinguished, and soon there was emptiness where before had been the man and the candles.

"And surrounded by darkness and empty waste,

Man trembled hopelessly before the dread of the Infinite. So spake those who had a desire to speak."

Lazarus knew, and everyone who looked at him knew, and was paralyzed into inaction from the shock. Only two great souls turned to creative work to rid themselves of the spell. The most famous sculptor of his age, scorning his early creations of beauty, carved a misshapen, writhing mass of ugliness, but—under one projecting corner of it he placed a wondrous butterfly poised for flight—a symbol of a new hope and faith. The other man, an emperor, was attracted by the deep peace in the eyes of Lazarus until the calm of the eternal vision began to overwhelm his will. Then he remembered his responsibility toward his people, their simple joys and bitter sorrows, their struggles for some kind of worth and value, until sympathy with the joy and suffering of life gave him freedom from the deadening indifference of the infinite. In action for a better life and in faith and hope of a better future lies the solution of the riddle.

To gaze upon endless space and time may be a wholesome diversion for those trivial souls who find no other satisfaction than to possess more things which the dollar can buy; to make that gaze a permanent occupation and to remind us con-

stantly that we are but cosmic dust, means to cripple life in all its phases and to torture us endlessly with the pain of its futility.

Science does not, of course, intend to produce that effect; it is produced just the same. Man cannot live a one-sided intellectual life without paying the penalty. He must live a full life if he would be creative and develop even in science. It is the free man, not the bound, who points the way to higher achievements. This freedom men have always tried to find in the free creation of the fine arts.

2. *The Function of Art.*—If science calls for order and law, art demands a free expression of the imagination. If science means compulsion, art means freedom. But, strange to say, art needs the intellect. Art is based essentially on feeling; a man who does not feel strongly can never become an artist. Strong feeling might, though, turn a man into a voluptuary or a murderer from passion. Mere strong feeling still keeps man bound in the thrall of his own primitive physical nature. The only difference is that while *science binds us from without through the laws of nature, feeling binds us from within through its own tempestuous and impetuous force.* A life of mere feeling is, therefore, not one of freedom, but of slavery. If feeling is to become free, it must be combined with

an intellectual aspect or an idea. This is done in art by referring feeling to the idea of the beautiful, and in religion by a reference to the divine. Owing to the unity of the human mind, this conversion of the feeling into cognition, and eventually into volition, is absolutely necessary if man is to rise above the precariousness of an elementary life and is to develop his capacity in every direction. This matter was discussed in the third chapter. Our task now is to indicate what rôle art plays in turning feeling into æsthetic enjoyment, and how it liberates us from the thrall of impulsion.

The pleasure we have in looking at a beautiful object is natural and immediate, but it is not æsthetic enjoyment. The natural pleasure is turned into the latter by becoming imagination; that is, not only an immediate sensuous pleasure, but an interplay of feeling with intellect and will. Uncontrolled imagination or fancy is mental activity without let or hindrance. In artistic imagination this fancy is brought under the control of a guiding principle. The creative artist desires to embody some idea in his statue, picture, melody, or poem, and the connoisseur wants to find that idea. The emotions of each are thus objectified into an idea as far as that is possible. This partial transformation of the emotion into an idea constitutes æsthetic enjoyment; it is emotion plus idea. An

illustration may make this clear. Suppose we look at the picture of a beautiful woman. The effect is immediate—a sensuous pleasure arising from the mellow colors and the attractiveness of features. This pleasure is almost instinctive. But if we stop there, the probability is that the beauty of the woman will arouse sensual desire. If, however, feeling is referred to the idea which the artist wished to embody—*e.g.*, chastity, motherliness, aspiration, etc.—our feeling is transformed into æsthetic enjoyment, because it gives imagination a specific direction toward something noble and elevating. The elementary feeling of sensuous pleasure has become purified into a wholesome sentiment, and we have thus been liberated from the thrall of mere sensuousness. All art must have this faculty to arouse both the immediate pleasure and the mediate enjoyment. False art stops with the former. The necessity for this transformation lies in the fact that, like all elementary feelings, so the immediate pleasure arising from the observation of a beautiful object gets control over us, and we are not free. Life is feeling; but if it is to be free, the intellect must guide and the will must control. The function of art is, then, liberation.

The objection will naturally arise: Is art not bound to observe certain rules and the laws of na-

ture? Can the artist give unrestrained flight to his fancy and still create something beautiful? The answer is simple. The artist observes the rules or he creates his own technique if he is sufficiently great, as already noticed before; and he obeys the laws of nature. But he does so unconsciously; they are inborn, and do not have to be acquired by a laborious process, as a knowledge of science has to be acquired. People walked long before mechanics explained the laws of walking, and they breathed long before chemistry explained the necessity of the changes produced by breathing. They never felt, though, that they were acting under any natural or scientific compulsion, since these laws are a part of our physical organization. What is a part of myself, I never feel as an intrusion from without. So with the artist. He obeys the laws of nature without feeling that he is under any compulsion, because, as an artist, he has that peculiar ability of knowing how to express himself without going through an extensive process of apprenticeship. This may help him to avoid errors, but it cannot make the artist. The contention that art requires a peculiar mental structure is borne out by the fact that the modern artist has hundreds of aids which science of today has furnished to him; but we have neither greater poets nor greater sculptors than those of Greece

and Rome. The discovery of the perspective has greatly helped modern painters, but a minute knowledge of the anatomy of the horse has not enabled any sculptor to excel the equestrian statue by Phidias. In music we have made marvelous progress, not so much in composition, since we know very little about ancient music, but in orchestration, owing to the many new instruments which mechanics have provided for the musician. It is still true, though, that the most accurate knowledge of orchestration and of acoustics will not make a composer. Art, in obeying inborn laws, is, then, free; and the appreciation of art is likewise. What is taught in our schools on the latter subject is the *story* of the opera and of its characters; the ear for music can never be given; appreciation of music and of other arts is innate.

Being free, art has the function to beautify life and to give enjoyment pure and simple. When we contemplate a picture, or listen to music, or read a poem—the idea of consequences never enters our mind as it does in studying science, nor that of commercial value as it does when we produce something for the market. The past and the future, the near and the far, do not exist; there is a consciousness only of the blessed now and here. We are freed from all bonds and simply enjoy. This enjoyment may become ecstatic in

some person. Art thus furnishes a means of escape from the humdrum of life and prevents it from becoming a dry formula. It gives at least an occasional opportunity for abandoning ourselves to the moment of which Goethe said, "Delay, thou art so fair!"

These characteristics of art indicate its limitations. We have to be in our "mental Sunday attire" to enjoy it; we have to snatch a few hours to go to the museum if we would see a good picture, or to the opera and concert to hear good music. It is, so to say, a pastime when the responsibilities of life do not weigh too heavily upon us. To be sure, science has enabled us to have copies of some kind of all the masterpieces in painting and sculpture and the "canned" music in various instruments. We likewise have more beautifully furnished homes, owing to the mass production of today. These copies and repeating instruments usually lack the inspirational power of the original, and the standardized products of the furniture factories soon pall on us. They are products of science and lack the vivid impressiveness which the original, as the immediate expression of a personality, has for us. When you have to turn the crank to hear Caruso sing—well, it is better than nothing, but it is not artistic enjoyment. Bringing masterpieces within the reach of the

masses has had a good educational influence; it has not helped the arts very much.

A limitation is to be noted from another angle. The material of all the arts is more or less intractable. It is wonderful that a violinist can make us weep or laugh by causing horsehair to scrape catgut. It is marvelous that a sculptor can give the semblance of life to cold marble. The painter achieves truly remarkable results by combining different shades and colors. The material is always inadequate for the expression of an æsthetic idea. The human voice, if based on right structure and backed by proper talent, is more adequate. But always the arts deal with the difficulty of completely expressing a noble and strong emotion.

As to the emotions expressed, only a few words need be said. Being the product of individuals, imperfect and often woefully so, they share the characteristics of their originators. We cannot hide the fact that art has not infrequently lent itself to the expression of ignoble and vicious emotions. Under these circumstances art has not been elevating. The plea that art is for art's sake and that it has nothing to do with the good and the moral but only with the adequate expression of what the artist considers capable of expression, does not hold, since art is social in its effects and must be judged from that point of view.

The critics have, consequently, always a quiverful of arrows to shoot at any piece of art, when the different points mentioned are taken into consideration. The question arises whether it is possible to find a field of mental endeavor in which the emotions may have a better opportunity for rising to greater heights.

3. *The Function of Religion.*—There is only one function of religion which we have to consider here, namely, its effect on life by purifying and clarifying the feelings—*i.e.*, the basic elements in man's life—and thus enlarging his mind. Art, as compared with religion, reaches a comparatively small number of people. The number of *Schöngeister*, as the Germans appropriately call the worshipers of art, is small now, and will always be limited, owing to the comparative rarity of the artistic endowment in appreciation and more particularly in creative power. Religion treats, moreover, subjects of infinitely greater importance than art. The question of idealism or realism in art interests only a small number of people, while that of immortality evokes the greatest interest from everybody. Its influence on life must, therefore, be correspondingly greater.

Religion is, to say it once more, feeling in its essence. But if it were only feeling, we should have to admit that animals had religion. That

supposition would be absurd. Feeling must be combined with an intellectual element in order to become religious. In feeling, the individual becomes aware only of the mysterious and obscure background of life. It is indeterminate, aimless, and directed only to the satisfaction of immediate needs. In art the feelings combine with an idea to give æsthetic enjoyment by means of something visible or audible. In religion there is no such appeal to the imagination by means of the senses, since God is a Spirit. Man's imagination could, however, never picture a pure spirit, and he always had to resort to some visible or audible representation of what he conceived as divine.

Here lies the tragedy of religion, especially of its later forms. The earlier religions had little trouble with this problem. Any object which manifested some striking appearance or power, whether it was stone, plant, or animal, was supposed to be harboring a spirit, and this object was either literally or symbolically considered to be an image of the deity. Later—*e.g.*, among the Greeks and Romans—the gods were frankly conceived in the image of man on a larger scale, perhaps with the addition of the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience. Among the Greek philosophers, a protest was raised against this representation of the gods, and the abstract ideas of Plato were put in

their place by the *intelligentsia*. This meant the eventual supplanting of religion by philosophy, as has always happened in later times. The tragedy was very noticeable among the Hebrews. The command that man should not make to himself "any graven image" of Jehovah was stern, but failed to take human frailty and capacity into consideration. And so we find a battle all through the Old Testament between the conception of Jehovah as a Spirit, and idolatry—*i.e.*, attempts to picture God in some way accessible to the senses. The tragedy was deepened by Christianity; Jesus plainly denounced all representations of God, since He is Spirit and must be worshiped "in spirit and in truth." It was again too much of a task for human imagination, and soon we have various forms of reverence for saints and for Jesus which could be presented pictorially. And we are in this dilemma still, since nearly all Roman and Greek Catholics approach God through the medium of saints.

Psychologically the problem is this: Man's intellect cannot conceive of a God who is omnipresent, yet personal; immanent in the world, and still not absorbed by nature; unconscious in inorganic things, but self-conscious in man; concerned with the affairs of the universe, while hearing and

answering the prayers of a little child. An abstract principle serves it better and has always been used by philosophy and science when the latter speculated about the ultimate ground of existence at all. The emotions demand, however, that kind of a conception. The result is the conception of God as a person. Personality is spirit in the form of character; its attributes are self-consciousness, self-activity, and freedom. A purely spiritual personality cannot be represented by the imagination, and the result is a compromise offered in the incarnation of Jesus Christ. This conception leaves the pure spirituality of the Godhead intact, and supplies at the same time a means to represent the divine being worthily in the God-man. With that conception men are still struggling, as the numerous problems of Christology, from Manichæism to the Kenosis, prove. But it is a conception which man must entertain if he is to satisfy his whole mental nature. It gives the intellect a worthy idea of God, it satisfies the emotions, and it furnishes the will with a goal toward which to strive.

Our immediate problem is, though, the purification and clarification of the feelings. In the lower stages of religion man is naturally crude in his feelings. He wants chiefly the satisfaction of physical needs, and religion is simply a means to

attain those goods which he cannot get unaided. As he grows intellectually, his emotions become more refined and he demands a more worthy representation of the deity. There is an interaction between the intellect and the emotions, owing to the unity of the mind. Every advance in one direction produced a reaction upon the other aspect of the mind. The different steps which we have traced briefly in the struggle for a representation of the deity, are simply so many stages in that development. Man does not demand economic goods of God; he wants to find completion in Him, and that is what God wants man to seek. There is a mutual approach; there is a yearning on the part of both to meet. It is the yearning and groping and hoping for this kind of a religion, which explains the ready acceptance of Christianity by many people in the first few centuries and today among the Chinese and Japanese and other peoples.

Incidentally, Christianity helped man in other ways. It raised every action to a higher plane, since every action came to be considered a link in this chain for completion, not necessarily as *sub specie æternitatis* as the mediæval philosopher-theologians imagined such an act to be judged by a stern and exacting God, but as something which

man conceived to be leading him upward and forward toward a higher goal. His whole nature expanded, and faith had something tangible to cling to. Faith is the direction of our whole mind toward the realization of a complete self. There is always a chasm between actual knowledge and complete truth. But this faith that knowledge will become complete truth is implied in all knowledge. It is the belief that all honest search for truth will lead to full truth, which urges us on to search further. This belief is intellectual, but it is urged on by the demand of feeling for harmony and unity, and it is the concentrated energy of will that keeps us going in spite of many obstacles.

It is, then, again the whole of our mind that finds expression in religion, as against the one-sidedly intellectual element in science and the inadequately emotional aspect of art. Under such a conception, religion demands and creates a finer type of man. It will be our task now to study the development of religion so as to find out what contributions the different stages in this evolution have made toward the solution of our problem.

[1] R. A. Gregory, *Discovery, or the Spirit and Service of Science*, p. 316. 1916.
[2] Sir Oliver Lodge, *The Hibbert Journal*, April, 1904, vol. ii, p. 475.
[3] Sir Oliver Lodge, *Raymond*, p. 309. 1916.

[4] "India Politics Now Stirred by Religion," (Special Feature Section) *New York Times,* June 1, 1924.

[5] *Sanâtana Dharma,* p. 88. 1904.

[6] Samuel M. Zwemer, *The Influence of Animism on Islam,* p. 167. 1920.

[6a] Vernon Kellogg, "Some Things Science Doesn't Know," in *World's Work,* March, 1926, p. 528. (Italics his.)

VI

Development of Religion Toward Higher Ethics

1. *Orientation.*—The development of religion will be considered here chiefly from the point of view of its influence in making a better type of man. This matter has been treated in preceding chapters primarily in regard to man's intellect and emotions. These two aspects of the mind must express themselves in some kind of action, and action is usually identified with the will. Many things which are ordinarily treated under the development of religion will be omitted. Ceremonies of different kinds, religious institutions, the relation of religion to the state, and other matters which might be considered, will be referred to only in so far as they affect our particular problem. As an introduction to it, a brief discussion of the different stages through which religion has passed will be necessary.

2. *Stages in Religious Development.*—The simplest way of indicating the stages is by a reference to the number of gods who are believed in by the adherents of a particular religion. This

principle is more convenient than, for instance, that of ethical and nonethical religions, because it is ultimately the number and character of the gods which give a religion its ethical tone.

The first stage in religion is fetishism, sometimes identified with animism. The precise differences between the two need not be discussed here. Primitive man was mentally a little child, and anything that attracted his attention by either its shape, color, behavior, or any other quality, would be valued by him. Suppose now that he was exceptionally successful in the chase when he carried that object with him and the opposite when he did not, the conclusion would force itself upon him that it had something to do with his success or failure. It would become his fetish. This simple mental attitude has survived to this day even among Christians. The belief in "good luck," the carrying of amulets, the fairly general practice of having a mascot, are survivals. The writer has seen a school teacher and college graduate carrying a miniature picture of the Virgin Mary on the key to her automobile, presumably to ward off accidents. How incredibly simple the reasoning of children is may be illustrated by the following case:

During the World War it happened one day that a well-educated family had beets as a vege-

table. The four-year-old boy stared at them for a few moments, then said: "Papa, do you know what I saw today?" "No!" "I saw a beet kicking a German." "What did he do?" "He cried and ran!" "What did the beet do?" "It ran after him and kicked him again!" "What did the German do then?" "He turned and kicked the beet till it died!" "Charley, you did not see all that, did you now?" "Yes, papa, I saw it in the fields, and I'll show you the place!" A lecture on truthfulness by the father followed; but the problem how the boy could imagine that story still remained. The solution was this: The boy—always bright and alert—had seen some pictures of a certain soup manufacturer which represented beets, carrots, and other vegetables marching to his factory. The hatred for the Germans was strong at the time even among little boys. The conversation at table had been about a German defeat. The beet and the defeat suggested a connection and the yarn was spun out. During the questioning the idea that a beet beating a man was absurd gradually came home to the boy, and so the German killed his aggressor.

Primitive man was most likely as little developed mentally as this boy, and we need not be surprised that his vivid imagination suggested all kinds of absurdities as explanations for many natu-

ral events. His fleetness of foot and quickness of animal wits enabled him to meet most of the emergencies which he encountered, but when he tried to explain causes and effects he exhibited his mental shortcomings. He could not imagine, for instance, any impersonal causes, and so he endowed every object with some kind of life. For, being a reasoning being, he must have a world-view. Later he realized that there was a difference between animate and inanimate nature; plants and animals grew, stones and rocks did not. So he confined the ascription of life through spirits to the animate, or anything that seemed to have life as proved by change and movement. The bubbling spring was constantly moving and the babbling brook was changing—there must be a nymph there, and we get the naiad of the Greeks. The tree was growing; the change must be caused by a dryad. These are only a few samples of the reasoning of primitive man. As his power of generalization gradually increased, he singled out the more striking phenomena as being caused by spirits, or at least by superior spirits.

Polytheism is the second stage in religious development. No matter how hard man tried to imagine these spirits in different forms of invisibility, he had to picture them eventually as corporeal, since the only way he could conceive of

forces operating was the personal. So we get in the course of time various representations of the spirits in the form of animals, and later in that of human beings. All the classical religions, excepting the Hebrew, are in this stage when they appear in history, although many survivals of animism are still extant. As mental power developed, the recognition that some events were controlled by others forced itself upon man. So he subordinated the deities controlling the lesser events to those controlling the greater and more general events. This gives us the well-known hierarchy of the twelve great gods under Zeus in Greece, with many minor local deities. The same process went on in Egypt, Assyro-Babylonia, and India.

The third stage is called henotheism. A greater power of generalization led, at least in some countries, to the conception that there could be only one god in one country. The earlier history of the Hebrews and the common belief of the people in later times illustrates this phase. Biblical references are I Kings xviii: 21-40, and II Kings v: 15-19, and more particularly the book of Jonah. Just how widely henotheism was held no one can tell, because the line of demarcation between it and polytheism is hard to draw.

The last stage is monotheism. The better minds

among the Hebrews were pressing toward a more satisfactory solution of the religious problem, and so we find among the later prophets plain indications of monotheism. Just how clear this idea was even to the most large-minded of the prophets cannot be decided definitely. Whether it was some kind of pantheism or theism is never clearly stated, since the prophets were seers and poets rather than theologians. The Talmud and other rabbinical literature do not throw much light on the problem. It is, however, one of the greatest achievements of any people in antiquity to have reached this stage. Some Egyptian priests and a few Greek philosophers may have held a theistic conception; if so, they hid it pretty carefully from the people. The Hebrews not only reached these heights, but did their very best to disseminate the doctrine; and this much should be said to their everlasting glory. It is not strange that this feat was supposed to be impossible for mere human capacity, and that a special theory of revelation was invented to account for it. Be that as it may, monotheism ranks among the greatest achievements of mankind.

With the coming of Christ we have the first explicit teaching of theism, and it has always been the official doctrine of the Christian Church. Just how deep it has sunk into the consciousness of the

average believer remains and always will remain an unsolved problem this side of the grave. There are certainly no statistics on this matter; and perhaps better so, since any evidence would most probably lead to new divisions among Christians.

3. *Effects of Religious Stages on Man.*—Some remarks were made in the preceding chapter on the base uses to which art had, at least in some cases, been put. The same judgment has to be passed on religion in a more intensified form. There has been no institution in the history of mankind which has caused so many atrocities, obscenities, and hypocrisies as religion. These facts must be faced frankly, since no extenuating circumstances can explain them away. The reason for this misuse and debasement is, though, comparatively simple. Just because true religious leaders have always had more advanced ideas than the average men, they were looked upon as the best men of the community; this esteem was naturally extended to religion as a whole. Whoever was connected with a religious institution came to be considered a superior man, especially in an unsophisticated age. This gave the wolves in sheep's clothing an opportunity to work their own schemes and to pervert the purposes of religion to their own base desires. The results have often been not only inhuman, but disastrous. Religion

is suffering to this day from being manipulated by priests and kings for their selfish purposes. The resentment against this misuse has always been strong on the part of really religious people, but protest has usually proved futile, just as it has in art, business, and politics. These remarks may anticipate to a certain extent, at least, what influence religion has had on man. It has depended on the individual.

Personality in its innermost essence was considered in the third chapter as that part of our consciousness which no one could enter without the consent of the individual. If there is something permanent in man, there must be such a sphere; and if he is to be unique, that sphere cannot be shared with any other individual or person, not even with God; the relation of person to person must be ethical, not metaphysical. This sphere is the means of self-determination, over which no one has control but the man himself; it is the *person himself* or *herself*. It depends, consequently, on the individual what use he will make of opportunities; he may use them rightly, wrongly, or pass them by. In the following discussion our concern is only with the opportunities, not the use made of them in individual cases. One idea always determined man in his attitude toward opportunities—he wanted to get away from compulsion so

as to preserve his freedom of choice. It is impossible to understand ancient religions unless we realize that they imposed all kinds of obligations on man against which he waged constant war. The releasing word was spoken by Christianity, and this is one reason for its phenomenal success. It offered freedom and privileges, not compulsion and obligations.

Animistic religion offered man few opportunities and many obligations. He needed many things which he was unable to provide. Certain spirits seemed to have the power to help him, and he became thus subject unto them. As his ideas of their power extended, the chains of his slavery were more firmly fastened upon him, but his desire to be free became stronger in proportion. Hence he invented various forms of magic, of ceremonies, of rites. Their purpose was invariably to acquire some means which he could use whenever he wanted, and thus compel the spirits to do his bidding and become subject unto him instead of his being subject unto them. It was freedom that he wanted all along. This seems to be the only tenable psychological interpretation of the various and numerous ritual practices which every religion has invented in the course of time. And man has all through the ages endeavored to discover some means which would put the deity into his power.

But the spirits, being perhaps more in the nature of sprites, were just as anxious to preserve their own liberty of action. Hence the best devices of man frequently failed to achieve success. The result was a game of "catch as catch can," each party trying to get the best of the other by fair means or foul. We can imagine early man rubbing his hands gleefully in the anticipation of success when he had prepared a savory dish or something else of which a particular spirit was especially fond. This happens even today among some savage tribes.

It was inevitable that only lower motives could develop under these circumstances. Man was selfish; his religion was merely a means to satisfy his wants; he wanted to avoid destruction at any cost, and he employed everything in his power to achieve his object. One great gain he made, though. The very futility of his efforts sharpened his wits. He wanted to live, and in this endeavor he became a thinking being; he developed a crude philosophy, and incidentally acquired much useful information of a semiscientific character. He did not grow very much ethically, but gained much intellectually and volitionally.

Under polytheism we have a somewhat different situation. The deities were more clearly defined; each had a special function as to either locality or

occupation. This theory implied less freedom for man. The very specialization of functions on the part of the gods meant that every aspect of life was covered by some deity. That implied a loss of whatever freedom man had had under a lower religion which put only a number of life's aspects under the control of spirits. The whole domain of life was now supposed to be regulated by the gods. And this philosophy was no longer crude, but well developed. It meant complete subjection to the deities.

There was another difficulty. The gods were jealous of one another. Being created in the image of man, they could not be otherwise. This jealousy had three aspects. A deity demanded abject submission from a worshiper, lest he might try a less exacting or a more powerful god to help him. Man was thus kept in fear and trembling not only because he might offend his patron, but because he could find no relief by resorting to another deity. This jealousy also meant the hostility of other gods whom a particular man did not worship. As they delighted in the sweet savor of meat, it was natural that the more of it was offered the more pleased they were. Hence the competition for a larger number of worshipers to satisfy their own vanity. But the gods were also jealous of their own power in regard to man. They might

fight among one another; they stood, however, as a unit in jealously guarding their prerogatives against man. An exceptionally heroic man might be raised to the dignity of a demigod, but no god could ever become a mere mortal. The situation was, thus, more desperate for man than under lower forms of religion. We must look upon ancient history from these points of view if we would understand it.

As a result of this plotting and counterplotting among the gods, Odysseus was condemned to ten years of dangerous encounters by deities favorable to Troy, because his stratagem had won the city for the Greeks. The Trojan War was, as a matter of fact, fought as much by gods as by men, and Homer spares no words to describe their fury. The gods were envious of one another, engaged in intrigues against one another, and were pitifully small-minded. They were, however, united in guarding any secret which might help man in his struggle toward an easier life. Prometheus was severely punished for stealing fire and giving it to man.

The effect of this situation was one of bewilderment, gloom, and dissatisfaction. Men were puzzled, and never knew what to do lest some deity might be offended. There is little laughter in earlier Greek literature, and the heavy atmosphere

is rarely brightened by a lyric. From Homer to Sophocles and Æschylus the gloom is impenetrable, until Aristophanes engaged in comedy. By this time some enlightenment had spread at least among the educated classes, and at least the Athenians had learned to laugh. The Spartan and most of the other Greeks still remained under the depression which the uncertainty and futility of pleasing the gods imposed upon all.

One result of this attitude was that Greek philosophers came eventually to the conclusion of determinism—fate, implacable though leaden-footed, would in the course of time grind down everything, men and gods alike. This merely intensified the gloom; men lost heart and surrendered themselves to all kinds of dissipation so as to snatch at least a few pleasures from the impending ruin. The effects of polytheism were, thus, highly depressing; the only emotions called forth were those of terror and bewilderment, and the will was crushed. Yet, this could not be crushed completely; man developed art as a means to placate the gods, and science to aid himself in the struggle for life which has always been unquenchable.

Henotheism intensified man's dependence, but relieved the strain somewhat. As long as man stayed in one country, his dependence on his deity

was absolute. It was Jehovah who gave his people victory over their enemies, rich harvests, long life and good health, many children, numerous kids and ewes. But this was always on condition of abject submission. Not a spark of independence was left. The least deviation from the path marked out for a man was severely punished. The story of Jacob furnished an interesting comment along this line. The blessing of Jehovah was promised him, and all his scheming and initiative were crushed out of him on his return home; it was to be his on Jehovah's terms, not on his own. And so it was with Saul.

In other respects the strain was lessened. The Hebrew knew at least whom to obey; there was no divided counsel among the gods. Abject as the submission was, the Hebrew did not suffer from the tormenting uncertainty of the Greek. While he saw God chiefly from the point of power, the Hebrew was firmly convinced that it was sufficient to protect him from all his enemies and get him out of all his troubles. The story of the escape from Egypt and the journey through the desert furnishes sufficient material on this point.

When in the later history of Israel the idea of monotheism began to dawn on the Hebrew mind, dependence on God reached its climax. Hitherto the Hebrew might have secretly entertained the

hope that he could flee to another country where Jehovah had no power, the gods of which were less strict and exacting. There was undoubtedly much leakage of this sort as the fulminations of the prophets against the Philistines, Hittites, Moabites, and other neighboring peoples prove. This door of escape was now closed, as Jonah found out when he tried it. Jehovah was now the King of kings and the God of gods. Submission or destruction was the only alternative. The yoke was surely heavy, and many a Hebrew must have chafed under it. The figure of the potter doing with the clay as he pleases is a favorite of both Jeremiah and Isaiah, and indicates the hopelessness of any escape from Omnipotence.

Out of this depression two hopes were born: the moralization of the deity and the Messiahship. Just as among the Greeks, so among the Hebrews, the situation was too oppressive to be endured. But the avenues of escape differed. The Greeks, as we have seen, despaired and dissipated; the Hebrews moralized and humanized their God. The idea of the fatherhood of God, which had always been held as a faint and lingering theory in the background, came now to be stressed more frequently and to be declared more explicitly. There was a softening of the attitude; mercy and forgiveness were put in the foreground as attributes of

Jehovah. "Have we not all one father? Hath not the same God created us?" asks Malachi. If so, then "why do we deal treacherously every man against his brother, by profaning the covenant of our fathers?"[1] The emphasis is no longer placed on offerings and sacrifices, as indeed the prophets rarely did, but on well-doing and fraternity on the basis of the fatherhood of God. The classical passage for this new attitude is the last verse of Jonah. This prophet was—according to the author of the book who wrote after the return from the exile in the fifth century—not merely to be taught that henotheism was untenable and monotheism the only right doctrine, but that this universal God had pity on all men, whether Jews or Gentiles, and even upon cattle. When Jonah complains about the mercy shown to Nineveh and is wroth over the drying of the gourd, Jehovah reproves him in these memorable words: "And should not I spare Nineveh, that great city, wherein are more than sixscore-thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand, and also much cattle?" In other words, just because God is omnipotent and omnipresent, it behooves Him to temper His power with mercy and to consider all men as His children. Looked at from this angle, the book teaches two of the most important lessons in history, since

monotheism is established as against henotheism, and God is no longer looked at merely from the point of view of power, but from that of love and mercy, including even the mute creatures.

The Messianic hope becomes clearer and stronger under the conditions of subjection. There is that touching picture of the Servant of the Lord in Deutero-Isaiah.[2] God no longer threatens; He appeals to the people by showing them what their sins have done to His servant. And Malachi sounds the new note in a different key. "But unto you that fear my name shall the Sun of Righteousness arise with healings in its wings; and ye shall go forth, and grow up as calves of the stall. And he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to their fathers, lest I come and smite the earth with a curse."[3] The old conception is still there, for it was too firmly intrenched in the hearts of men; the new one is growing stronger, though, and sounds like a song of deliverance.

A new idea looms up here. Jehovah was always pictured as a worker; He was never the idler and the mischief-maker, as the Greek gods were pictured. He was, however, pictured as "high and lifted up," far away and unapproachable. The Servant of the Lord brought God nearer; He seemed to be working with and among men, in-

stead of driving from without. The whole conception of God became one of greater intimacy, and raised many hopes for the future.

Summing up, we find that while monotheism was a gain on the whole, its effects were not altogether wholesome on the problem of making a more independent and self-reliant man; not, at least, until the conception of God began to change. Looking, moreover, at both Greeks and Hebrews, there is a convergence of ideas, since both peoples found themselves in the clutches of an implacable force, the Greeks under that of fate and the Hebrews under that of an omnipotent deity. The effect on man was not unlike that of the scientific conception of natural law today—men feel bound and unfree, and cannot be buoyant and aspiring. Man is condemned to passivity.

Christianity came as a means of delivery from this bondage. Whatever differences there may be between the four Gospels, each of them begins with the story of a gift by God to man. Here is a fundamental difference between all the ancient religions and Christianity. Man is not required to do something: he is asked to accept something; it is the gift of God to man. The other striking difference is the first public utterance of Christ in the Sermon on the Mount. The keywords to that sermon are the following: Blessed; Light; Ful-

fill; Our Father; Judge not; Ask and ye shall receive; By their fruit shall men's religion be known. There is no demand made, no extensive ritual to be observed; there is just plain love and kindness and aspiration for God. The very simplicity and ideality of it have always appealed not only to professed Christians, but to those men who are indifferent to the churches. It is small wonder that the people were astonished at His doctrine, for here was something new in the world.

Much has been said to minimize the originality of Jesus' teachings. Love was certainly spoken of in Hebrew religion, and ethics was taught in China by Confucius as a matter of patriotism and politics; self-control was insisted on by Greek philosophers. All this is freely admitted, and yet there was something fundamentally new about Christ's teaching. It was the new attitude, the new way of approach, the new spirit of His religion. He had to take the material that was extant and with which His hearers were at least somewhat familiar in order to make any impression upon them. He deliberately used the most familiar occurrences of life to point out His lessons. If His material had been entirely new, He would not have been understood; as it was, He had to give up His life because the leaders of the Jews considered His doctrines sufficiently revolutionary. He was, more-

over, a Jew, and His social consciousness was that of His times.

Admitting all this frankly, there is still that utterly new conception of religion which He not only taught but embodied in His life and person. Such a personality was not the product of His times, since there was nothing in their conditions to produce Him. Quite the opposite kind of men were produced by those times—men violent, deceiving, hypocritical, subservient, punctilious, striving for power, advertising their own virtues. All kinds of men were brought forth by that age, but not one Jesus. He appears as being in full touch with His age, but somehow He seems to belong to all ages. We of today are just as near to and still as far from Him as His contemporaries. We know Him, and yet we do not. The least that can be said about Him is that if every man is unique, Jesus is the most unique person that has ever appeared in history. As a religious leader He brought not only His personality, but liberation to all men. And this brings us back to our topic, namely, how did His religion affect the making of men? It is not necessary to go into the details of His teaching, nor, for that matter, into Christology. For the purpose of this discussion these matters, important as they are, seem beside the point. We are concerned with religion only

from the point of view of its general attitude on the making of a higher type of man, and must stand by our problem.

We have seen that the general trend of the pre-Christian religions was toward suppression; "I am a worm and no man"[4] as the Psalmist says, is about as good a characterization of the influence of the older religions as can be found. But man did not rejoice in that attitude; it was gall and wormwood to him. He might yield to the superior power of his gods, but underneath his spirit was unbroken, as the numerous disobediences amply prove.

Man wants to be valued, roughly speaking, along two lines—personal and social. Along personal lines he wants to have satisfactions for his intellect, to broaden and deepen it; for his will, to direct toward some worthy end; for his emotions, to rejoice in the consciousness of complete union with another, if possible, higher type of being. Along social lines man wants to be valued as a human being—*i.e.*, he desires to have certain rights granted to him universally. And he wants to have these two valuations combined by having them made eternal; he wants to be immortal. In these three ways man hopes to gain full completion. It may, perhaps, be best to begin with the last point as the most general and most important.

I. Immortality is the one thing which, in some way or other, men have always sought in religion, and it is the one thing they could find nowhere else. It may, therefore, be considered the special feature and the essence of completion, since it included a number of other features. In every ancient religion there are ceremonies, prayers, acts of worship to insure this indispensable requisite to man's peace of mind. We may divide the developments of the conception of immortality into three stages. Primitive man had no clear conception of it; he 1. simply believed that he would continue to exist in some form, perhaps as a ghost such as the departed whom he saw in his dreams. It was enough for him to know that he was going to live, and he most likely did not trouble himself about the length of that life. Placing of food, clothing, and tools near the place of burial showed plainly that the departed were not deemed dead. In the second stage we find the Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, 2. and Hebrews. They had, especially the Egyptians, a fairly clear conception of a future life with its retribution for good and evil deeds done in this life; the embalming of the body was a clear sign that they expected the soul to return from time to time to its former habitat. Among the Greeks the condition of the dead was less clear, perhaps because they did not esteem that state highly.

The answer of Achilles to the question of Odysseus shows this plainly. He would rather be the lowest of slaves in the upper world than king in the nether world. The philosophers of later times developed the idea more clearly, but, since they had no conception of a personal God after polytheism had been abandoned, it always remained vague.

The Sheol of the Hebrews corresponds closely to the Hades of the Greeks. The term is sometimes translated by "grove," again by "pit," and occasionally by "hell." These are clear indications that the Hebrews had an idea of immortality, but it was vague, undesirable, uninviting. Sheol is always a place of gloom and terror. The passage in Job xix: 25-27, "For I know that my redeemer liveth," etc., is quite clear in itself, but taken in its context, it may be a figurative expression like so many other passages in that book. To the Hebrew, immortality meant more the continuation of the race and nation than that of the individual; the former was certain and assured, the latter hoped for and desired, although the place of survival was anything but inviting.

In the midst of this uncertainty came the clarion sound of Jesus: "For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him, should not perish, but have

everlasting life." The Gospel of St. John is replete with passages dealing with eternal life, and so are the Epistles as well as the Acts. While the Synoptics say comparatively little about immortality, the implication all through their Gospels and elsewhere in the New Testament is that it is taken for granted and no argument about it is needed. The only jarring note is that of the question of the Sadducees, and they promptly got an affirmative answer.[5] Later came the Resurrection with doubting Thomas and the overwhelming belief of the disciples that it had actually taken place. The evidence from the New Testament need not be multiplied, since, whatever interpretation we may put on these passages, the spirit of Jesus' and His disciples' teaching is permeated with the unquestioned assumption of immortality.

II. The second valuation, namely, the social, is likewise evident in the New Testament. Jesus speaks constantly of God as the father of men, and in many ways the idea of the brotherhood of man is brought home to us. The Kingdom of God is to be universal, and the gospel of glad tidings is to be preached to all the world. The idea of a world-encircling kingdom and brotherhood resounds time and again throughout the New Testament. What else can that mean than to give every man certain rights merely by virtue of his

sharing in the traits of mankind? Internationalism was born on the Day of Pentecost when people from all kinds of nations embraced Christianity. The unification of mankind began at that time, and has since penetrated the secular spheres of life. In our commerce, science, and, to a certain extent, politics, the world has been growing more international; but the inception of the idea was in religion.

Much has been said by historical writers to the effect that the idea of a universal kingdom was introduced into Christian teachings from the Roman Empire. We may freely admit that the *jus naturale* and the *jus gentium* of Rome had produced a spirit of internationalism and that its echo was heard in Palestine. That Christ borrowed it from Rome is not true. His whole personality was, so to say, tinged and permeated with that idea. As a Jew, He should have been intensely national; and perhaps He was. As a member of a people subjected and oppressed by Rome, He would not have been inclined to adopt an idea from the hard mistress of the world. The Jews were the only subject race who, for instance, in the matter of religion, gave the Romans much trouble by refusing to have Jehovah put on the plane of Jupiter and other gods in the Pantheon. Jesus was more pronounced in His denunciation of serving

false gods than any Hebrew prophet could have been, because He had a loftier conception of God. It is, consequently, not likely that He would adopt the idea of internationalism which was to a considerable extent based on the conception of the Pantheon. His whole attitude in religion was, furthermore, different from that of preceding religious founders, and internationalism was, so to say, natural to Him. If what was said above about the beginning of His career as a teacher is true, this statement needs no further proof.

That religion is responsible for internationalism may be proved from another angle. Monotheism was in its very nature international, as Jonah found out and as Isaiah showed long before that book was written. In the nineteenth chapter the prophet depicts the fall of Egypt as he had already described that of Assyria in Chapter xiv: 24-27, and then brings these two nations together with Judah on an equal footing in the service of God. This prophecy is dated about 720 B.C., just about the time when Romulus and Remus were still pasturing their flocks on the Seven Hills and were struggling to build a tiny village on one of them—at least, if we are to trust Livy, the historian, and distrust Virgil, the poet. Monotheism was, then, the beginning of internationalism, and Christianity gave it a definite content. This meant that man

could feel himself a citizen of the world at least in theory. If politics failed to put it into practice, that was no fault of religion. The personal attitude was, nevertheless, created in man to look at himself as having universal value, and that was the really important point toward which we have made a gradual approach during the last two thousand years. The hopes of man were aroused, his confidence in himself was strengthened, and his self-reliance began to increase. He had an opportunity for the first time in history to develop all his qualities and to become a full-orbed man.

The new development took place along the three lines of man's psychical nature. Being assured of his own worth and dignity owing to his eternal and universal value, he could proceed to develop his intellect, will, and emotions. Both polytheism and monotheism had given considerable opportunity for intellectual exertion; under polytheism he had developed a remarkable acumen how to "play one god against another," only to find in the long run that the line of divine beings stood unbroken when it became necessary to oppose mankind as a whole. The individual might attempt to utilize the jealousies of the gods for his own advantage, but he could not do it. Hence the gloom spoken of before. Under henotheism and monotheism man's greatest intellectual exercise

consisted in finding out the inscrutable decrees of God; it was a negative procedure, restrictive, limiting. It led, as among the Pharisees, to an endless devising of new regulations, the learning of which alone took nearly a man's whole time. There is, perhaps, nothing more contemptible in God's whole creation than a man who imagines that he knows the whole of His will by observing innumerable small rules. Yet, that was the effect of an attitude which was bound to obedience without an opportunity to unfold one's capacities.

With the coming of Christ there came a change. God appeared in a new light. What a change from omnipotence to fatherhood! It was overwhelming. The intellect could freely explore new regions, friendly and hospitable. The relation between man and God changed fundamentally, and man felt free to enter into the meaning of God's being a spiritual entity. When later the relation of Christ to man and to God became a matter for discussion, what an infinite realm for speculation opened up! To this day the most devout thinkers have not solved the problem. What is the real meaning of the brotherhood of man? What are its implications and ramifications? What is sin in the light of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man? In ancient times morality was strictly tribal; it was, "me and mine," who

were protected by the laws of my community; all others were outlawed; there was no protection of any kind for them and they could be killed or trapped like the birds and beasts. It was considered even a virtue to dispose of them—*e.g.*, among the head-hunters to this day. A thousand questions, deep and comprehensive, opened up, and the reason of man was furnished with untold opportunities to go ahead and find out. Small wonder that Greek and Roman philosophers were attracted to the new field of speculation. The contentions among the members of the early Church councils give ample proof of the wide scope and deep penetration of the problems to be solved. Such discussions by members of many nations had never been heard of before, because men were afraid and more divided than their gods. A new impetus was given to thinking, and men were invited to investigate. "Prove all things, hold fast that which is good."

The will had likewise a new opportunity for development. There was no longer the limitation imposed upon man that he should confine his activities to one tribal god and his people. The field became world-wide. Again, God was not jealous lest man achieve too much. He wanted man to develop every faculty. The goal set for man was higher and broader and more diversified. There was the moral perfection of God, exem-

plified in Jesus. "Be ye perfect as your Father is perfect." God set the example of a continuous worker; so did Jesus. "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." If man is to love his neighbor as himself, there is plenty of every kind of activity open to him, since the improvement of society and its members is an endless task. Love is not merely an emotion, it is a spring of action for our fellow men, and true service requires all kinds of activities. The will is, thus, given every possible incentive for action.

The emotions of man have been greatly purified and amplified through Christianity. Abject fear and dejection were characteristic of the older religions, love and hope of the Christian. Notwithstanding the extreme poverty and maltreatment of the early Christians, they were rarely without the confidence that all would be well eventually. The terrors which overcame the followers of the older religions were not theirs. They had that intimate communion with God through Jesus which is born of love and assurance that a friendly hand is guiding and encouraging us. The hymns of the various churches give many proofs of this utter trust and childlike submission to God in the midst of any circumstances. "Nearer, my God, to Thee," "Jesus, lover of my soul," "Love lifted me," are only three titles out of many that

could be mentioned. Pagan hymns may ask forgiveness, express complete obedience, praise the deity for victory or a plentiful harvest, but never with that feeling of a child having a loving father to whom one may go at all times to find comfort, or for the mere joy of manifesting one's affection. There is always a note of distance discernible in all pagan hymns, simply because man never knew exactly where he stood with his god. The Psalms and other songs in the Old Testament express a somewhat closer approach to God, and yet there is still something in the attitude which forbids too great intimacy. The Twenty-third Psalm, for instance, seems to express faith if read with our Christian preconceptions; if divested of them, the note of resignation is more dominant. It seems as if the author had tried his very best to find a way out of his difficulties and, finding the tangle hopeless, simply submits to the inevitable and hopes that he may be kindly dealt with. That was plainly the best thing he could do under a philosophy of an all-controlling and omnipotent god. Resignation is, however, negative; it is not the exuberant joy expressed, for instance, in "Love lifted me." The objection may be raised that many Christian hymns are dominated by a tone of resignation; that is true, but with a difference. The Christian knows what to resign himself to,

namely, a loving father to whom he has voluntarily submitted because he deems it best to do so. That is different from submitting to the inevitable against which struggle is vain. Confident expectation differs from involuntary submission to the unavoidable. An expansion of our whole mental nature is thus offered by the religion of Jesus.

Only a few points of the difference between pre-Christian religions and the Christian have been touched upon here. The difference is sometimes better expressed by the artist than by the philosopher, and we will let two artists speak.

The contrast between the older Greek attitude and that of modern man is well illustrated in two masterpieces of sculpture—the Laocoön group in the Vatican Gallery, and the "Man Triumphant" by the Swedish-American, David Edstrom, the model of which is in the Art Center, Washington, D. C.

The Laocoön group is an expression in marble of the Greek doctrine of surrender to fate. The priest of Apollo had endeavored to warn the people of Troy of the deceit practiced upon them by the Greeks. In doing so he was fighting against the will of the majority of the gods, who had determined the doom of Troy. Hence the serpents of Poseidon are sent to bring to naught his good advice. They come out of the Ægean Sea, encir-

cle in their folds the hapless priest and his two sons, and crush them to death. The Trojans take this as a portent, admit the wooden horse filled with Hellenic warriors into their city, and ill-fated Troy falls.

"How different by contrast are the young warriors of Edstrom, who stand back to back, grapple the serpent with confident mien and demonstrate man's ability to vanquish the powers of evil. Like the American heroes of Château-Thierry and the Argonne Forest, they joyously grapple with Nemesis in the grewsome form of a huge serpent, and win the victory against all odds.

"Edstrom's masterpiece is an epic in stone. There is a universal quality in this combat which applies to human struggle in all times and under all conditions. In this dynamic work these three invincible (because coöperating) young giants stand for ideas as well as for men, and are regarded by the artist as Initiative, Concentration, and Tenacity. We have here the essence of the artist's optimistic philosophy, his belief in man's conquest of nature through his ability to wrest its secrets from her, and in his power to overcome the weaknesses of his own heredity by his God-given powers."[6]

The reliefs on the architectural base reveal the details and processes of this great idea. In front

of each stands a heroic figure, representing a stage in man's development. The first figure is called *Thou Must*, symbolizing physical labor and adolescence when one learns that nature's laws are inexorable and must be obeyed. It seems to stagger under a load. The second figure is called *I Must;* it stands straight and expresses determination; it shows that man is able by patient study to convert the powers of nature to his own uses, and that by the exercise of his will he is able to turn the powers of his mind into channels chosen by himself. The third figure is called, *I Desire*. It goes a step further and shows that a higher realization of himself becomes possible through a vision of beauty and harmony. The figure is relaxed and sweet, confident of its ultimate victory. The fourth figure is called, *I Am*. It symbolizes the perfected human being by attaining self-mastery and world-mastery through his relation to God by love and service. The figure is serene and tranquil, because the victory is won.

One may find fault with the details of this conception, since nothing human is perfect. Each statue represents, though, the spirit of its own times. The Laocoön group is the work of three artists living in the first century B.C. Many changes had occurred since the Trojan War, when the events depicted are supposed to have taken

place. The Greeks and the Romans had achieved many notable victories in the fields of science, philosophy, and literature. But the spirit was essentially the same in the first century as in the tenth century B.C. There was still, as we have attempted to show, that attitude of helplessness in the face of the riddles of the universe. Man still had failed to find out whether he was a product of the fortuitous concurrence of atoms, or something of permanent and universal value. The Sphinx still held her secret. She had to give it up when Christ came.

The modern artist has caught the spirit of our time. He presents in a few strokes a picture of the whole development of man in the four subsidiary figures, and the fundamental difference between the ancients and ourselves in the three main figures. Man may now hope and trust in a kindly father, and he may have confidence that his striving for self-mastery is, after all, worth while and will find its reward. For, in doing so, he is building not for a paltry threescore years and ten, but for eternity.

The victory is far from being won, though. There are still many ideas current in our midst, which prevent a fuller development of man. And two of these must be discussed now.

[1] Mal. ii: 10.
[2] Isaiah liii.
[3] Mal. iv: 2 and 6.
[4] Ps. xxii, 6.
[5] Matt. xxii: 23-33.
[6] Mitchell Carroll, in *Art and Archæology*, p. 53; July-August, 1922.

VII

Miracles and Vicariousness

1. *Vicariousness a Natural Fact.*—All through the realm of higher organisms, vicariousness becomes the most important fact in the continuation and preservation of the species. Even among the insects this feature is prominent, since at least a few species—*e.g.*, ants and bees—exercise the greatest possible care for the preservation of their offspring. As we rise higher in the scale of the living, this feature seems in part abandoned, since most of the fishes and reptiles simply lay their eggs, abandon them, and often travel thousands of miles from where the young are born—*e.g.*, shad, eel, and salmon. Among the warm-blooded animals, nearly all species of birds and mammalia are most conspicuous in their solicitous care for their offspring. Practically every species of birds would become extinct in two generations were it not for the infinite trouble which at least the female takes in building the nest, sitting on the eggs, and feeding the young. Figures have been furnished by ornithologists to show that the females,

and occasionally the males, often become almost exhausted in performing this vast amount of labor.

Among the mammalia there is not only the taking care of the young, but the care which a leader takes for his herd. Among all the gregarious mammals which are usually herbivorous, the leader must protect the members of his herd against enemies if he is to retain his position. Being the leader of a herd of buffalos or of wild horses is no sinecure, since leadership implies all kinds of hazards for the benefit of the members. The leader must be alert, courageous, willing not only to fight, but to give his life for the herd or any member of it. The lending of aid is, indeed, so general among birds and mammals that Prince Peter Kropotkin could write a whole book on "Mutual Aid" among animals. It is very interesting to note that gregarious animals are more numerous, notwithstanding their poor equipment for fighting, than the predacious animals. There are many more wild sheep than lions and tigers. The difference is due to the fact that the latter have not developed the system of mutual aid to the same extent as the former; hence their young perish more easily. We have, thus, some aspects of vicariousness in the animal realm.

When we come to man, this feature is accentuated. The human being is the most helpless off-

spring at birth of any living creatures, and remains so for many months and years. The heroism—for that is what the self-sacrifice of mothers must be called—of women in taking care of their babies and little children has been one outstanding fact in the history of mankind. Whatever other failures the human race may be charged with and convicted of, the mothers have fulfilled their mission nobly and efficiently. They have had little recognition in the past; the males have used the females on the whole as toys or as drudges, and there is no more shameful chapter in history than this subjugation of woman by man. Many tribes had to pay the penalty of extinction for their cruel treatment of women, because the latter were unable to bear and rear a sufficient number of children under these revolting conditions. Herbert Spencer has given the best description of this situation:

"In the history of humanity as written, the saddest part concerns the treatment of women; and had we before us its unwritten history we should find this part still sadder. I say the saddest part, because though there have been many things more conspicuously dreadful—cannibalism, the torturings of prisoners, the sacrificings of victims to ghosts and gods—these have been but occasional; whereas the brutal treatment of woman has been universal and constant. If, looking first at their

state of subjection among the semicivilized, we pass to the uncivilized, and observe the lives of hardships borne by nearly all of them—if we then think what must have gone on among those still ruder peoples who, for so many thousands of years, roamed over the uncultivated earth, we shall infer that the amount of suffering which has been, and is, borne by women, is utterly beyond imagination. . . . Utter absence of sympathy made it inevitable that women should suffer from the egoism of men without any limit save their ability to bear the entailed hardships. Passing this limit, the ill-treatment, by rendering the women incapable of rearing a due number of children, brought about the disappearance of the tribe; and we may safely assume that multitudes of tribes disappeared from this cause, leaving behind those in which the ill-treatment was less extreme."[1]

As Spencer points out in the same place, women were perhaps as cruel when they had, for instance, an opportunity to torture prisoners. These chances came, however, only occasionally while they, as the weaker sex, had to bear maltreatment constantly, and would naturally let their suppressed emotions, which had been brutalized by their own ill-treatment, find a vent when opportunity came. They were, though, on the whole much better than the men, since the care of children demanded

the manifestation of the tender emotions. Only within comparatively recent times—*e.g.*, among the Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, and the early Christians—were women better treated and more appreciated; and only in the last few centuries have poets sung of mother love and its beneficent influence on children and nations.

This self-sacrifice of mothers is still going on. A woman almost always risks her life when she is giving birth to a child. Yet, women are not only willing but glad to go down to the "valley of the shadow of death" for the joy that a man should be born. That is only the beginning. Even among the highest animals offspring need the care of parents, although for only a short time. The period of lactation is short, and the young bring their equipment for life's struggles with them in the form of instincts through physical heredity. In a few years at the most they are able to look after themselves. The function of the animal mother is chiefly to give life. In the human realm this function must be supplemented by that of education. This requires much more time and energy, and more self-denial. It spreads over many years, and hardly ceases even after the children have reached adult age. To one who has not had an opportunity to observe the sacrifices, the self-denials, the constant care and worry of mothers

among the poor, the lifting of the veil into some poor family's life would be nothing short of a revelation; and not only there, but among many professional people—the teachers, the physicians, the clerks in government service. These families must maintain a certain social standard as to dress and housing, entertainment and education of the children. If one could know all that goes on behind the scenes in these professional families, one would marvel at the goodness and courage of human beings, since on small salaries they not only maintain a good appearance, but a bright and hopeful outlook upon life, and often give exceptionally valuable sons and daughters to society. The fathers are very often close competitors for honor in this respect, although their opportunities are somewhat more limited. It was a beautiful and, let us hope, a useful idea which prompted a woman—herself denied the privilege of wifehood and motherhood—to advocate the observance of a "Mother's Day" in our churches. Its fairly general adoption proves that the American people are sound as a whole, since otherwise the project would have failed. The fathers should be honored similarly either on the same day or on a separate Sunday.

Out of this vicarious suffering of parents, especially of mothers, have grown some of the most

beautiful fruits of civilization—the tenderness for the helpless, love and kindness and forbearance and sympathy for those in the family circle, and eventually for those without. And it is these qualities that have lifted mankind to higher planes of living, not our skyscrapers and steamships and airplanes. Self-sacrifice and vicarious suffering always produce high qualities, if not immediately, then later. Vicariousness is the principle of life, and life will not be mocked.

The principle works also in society, although it seems less evident there. All through the history of man the few have borne the burdens of the many, and just as in the case of women referred to, so we find here that those societies perished which did not give these exceptional men at least a fair chance. For, it is one thing to be willing to work for others; it is another thing to be granted the privilege of doing so. These standard bearers have had such a great influence on the progress of society that a brief discussion of their work is necessary.

2. *Great Personalities in History.*—There are two sociological theories to account for progress—the mass theory and the great-man theory. According to the former, progress is to be accounted for by the gradual rise of the masses to higher planes. This rise is considered to be the product

of evolution. The defenders of this theory contend that if sociology is ever to become scientific, it must deal with the masses as the vehicle of progress—*e.g.*, it must adopt the quantitative standard as is done by the more exact sciences. The great-man theory, they say, deals with qualitative standards which can never give reliable measurements. Just as in chemistry it is comparatively easy to find out what particular elements are contained in a mixture, so it is easy to point out certain great men in history as the bearers and originators of progress. But chemistry never got very far until it resorted to quantitative measurements and found out in what exact proportions each element was present in a mixture. Sociology must do the same, and give up the comparatively easy method of depending on the quality of a few great men in accounting for progress. That means the adoption of a quantitative standard or an analysis of the masses.

There is a confusion here between the organic and the inorganic. In the inorganic realm certain elements always combine in the same ratio and give the same results; in the organic, the same combination of elements may give very different results, owing to the presence of that hitherto unanalyzable factor called life. Cellulose has the formula $C_6 H_{10} O_5$; starch has exactly the same

formula, $C_6 H_{10} O_5$; yet they are different substances. Starch is soluble in hot water; cellulose is not. The difference in the two substances is supposedly due to the difference in the position or linking of the atoms. Since this is still unknown the formulæ are given as follows:

Starch $(C_6 H_{10} O_5)$ x.
Cellulose $(C_6 H_{10} O_5)$ y.

The x and the y represent the unknown factor of position or linkage.

It is evident from this simple illustration that where life, even in the simple form of carbon compounds, is present, exact measurements are no longer possible. When we come to the highest forms of life, the unknown factor becomes increasingly greater and more important. Differences in capacity between individuals become more striking. The attempt to level up or down the highly and the lowly endowed individuals in the mythical average man or in a statistical table, has always resulted in failure or confusion. Quantity or number among human beings does count, but quality is more important for progress.

The Chinese Empire has always had a large quantity of human material, but quality has been scarce. Confucius, who lived about 2,400 years ago, still has great influence in that country, owing

to the general poverty of the human harvest in succeeding centuries. Holland, compared with Russia, is a little bit of a country from the point of view both of size and of population, but its influence on culture during the last few centuries has been considerably greater than that of Russia. This much by way of general argument.

When we come down to specific cases, the influence of quality, or that of the great man, is still more apparent. The older historians were justified in treating history essentially as the story of great men; their fault lay in overemphasizing that influence and neglecting the masses altogether. A proper relation must exist between quality and quantity of population if progress is to result. It is true, for instance, that a Newton could not have arisen among the several thousand Hottentots, owing to the very low civilizational level among those people, but it is just as true that among the several million Englishmen living around the year 1700 only one, namely, Isaac Newton, had the capacity to discover the law of gravitation. Progress must proceed from the level of the general socialized intelligence of a particular period, but always only the more gifted few are able to pass beyond that, owing to their ability to invent or discover something new on the basis of the known. Great men have always been the initiators and directors of

progress, and they have always been recognized as such.

These men have usually acted in a vicarious rôle among their fellow men. They not only bore the brunt of the burden of progress, but often had to pay for their ideas with their lives, and more frequently by being persecuted. They have, almost literally speaking, been the scapegoats of human advance.

The great men may for our purpose be divided into two classes—those who brought temporal goods, and those who brought spiritual goods. The former have, as a rule, fared better at the hands of society than the latter. The reason for the difference is obvious. The man who invented the bow and arrow and made possible the killing of more game and wild beasts at a safer distance, appealed to the practical sense of even the dullest-minded and most selfish, and he was praised. The man, on the other hand, who demanded social justice and higher morality offended the rich and the powerful as well as the poor and the lowly. Jerusalem killed her prophets, not her captains of agriculture who taught the Hebrews that farming was more profitable than the pasturing of herds and flocks. In earlier times men needed relief from physical dangers, and everybody could appreciate the seven labors of Hercules, the feats

of Theseus and Beowulf and Siegfried and St. George and St. Patrick. These men were deified, while the moral reformers were usually crucified. This distinction has been made all through the ages, simply because the one class conferred material benefits upon the race, while the other demanded moral regeneration. That does not mean, though, a disparagement of the material benefactors; they suffered for their fellow men in executing Herculean tasks.

A new situation arose with the advent of modern times when science began to go its own way independently of theology. The names of Giordano Bruno and of Galileo are the most familiar, but not the only ones of those men who suffered vicariously for mankind. In modern times scientists, especially physicians, expose themselves to all kinds of dangers to liberate men from error or from disease. The discovery of the cause of yellow fever is one of the best known recent examples. Two physicians and a nurse volunteered to serve as experiments; one physician, Dr. Lazear, and the nurse lost their lives. Dr. Caroll survived. In another experiment several privates of the United States army volunteered their services, although the risk of losing their lives was fully explained to them. One, John J. Moran, was chosen for the critical task, and he too sur-

vived. That was in 1900. Since that date the age-long scourge of the Western Hemisphere has been wiped out, and the lives of many thousand people have been saved and the loss of millions of dollars in property has been obviated. Again, these are but a few names out of many. All these men suffered vicariously for their fellow men.

The general conclusion we reach then, is. Vicariousness is one of the most fundamental laws of nature in the promotion of evolution, and one of the most basic principles in human progress. The burdens of the world have always been carried by the few, and the many have appreciated this fact but slowly, if at all.

3. *Religion and Vicariousness.*—In religion vicariousness is just as much a fact as in other spheres of life. The great religious innovators and the moral reformers bore the burden of their fellows and often sealed their convictions with death. Unfortunately for the whole trend of religious development, this natural law was perverted into a demand for conciliating the gods. The idea of sacrifice for averting their anger, and that of an offering for retaining their good will, necessarily crept into the religious conceptions of earlier times, since that religion was based almost exclusively on economic relations. The conception of the gods as jealous of one another, as arbitrary and spiteful,

in other words as very human, strengthened the idea of the necessity of sacrifices and offerings. And the devices which men concocted to escape the wrath of the gods were not only numerous, but in many cases most revolting. With the limitation in the number of the gods, sacrifices became fewer in number, but often more exacting in nature—*e.g.*, human sacrifices instead of the first fruits of the field or of the flock. With the moralization and the universalization of Jehovah among the Hebrews, a new turn was given to the idea of sacrifice and conciliation.

We saw in the preceding chapter that the ideas of henotheism and monotheism really limited the liberty of man, since there was no escape from omnipotence either in the same country or in any other. This is the argument of the book of Jonah; hence abject submission and absolute obedience is all that is left to man. The moralization of the deity had a similarly restricting influence. As long as the deity was not supposed to be "above reproach," man could cast about for something that would be acceptable to the god, and the great variety of sacrifices and offerings is testimony to this fact. The moralization of Jehovah—to take the most specific case—had two effects: it strengthened the priestly conception of ritual purity, on the one

hand, and gave a new impetus to the prophetic conception of religion as a moral life, on the other.

The idea of Jehovah as perfectly holy occurs but rarely in the older Hebrew writings. He is more the "jealous God" who visits the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate Him, but shows mercy unto thousands of them that love Him and keep His commandments. He seems to be still engaged, in part at least, in establishing this supremacy over other gods. In this battle the idea of His purity and holiness became an auxiliary weapon. The horrors and abominations of the religious practices among the various neighbors of the Hebrews must have shocked the more sensitive men in Israel. For, lower though their moral standard may be, compared with ours, it was very much higher than that of the different peoples in and around Palestine. Hence, Jehovah was declared not only more powerful, but purer and holier than other gods. And the best minds among the Hebrews—it is *their* attitude only which can be considered here, since that of the common people was often lamentably low—hammered away at this idea and embodied it into the Hebrew institutions. The different steps cannot be traced here, since it would require a detailed study of the different periods in Hebrew religious

and secular history. Intimations have been given in Chapter VI of the higher moral character of the Hebrews. Eventually the higher idea prevailed and was considered the official doctrine. It was here where the split between the priestly and the prophetic ideal occurred—the priests developed the idea of holiness until Jehovah appeared almost unapproachable, while the prophets utilized it for emphasizing righteousness of life. A brief discussion of each is necessary.

In proportion as the holiness of Jehovah was stressed, the sinfulness of man appeared the greater; it was, indeed, the foil for His absolute purity. Hence, the ritual of making sacrifices was carefully prescribed; they could be offered in one place only, the temple of Jerusalem; and by one set of men only, the priests of the House of Aaron. The whole tribe of Levy was set apart to order the temple services, not only in the most ornate and decorous manner, but with strict fidelity to an elaborate ritual. And the sacrifices and offerings constituted the principal part of it. The gap between man and God tended thus to become wider on ethical grounds, as it had already become wider on metaphysical grounds. Eventually the futility of these sacrifices must have been brought home to the Hebrews. Israel became a castaway and its members were lost in the Assyrian captiv-

ity, never to be heard of again. The members of the Kingdom of Judah might have ascribed this catastrophe to Israel's departure from the true faith. But less than a century and a half later Judah shared the same fate at the hands of Babylon; Jerusalem was taken and the temple itself destroyed. The second temple, built after the return from the exile, lacked two of the apparently most important insignia, namely, the breastplate of the high priest with its Urim and Thummim, and the Ark of the Covenant. This, too, was destroyed later, and Herod's restoration of it must have lacked many features dear to the true Hebrew. There was evidently something wrong in the conception of sacrifices for the purpose of conciliating Jehovah. What could it be?

There was one explanation offered by the increasing sophistication due to the contact of the Jews with Greek and Roman philosophy. To what extent it had penetrated Jewish thought about the beginning of the Christian era cannot be ascertained accurately. The parties of the Sadducees and Essenes prove that such an influence existed. They cared but little for the higher ideals of Judaism and were chiefly interested in the promotion of secular matters—the former in the enjoyment of life and the control of the people; the latter in the formation of communistic settlements

chiefly in country districts. The Scribes and the Pharisees, on the other hand, may be called the "fundamentalists" of their time; they not only believed in the law as it stood, but in the unwritten law supposed to have been handed down by tradition. These two parties were sharply opposed to the Sadducees and Essenes, and tried to solve the problem of their people by increasingly minute extensions of the law. Perhaps nothing else could be done under the circumstances. Both the metaphysical and ethical attributes had made Jehovah unapproachable, and men sought comfort in the observance of endless details, as always happens when the substance is gone and only the shadow remains.

The idea of the necessity and effectiveness of sacrifices was, however, too strongly intrenched in the human mind to be given up. Man was, perhaps, too unworthy to make a proper sacrifice, too sinful even to approach Jehovah. Yet, sacrifice there must be if there was to be a conciliation of God to man. It must, however, be sufficiently pure and great to be worthy of Him. *Man could not make it, so God must make it.* The *impasse* into which the relation of Jehovah and His people had fallen could not be relieved in any other manner. The idea of the God-man readily suggested itself under the circumstances, and Paul, the

"Pharisee of Pharisees," took hold of the problem and tried to solve it. He started from two opposite but complementary propositions, already given in the situation—the utter unworthiness of man, and the absolute perfection of God.

On the basis of the first proposition he worked out the theory of the total depravity of human nature; on the basis of the other, that of the perfect glory and majesty of God. The conclusion was the necessity of the sacrificial death of the God-man; the corollary was justification by faith. The larger part of the Epistle to the Romans is devoted to this problem, and need not be discussed further. The theory of atonement was elaborated in the post-Apostolic age and by the Church Fathers, and was fastened upon the Church, where it held undimmed sway. It was attacked repeatedly as unworthy of God as the Father of men, but the attacks were warded off and the theory became the official doctrine of the Church. The priestly ideal came thus to its logical culmination and put a power into the hands of an ecclesiastical hierarchy unequaled by that of any secular potentate known in history. The doctrinaires have had their way because this forensic process of justification by faith was much more readily understood by the worldly-minded major-

ity than the inner life of spirituality and service. It has led to some curious paradoxes.

According to the strict official interpretation of this doctrine, whether in the Protestant or in the Roman Catholic church, nobody can enter the Kingdom of Heaven except a believer in the creeds, at least those of the Ecumenical Councils. No matter how worthy and useful a life a person may have lived, his deeds are merely *vitia splendida*; while another person who may have squandered his human birthright and done all he could to advance his own selfish interests may be and is saved by repenting his sins a few days before his death. To put it concretely and choose one example from the past so as not to give offense by a reference to modern men, there was Charles V, the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire during the time of the Reformation. His one and only ambition in life was to increase the power of his dynasty by bringing as many peoples under its despotic sway as he could cajole by trickery and force by military arms. Nothing was sacred to him when it stood in his way—persecution, breach of treaty, were mere incidents to further his ends. Two years before his death he retired to a monastery, donned a monk's cowl, and died officially in the odor of sanctity. There are, on the other hand, Pierre and Marie Curie, known the world over for their

services to science and to mankind, working for years with poor equipment and in poverty to make a great contribution to man's welfare. They refused to sell their discovery by having it patented and becoming rich. "There were no patents. We are working in the interests of science. Radium is not to enrich anyone. Radium is an element. It belongs to all the people." Their private life equaled their official life in simplicity and singular devotion to each other. Yet Pierre, already passed into the Great Beyond, is not saved according to this doctrine of the Churches. Truly a paradox.

It was paradoxes of this kind—for, *mutatis mutandis*, they have always existed—that called forth the protest against and the denunciation of official religion by the prophets and by Jesus. They considered religion a moral life rather than ritual performances and the bringing of sacrifices for conciliating God. The well-known passage in the opening chapter of Isaiah gives the keynote to all the teaching of the prophets: "To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord: I am full of the burnt offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts; and I delight not in the blood of the bullocks, or of lambs, or of he-goats." They are vain oblations and an abomination together with all the other externalities of religion, including even sacrificial prayers. "Wash

you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil, learn to do well; seek judgment; relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow." Just because the prophets were with few exceptions men of and from the people, they protested against the official religion which united the priests and the kings for the exploitation of the masses. The opening sermon of Jesus likewise speaks of proper religious attitudes and actions, not of sacrifices and ritual observances.

Sin is not condoned either by the prophets or by Jesus; it is condemned in the strongest and most scathing terms. It is, however, not to be got rid of in the convenient manner of the official religion by means of a sacrifice. To begin with, evil-doing is not something unavoidable. Men may and can live upright lives. Then why not act rightly? Why insist constantly on the weakness and wickedness of man? It leads him to think that he is really as he is painted to be. In the opening chapter of his epistle St. James assumes all through that men may do what is right, and tells in plain terms what he considers religion to be. It is plain, sensible, good action within the reach of everyone, not something to be sought afar off. "Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this: To visit the fatherless and

widows in their affliction and to keep himself unspotted from the world." Right action or "works" imply faith or a spiritual attitude toward God and man. And faith, according to St. Paul, implies right action, or it is according to both apostles "dead." For, even justification by faith is ultimately not for its own sake, but for the sake of the new life. As soon as St. Paul looks at the religion of the Master without a philosophical bias, he insists as emphatically on the purity and uprightness of life as his apparent antagonist, St. James, does. It is as a philosopher and as the systematizer of the new religion that the Apostle to the Gentiles takes the priestly conception, because the whole religious background of both Jews and pagans demanded a philosophy. And one of the principal features in that philosophy was a sacrifice for sin. It was comparatively easy to prove the superiority of the new religion from this point of view—the one perfect God demanding a perfect sacrifice, and since man could not possibly make it, He made it Himself. That was plausible and convincing, and people gladly accepted it.

It was infinitely more difficult to convince people that Christianity meant a Christ-life; and St. Paul had ample opportunity to witness that when he observed the Corinthians and the Ephesians and other believers. It is not easy to philosophize

about a righteous life. That is its own *raison d'être.* It stands out plainly; it needs no defense nor argument. This has always been the case. The young theologian just escaped from the seminary with his diploma will preach eloquently about almost any doctrine of the Church; but he is blundering when it comes to touching the emotions and leading his people to righteousness. The priest has always had an easier task than the prophet. Yet, that is the one thing which the new religion has always stood for and which the true disciples of Jesus have persistently striven to exemplify in their lives, usually without much concern about theology. It is the one thing that fired the imagination of the early Christians, and was the envy of the pagans. "Behold, how they love one another!" It was the driving force for that semi-communistic experiment in the first church at Jerusalem. It has been the "salt of the earth" and the salvation of the Church. Without it, Christianity would long since have disappeared and gone the way of other religions. It is today the main dependence of civilized nations. Theology may be and is on the defensive; religion as a life is on the offensive and in the ascendance. No evil power in the world can withstand it, and it is bound to prove victorious.

4. *Conversion.*—One result of the priestly con-

ception that God alone could and must provide a sacrifice was an overemphasis on conversion. If the "natural man" was totally depraved, how was he going to be saved? He could plainly not appreciate what had been done for him, and, being blind, he could not see. A miracle was necessary to open his eyes. A long series of theological doctrines was hung on this thin thread. The situation was as follows:

If God alone could provide a proper sacrifice, he naturally had the right to decide on the beneficiaries of it. And since men were totally depraved they could and would not accept the invitation to a Christ-life. What was to be done? God could not be mocked. There was no rational way out of the dilemma, so an irrational expedient was resorted to; the priestly mind has always been logical even at the risk of sanity. A miracle had to be done—the unwilling had to be made willing, the free personality had to be forced into accepting what he did not want and stubbornly fought against. Whether it would have entailed too much effort on the part of omnipotence to subject all men within the hearing of the gospel to this pressure, or whether God's glory was equally increased by letting the majority be lost, has been a serious question among many of the older theologians. They had a good basis for discussion in the Epistle

to the Romans, especially in the ninth chapter, where the Old Testament figure of man being like clay in the hands of the potter is accentuated by having the artisan turn one lump into a vessel of honor and another lump into a vessel of dishonor. By implication, at least, God has even more power and a clearer right to do as he pleases with men. The idea could not, of course, be put quite that bluntly, so the term "grace" was introduced to show that God did not lose any of his moral greatness by "passing by" most people. It was the picture of an Oriental despot whose unlimited power may be exercised arbitrarily. Those who become its beneficiaries have no reason to rejoice —perhaps they never had—and the victims certainly have no right to complain. So God simply forced some men to accept his grace and they were converted in a manner that must be considered truly miraculous.

But when was their conversion and, naturally enough, their continuance in a state of grace determined upon? Here was a wide field for speculation. Predestination might have taken place before or after Adam and Eve spoiled the plan of the Almighty by eating of the fateful apple. And so there are "supra" and "infra" lapsarians. The problem of how the individual man is to know whether he is elected or not is very complicated

and has in many cases given rise to the most gloomy forebodings and the utmost despair. How simple and reassuring, on the other hand, the statement of Jesus: "For whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in Heaven, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother."[2] A theologian, young and cocksure in his newly acquired knowledge, stated to the author in the days of Robert Ingersoll's attacks on religion, that he could make ten times more damaging statements than that lecturer. He was well versed in all the arguments of the old-school theology, and deemed the election of a few men the greatest tribute to divine mercy. This view is no longer held by men who have some regard for human dignity; conversion is a natural process with them.

The power of new ideas has always been recognized as sufficient to turn men into new channels of action. This principle applies not only to religion, but to every important aspect of life. The idea of a Christ-life makes an appeal to every normal man. As such it is, however, more or less abstract. It must be embodied in a human being; if so, it makes a powerful appeal which many persons feel unable to resist, and, if proper measures are taken, they will gladly embrace the opportunity to live righteous lives. For, the sinner and the criminal are not at unity with themselves.

But disunity cannot be endured for long. A man must somehow or other justify himself to himself, or go insane.

There is a slight split in every man's consciousness, owing to the fact that there is always a difference between what he is and what he wants to be, or between reality and ideal. He can no more avoid that than he can avoid breathing and living. It is the urge for completion throughout organic nature, as we have seen before. This urge becomes a desire in man, and leads to the establishment of ideals which always keep ahead of actual achievements. This capacity leads to progress. Every community has an ideal which is set up before the individual and which he unconsciously absorbs. Only the leaders transcend that ideal, owing to their capacity to establish a higher one. The average individual finds, then, a certain ideal before him, and he finds that all the forces in his environment as well as his own consciousness urge him on to conform to it. If he lags far behind it, the split between the actual and the possible widens. What happens? He becomes miserable; he becomes aware of too great a discrepancy between what he is and what he ought to be. There are numerous and varied agencies which call his attention to his shortcomings. The school, his family, his associates, the general tone of the com-

munity—all send out a call for repentance. He himself longs for unity so as to escape his misery. Expectation is aroused that he may have it; hope is engendered that it is within reach. Only a proper stimulus is needed to bring the matter to a focus. Such a stimulus may come in many ways; but it comes chiefly from a person who is living a Christian life. It may come by direct contact or indirectly through reading or in some other way. What needs to be emphasized is that the ideal is rarely, if ever, abstract, but always concrete and definite.

And this search for unity and consequent peace very often comes at the time of puberty when the mental equilibrium is upset owing to physical disturbances. There is a call for the enlargement of life and for new and broader activity. This change is in many countries of Europe accompanied by an actual change in occupation—from school to work. The transition is marked by "confirmation" about the age of fourteen for girls and fifteen for boys. The whole nature of the boys and girls is in a receptive mood for guidance and direction. In the denominations which do not administer "confirmation" there are many young people who join a church at this age just because it is the period of enlarging ideals to which the boys and girls wish to conform. The process is natural and

should be normal with all young people. It is an aberration from the normal if they are allowed to pass through this impressionable age without an appeal being made to their responsive minds to "seek God" and find completion in communion with Him and peace through unity with themselves and the best elements in their environment.

5. *Miracles.*—The modern man, if educated, looks askance at miracles of any kind. He may be just as much a follower of Christ in his daily life, be devoted to social welfare, and believe in spirituality, as the other man who implicitly believes in miracles as direct interferences of God with the natural order. He certainly does not believe in the suspension of natural law by direct divine volition for the benefit of any particular human individual. The disinclination to believe in miracles is based on the modern scientific conception of the law of cause and effect. This law means, briefly, that every physical effect has a physical cause. Translated into terms of religion it means that every spiritual effect has a spiritual cause.

The law of cause and effect has always been a part of man's reasoning; he cannot think except in terms of that law. There is, however, a world-wide difference whether that law is conceived and applied scientifically or spuriously. In the distant

past it was usually applied in a spurious manner. When the cave man believed that by representing the stag he had drawn on the wall of his cave as pierced by arrows he would be successful in the chase, he applied the law of cause and effect; it was a spurious conception, and we call it magic. When the Shaman of today believes or pretends to believe that by the exact repetition of his formula of incantation in word, modulation of voice, and gesture, the spirit has to obey and do his bidding, he applies that law, but in a spurious manner. When the Russian peasant believes that he will escape drowning by carrying an amulet around his neck, he applies the law of cause and effect in a spurious manner. All through the ages men have twisted and turned and performed mental acrobatics to escape the consequences of their own actions or produce a desired result without well directed effort, but all in vain.

The fundamental teachings of the Old and the New Testaments agree on the operation of this law in a scientific sense—*i.e.*, that physical effects have physical causes. "The iniquities of the fathers shall be visited upon the children unto the third and fourth generation." That does not mean that the evildoer shall escape the consequences of his deeds; it means that even his children will have to suffer for their elders' misdeeds. The former

interpretation was evidently put on this passage by some unnatural parents who imagined that as long as they escaped the consequences of their iniquities, their children would have to look out for themselves. On the other hand, some Hebrews blamed their ancestors for their troubles and attempted to shift responsibility by referring to their fathers' eating of sour grapes. This interpretation is corrected by both Jeremiah and Ezekiel. Jeremiah warns very distinctly against a possible escape from having one's teeth set on edge after eating sour grapes: "but every one shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eateth sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge."[3] In Ezekiel[4] the idea of individual responsibility is brought home very strikingly. The sinner shall die, but he that is righteous and abstains from evildoing shall live. The law of cause and effect is thus upheld. Again, Jesus emphatically declares that we "cannot gather figs from thistles and grapes from thorns"; and St. Paul is no less emphatic in telling us that "whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap."[5] The very fact that this perfectly plain law has been "side-tracked," and that escape from iniquity of every kind was sought in sacrifices and other acts of propitiation, is evidence of the inclination of man to shun responsibility. The attempt has never succeeded. Mod-

ern man has made that great discovery in the spiritual world, and our whole morality has been put on a higher plane as a result of it. Man has learned that he is a free individual, that he is responsible for his actions, and that he must apply the law of cause and effect to his moral and spiritual life. He is disinclined to believe in miracles.

Whether miracles have happened, can be neither proved nor disproved. The scientifically trained man would deny the possibility on *a priori* grounds, because according to his reasoning there is no room for them in the economy of nature. Whatever happens there is the result of a combination of preceding forces. These forces may in many cases be unknown, but they must, according to scientific reasoning, be natural or physical; no others are admitted. In the psychical realm, the scientist is perhaps less dogmatic about the nature of these forces, but even there he adheres strictly to the law of cause and effect in the sense that what *is* is the product of what *was*. There is, thus, no way of arguing with a man of that type.

Some religious people manifest a strange inconsistency in regard to miracles. They are inclined to accept those claimed for their own religion, and to deny those claimed for others; or, if they admit the latter as actual, they ascribe them to evil spirits. They are predisposed to accept miracles at

least as possible, if not probable. If the historical evidence seems fairly reliable, they believe them to be actual. But few of these people are sufficiently trained in the methods of evaluating matters pertaining to testimony and evidence. They are apt to consider anything true which seems to favor their inclination toward belief. They are, however, just as much disposed to accept miracles on *a priori* grounds as the scientist is disposed to deny them. The battle for and against miracles has been waged to and fro without any decision. The question need not detain us, since, as we shall see presently, miracles are not essential to spiritual religion.

If miracles—in the sense of the temporary suspension of natural laws in particular cases—do not happen, what are we to think of the strange occurrences reported not only in the Bible and in the past, but elsewhere and today? There are new discoveries made almost every day, not only by chemists and physicists in the inorganic field, but by psychologists in the field of mentality. Inorganic matter is no longer considered the inert, dead substance, as it was in the past. Scientists speak now of energies and forces, of attraction and repulsion, of positive and negative polarity. The term "substance" is hardly ever used in our own days because matter, whatever it may be, is

no longer considered as static, but as dynamic. In the realm of the psychic, we have learned likewise that there are many hidden depths in the human mind, few of which have been fully explored. Owing to the needs of life, we have developed chiefly our intellect and will—*i.e.*, the objective aspect of our mind; the feelings and emotions or the subjective aspect, still present a *terra incognita*. Some men have always had the power to affect others in a striking and impressive manner, and a certain type of man has been peculiarly susceptible to such influences. Early religion predisposed men to trust in the efficacy of unknown powers, since it had its starting point there. Some men have always been more easily and permanently impressed than others, and with the whole weight of religion being thrown on the side of the miraculous, an expectancy was engendered in nearly all men, but particularly in those of a primarily emotional disposition and a subjective or introspective tendency. About this type of mind very little is known scientifically just because it is subjective and, therefore, difficult of access. What hidden powers there may lurk in such men's consciousness, both of those who have the capacity of impressing and those who have the susceptibility of being impressed, no one knows today, and certainly no one knew in the past. The

capacity for impressing and susceptibility of being impressed were most likely more prevalent in the past, because men's attitude toward the miraculous was more favorable, owing to the greater dependence of man on the deity and his lesser knowledge of the world about him. Man, as we have seen, was always and in everything looking for some unexpected interference of some deity. We, on the other hand, explore, investigate, form our aims, and then adapt means to ends. Our whole attitude is, consequently, one of greater self-reliance and of trust in the laws of nature and the powers of our own mind. We know more about the relation of mind and the nervous system, but our knowledge is still very limited. "Of all the myriad activities in the nervous system only a few can be known at any moment."[6] "Very little of the nervous action is really accompanied by consciousness, although a very large part of that activity has an effect upon consciousness."[7]

Consciousness is limited in most cases to the things referred to or meant, rather than to the elements that are supposed to carry the meaning. Each group of nervous elements may by its activity contribute to the consciousness of the total, but the conditions of consciousness must still be regarded as obscure. In view of this limited knowledge, it seems wise not to deny too hastily

certain strange occurrences, especially in the realm of healing, and wiser to suspend judgment until further investigations give us more insight into the conditions of consciousness and the special powers and susceptibilities some men had in the past and others have today. That still leaves one question open, namely, whether miracles are necessary to religion. *By miracles we mean events in the natural world, but out of the established order, and possible only by the intervention and exertion of divine power.*

Definition of Miracle

6. *Miracles not Essential to Religion.*—Our concern is now exclusively with the Christian religion, since we are apt to discredit the claims of other religions to miraculous power on the part of their founders. The argument against the necessity of miracles to religion may be divided into four parts—the attitude of Jesus; the worthlessness of miracles for spiritual power; the greater spirituality of those Churches which lay little stress on miracles; the greater efficiency of medical science in healing, and particularly in preventing, disease.

I. The Attitude of Jesus.—Many miracles are reported in the New Testament, but the attitude of Jesus seems to have been one of resentment against the necessity of having to perform them. His infinite pity went out to the suffering of every

kind, and He did what He could for them by relieving them from their distress. Just what His power was need not be discussed now, but He certainly did not seem to delight in the necessity of performing miracles. We get the impression that if there had been any other way of relieving the distress He would certainly have done so; and in His attitude toward those who needed miracles in order to believe we plainly find a note of impatience as toward a fretting and willful child that has to be humored.

In the story of the Temptation Jesus point-blank refuses to perform a miracle, because—in the order given by St. Matthew—the first two temptations would have involved a breaking of the natural order, and the third would have required the relinquishing of the difficult task to win the world by moral force. He was certainly unwilling to break the natural order; bread should be procured by tilling of the soil, the sowing of the seed, and caring for it until harvest time. That is the natural and, therefore, the divine order by which man must live; it is the "word" that had proceeded out of the mouth of God long before the advent of Christ, and men had tried in vain to break it, for "if any would not work, neither should he eat."[8] Work was the ancient Hebrew order given to Adam after the expulsion from the Garden of

Eden, and enforced all through the Old Testament. Whatever the Hebrews may be guilty of, idleness has never been charged against them as a race. The very fact that their learned men or scholars were obliged to learn some trade so as to make a living independently of their teaching is sufficient evidence that work was valued as a necessity and as a physical and moral discipline. And St. Paul in writing to the Thessalonians not only emphasizes work, but sets a good example. For Jesus to break this order would have meant to be untrue to His own early training and to the whole Hebrew tradition. The invitation to cast Himself from the pinnacle of the temple He plainly rejects as a temptation of God because it would involve a breaking of the natural order. To win the world by the easy process of conforming to its wishes He regards as apostasy. The method of winning it by the slow operation of moral forces is infinitely harder, but it is the only one that would succeed. For, we never possess anything in the true sense of the word, except that into which we have put our own physical and mental energy. That, again, is the natural and spiritual order which Jesus could and would not break by performing a miracle, since that would not have solved the problem of man's spiritual growth by the slow process of working for it.

This is an additional reason why conversion was rejected above as being a miracle. Jesus stood, then, by the natural—*i.e.*, divine—order in all three temptations.

The attitude of Jesus toward those who sought signs or wonders in order to believe is strikingly expressed in the words: "An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign."[9] The illustrations which follow these words show plainly that the people of Nineveh were spared because of their repentance, not because of Jonah's sojourn in the whale's belly, and that "the queen of the south" stands above the Pharisees because she loved wisdom for its own sake and was willing to undergo the hardships of a long journey to acquire it. Again, He insists on the moral qualities as superior to miracle working. The most striking repudiation of miracles as necessary to faith is found in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, (Luke xvi: 19-31). Dives wanted to save his five brothers from the fate which had overcome him by asking that one from the dead should be sent to preach to them. Twice the demand is refused in the words: "They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them. . . . If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead." Once more

Jesus insists that a moral and spiritual life is the way to salvation, not miracles.

II. The Worthlessness of Miracles for Spiritual Power.—One of the strongest phenomena in the history of all religions, especially of the Christian, is the emphasis placed upon miracles as a verification of their claims and as an authentication of their origin. The Roman Catholic Church has developed a regular system for passing certain deceased persons through beatification to canonization, the last step depending on evidence produced to show that miracles were performed after beatification upon the candidate's intercession. Yet, the most significant aspect about miracles is their almost complete worthlessness for the higher and the larger spiritual life. Some people are, of course, awed with veneration when they are told about or claim to see a miracle. That, however, seems to end the story. It has apparently no power to raise them to a higher plane; there may be a few exceptions to this rule, but in the light of history there are certainly not many. This statement applies not only to observers, but to the beneficiaries of miracles, at least when the probe of intelligent investigation is applied. There are, naturally, hundreds of stories current about the saintliness of saints; they originated, though, at a time when credulity ran high and was deemed a

virtue. Just as spiritistic phenomena are firmly believed in by many people today, so miracles were in the past. For, a certain type of mind will and must have miracles, notwithstanding the denunciation by Jesus.

It is difficult to ascertain the number of miracles credited to Jesus. In the Gospels there are thirty-eight distinct references, most of them relating to persons healed of some infirmities. In several of the passages two or more persons are the beneficiaries of Jesus's power—*e.g.*, the cleansing of the ten lepers reported by St. Luke. The number of miracles may be larger than actually reported, since St. John at the end of his gospel credits Christ with many more "things which Jesus did, the which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written." In the feeding of the four thousand and that of the five thousand we have, all told, nine thousand persons as beneficiaries of miracles; allowing for the persons reported in other cases and for those "other things which Jesus did," an additional thousand, we would have a total of ten thousand. This number should give us a fair estimate of the moral influence wrought by miracles. Such an influence is necessary according to the older view of Chris-

tianity. Only one passage need be quoted from an elaborate argument along this line:

"Furthermore, whatever ends may be contemplated by the Deity for the laws of nature in reference to the rest of the universe—(in which question we have as little information as interest)—we know that, in respect of us, they answer discernible moral ends—that they place us, practically, under government, conducted in the way of rewards and punishment—a government of which the *tendency* is to encourage virtue and to repress vice—and to form in us a certain character by discipline; which character our moral nature compels us to consider as the highest and worthiest object which we can pursue. Since, therefore, the laws of nature have, in reference to us, moral purposes to answer which (as far as we can judge) they have not to serve in other respects, it seems not incredible that these peculiar purposes should occasionally require modifications of those laws in relation to us, which are not necessary in relation to other parts of the universe." [10]

This quotation is from a theologian of the older school, and represents the trend of theology down to recent times very ably. It means practically this: *No miracles, no Christianity*. Is that true? Have these men looked at the facts?

So far as the writer has been able to find out,

not one of the presumably thousands of beneficiaries of miracles played any important rôle in the Mother Church at Jerusalem, or became a spiritual power elsewhere. The objection may be raised that this silence is as it should be; these persons kept quiet after having received the great mercy and had no inclination to shout the fact from the housetops. The answer is, suppose that these persons wished to keep quiet; if they had lived a deeply spiritual life, the world would have come to them just as it came to other persons of saintly character during the Middle Ages. Their influence would have been felt, and might have been greater for their very reticence. Another objection may be stated as follows: Perhaps none of these persons were conspicuous for great mental gifts, and there is no reason to expect that healing them would increase their poor natural endowment. One might even add that their very defectiveness was an indication of poor mentality. Why should they, then, become prominent in the Church? The answer to this objection is more difficult and needs a fuller reply.

It would be passing strange that among the ten thousand persons who received some token of special divine favor, there should not have been one with at least average ability. The laws of chance and probability are against the assumption. There

were, moreover, some beneficiaries whose natural gifts should have been fairly high, since they came from good families. Some of them were raised from the dead, and death comes to the highly and poorly gifted alike. The "nobleman's" son was cured of fever, according to St. John, iv: 46-54. His gifts should have been at least fair, since that title meant more in those days than it does in Europe today. The daughter of Jairus must have had a fair endowment, as her father was a ruler among the Jews and her death was no indication of any physical defect. Lazarus came of an apparently good family, since his sister Mary could afford to anoint Jesus with the precious spikenard in a costly alabaster vase. But none of these persons became conspicuous or is mentioned later, except incidentally. Lazarus is mentioned in chapter twelve of St. John's Gospel, the event closely following the story of his resurrection, as having aroused the hatred of the priests, not because he was conspicuous for any spiritual power, but because the people believed in Jesus owing to the miracle performed on him. One would expect with some justification that at least a few out of the many people who had felt the direct power of God and for whose sake, according to the older theology, a natural law was suspended or supplemented or modified—whatever word may most

suitably express that view—would stand out as spiritual lights, even though in a humble way. But none is to be found.

There is one more case. Mary Magdalene is most probably the woman who is identical with the one mentioned in St. Luke vii: 37 as a sinner; the "seven devils" cast out of her would in that case be grievous sins, and her cure would be moral rather than physical. If so, she stands out as an example of moral regeneration who had the courage to follow Jesus to the cross and to manifest a permanent interest in Him. Out of the thousands who had experienced mere physical healing power, all forsook the Lord; the one striking example of moral regeneration stands out for steadfast love and devotion.

Space forbids entering into a discussion of Apostolic and post-Apostolic miracles, or to take up those of the Roman Catholic Church through the Dark Ages and Middle Ages or of modern times. Only one case needs discussion owing to its prominence in our own age.

The grotto at Lourdes, France, has been famous for over half a century. It was in 1858 that Bernadette Soubiroux had eighteen apparitions of the Virgin Mary. In 1908 the semi-centennial was observed with due pomp. Three magnificent churches have been built at the word of a

little village maiden who was too limited mentally to learn her catechism. The trade in candles, rosaries, souvenirs, and the water from the spring is enormous. According to the *Catholic Encyclopedia* under article "Lourdes," 4,919,000 pilgrims had registered by 1908, counting only from 1867, when the grotto had become famous; and about 1,000,000 visitors go there annually at present. Among the visitors—including pilgrims—there had been up to that time 69 cardinals, 19 patriarchs, 10 primates, 546 archbishops and bishops, and many other dignitaries of lesser degree. This is certainly an imposing showing. What is the result?

According to the same authority about 4,000 cures had been effected by 1908. That is, out of not less than 5,000,000 people who visited the shrine in half a century, 4,000 persons had felt the effects of the miraculous waters. It is, of course, impossible to know how many of the visitors were pilgrims in search of health. One man's estimate may be near the truth, another's far from it. It would seem perfectly safe, though, to take twenty per cent of the visitors to be invalids, since mere seekers after novelty and sensation would hardly care to register; and it is only of those registered that we have any record at all. That would give us 1,000,000 health seekers out of

the 5,000,000 and would leave 4,000,000 as companions, friends, and curiosity seekers among those registered. If 4,000 out of 1,000,000 were cured, the percentage would be 0.4 of one per cent, or one out of 250. That is a very small ratio. It is, nevertheless, a respectable number; but it is very small compared with those who sought the healing waters in vain. For the astonishing thing about Lourdes is not the number of those cured, as we are assured time and again, but the very large number of those who go there in vain after elaborate preparation and with the fervent expectation of relief. The "stage setting" at Lourdes has been thought out to the last detail. On this point both the opponents and defendants agree.[11] Everything is done to produce a high nervous and mental tension and to arouse the hope and confidence of the sick for a cure. Then come disappointment and deepest gloom and despair for the vast majority of both the sufferers and their friends. The few cures are, nevertheless, a powerful magnet to attract people, and about a million go every year.

Most of the cures actually accomplished are attested or certified. The value of these attestations need not be impugned; a year is expected to elapse between the cure and the issue of the certificates. The physicians issuing them are undoubtedly hon-

est. Whether they are always right is another question. In many nervous ailments diagnosis is very difficult; in certain organic diseases it is perhaps more so. It may happen without prejudice to a physician's honesty that he makes a mistake through lack of skill or through a tendency not to antagonize those with whom his lot has been cast. A village physician is just as much subject to public opinion as the mayor or any other official. Usually the men with the least skill and knowledge settle in villages; hence mistakes may be made in perfectly good faith. Such things happen to the most skilled and experienced. In the writer's knowledge the foremost authority in this country and the second highest in the world on the thyroid gland diagnosed an enlargement of it as cancer, and was unconvinced when after the operation the verdict of the laboratory examination was negative; only a second and more searching examination proving to be negative finally convinced him that he was wrong. Why, then, should we credit a French or Italian or Spanish country doctor or even a high authority in Paris with infallibility? The hundreds of certificates at Lourdes do not lie; they simply do not tell the truth, because the truth in these particular cases is not known. Our knowledge of the organs and of their coöperation, and the relation of the parts to the

whole, is still very limited, notwithstanding the tremendous strides made by medicine in recent times. About the interaction between mind and body, still less is known. Cures are undoubtedly effected at Lourdes, just as they are effected in Christian Science churches, by Mr. Coué, and through many other agencies. To deny these cures would be foolish; to attribute them to the cause claimed would be more so. The power of suggestion over those susceptible to it is still an unknown quantity.

If the cures were effected by divine intervention through a power bestowed upon or resting in the water, all seekers after health should be cured. That is the case with vaccination and inoculation, which, when they "take," confer immunity against certain diseases whether the patient believes in the power of the serum or not. If, on the other hand, the cure depends on the faith or psychic suggestibility of the patient, we no longer have a miracle, but one of those numerous occurrences in the realm of the psychic and, perhaps, of the physiological, in which we have just become interested. The vogue of Freudianism is due to this fact. Psychologists of the modern school insisted some years before Freud that there was much more in our consciousness than we had generally believed. In time many of these recesses

and crevasses of our mental and nervous structure will be cleared up. At present we are still in the "outer court" of the temple of knowledge, in this as in many other respects. The ability of migratory birds to find their way across oceans is still a mystery, but we do not make a miracle of it; we expect to know in time. Lourdes and other shrines are real indictments of the countries where they are located. That the public health service and the hygienic and dietary and moral conditions of the land of Louis Pasteur are so poor that resort to a shrine must be taken for curing disease, is an indictment of that country's neglect of her most precious assets—the health and the morals of her people.

Of the people who are cured, rarely anything is heard afterward. Their spiritual life is, let us hope, quickened, but certainly no more than that of other persons who have come in contact with spiritual forces by other means. But hardly any, if any, of them are heard of afterward as outstanding examples of a new life. Just as in the Gospels, the cure seems to have affected the body only. The woman of St. John's eighth chapter—if she was Mary Magdalene—alone stands out as one morally regenerated who proved her devotion by love and service.

The writer is fully aware that this argument is

one *e silentio*. But it is certainly strange that none of the people healed, either by Jesus or at the numerous shrines which have claimed cures all through the Middle Ages and modern times, should have become prominent as exponents of spiritual life, if the hypothesis of the miracle is adopted, while all the persons who have left their mark in the history of Christianity were not subject to any direct influence of God as is claimed in the miracle of physical healing.

III. The Greater Spirituality of Those Churches Which Lay Little Stress on Miracles.—It would be a bold venture to compare the spiritual power and influence of John Wesley with that of St. Francis of Assisi, or that of John Calvin with that of Ignatius Loyola. The four men are so very different from every point of view, that only an extensive review of the work of all four could do them justice. So the writer would simply call attention to the type of men they were as representatives of three great branches of the Christian Church. St. Francis represents the best type of the mystic in the Roman Catholic Church, and the miracles which happened to him and after his demise at his shrine are fairly numerous. Loyola represents the fighting element in that Church, and, while he is responsible for fewer miracles, his influence has been considerable, owing to the

founding of the Jesuit Order. Calvin's place in the history of Christianity is permanent, since he inaugurated not only religious reforms of great importance, but, as we have come to realize only in very recent years, he established a bureau of vital statistics—the first one in history—and a system of sanitation as far as the engineering skill of his times permitted; this is in additon to being the father of democracy. For, as among the Hebrews, so in Geneva, the theocracy established a democracy among men; prince and pauper were alike in the sight of the omnipotent God. Dogmatic Calvin undoubtedly was, just as were Luther and other dominant persons of that period. Men of iron and steel were needed in those times of moral flabbiness and ecclesiastical corruption. The more human tendencies and the broader outlook came in later when mankind was ready for them.

John Wesley and his associates were the men for putting these tendencies to work. And what a work it was! Probably no factor, maybe not four or five factors put together, have had the same social and spiritual influence on Great Britain and the British Empire as the Methodist phase of evangelical revival. In philanthropy, in medicine, in popular education, in providing good but cheap literature for the people, in establishing a "provident loan fund" for those in temporary dis-

tress, in initiating the British labor movement—John Wesley had no peer. And the Church founded by him has been notable along these lines, especially in Great Britain and our country.

As we look back today upon the work of the four men mentioned, there is a vast difference in results. St. Francis is still remembered as the lover of birds and other animals and the gentle friend of men, as the saint who sought above all else his own peace with God by the renunciation of struggle. Those who believe in that comparatively negative ideal follow him, but their number is decreasing, owing to its social sterility. Loyola created that militant organization which must be credited with some great achievements, but has, on the other hand, been charged with being responsible for more dissensions and crimes of every kind than any other religious organization known in history. The Jesuits were hated for this not only in Protestant countries, but in most countries of their own faith, and were expelled from several of them. Even a "brief of suppression" was issued against them by Pope Clement XIV in 1773. The work of Calvin and Wesley has, with very few exceptions, been socially beneficial and morally uplifting. The country of Loyola cannot compare in any respect with Holland or Scotland, and that of St. Francis was away behind Great Britain

and our country until the papal domination was supplanted by a modern government of enlightenment. It is impossible, though, to repair in half a century what damage was done in the course of several centuries, and Italy still suffers in all its institutions and every aspect of its life from the results of ecclesiastical control and the quiescent influence of the Franciscan order. Some Protestant countries have suffered similarly, and they have their crimes to answer for. The trial of a teacher at Dayton, Tennessee, in 1925, for teaching the theory of evolution was a great shock to all enlightened men. The fact that a politically prominent man headed the prosecution, made the matter worse. Other factors undoubtedly operated in the countries named to produce the results referred to, since one factor, even though powerful, never acts singly and would by itself be comparatively impotent. The religious factor was, nevertheless, of the utmost importance, since in Protestant countries it liberated men's minds from the incubus of hierarchial domination, and thus made self-reliant beings of them through the right of private judgment in the, to them, most important aspect of life. The mind, thus set free, soon developed its own resources, and progress became inevitable by the unfolding of talents which had lain fallow for ages. French and Danish farming conditions

furnish an interesting contrast. Notwithstanding her poorer soil and less favorable climate, Denmark has educated her farmers in art, music, science, and literature through the "folks" high schools, and has enabled them to acquire an economic prosperity far beyond that of French farmers.

Yet, "a wicked and adulterous generation" still seeks a sign instead of learning a lesson from history; and the claim that miracles are necessary for the *bene esse*, if not essential to the *esse*, of the Churches, it still with us. And so the miracle workers of one kind and another are getting large audiences eager to witness an act of interference with or temporary suspension of natural law on the part of God. From far-away New Zealand comes Taku Wiremu Ratana, a new Maori convert to Christianity, to perform miracles in London, England, after having gained a reputation in his own Dominion. In 1920 he began his career among his own people; his success brought him the indorsement of the Wellington Diocesan Synod, and his fame spread to Australia and eventually to London, where he came in 1924.[12] Of 160,000 applicants who wrote him—for Ratana refuses to see Europeans—*i.e.*, non-Maoris—he has healed 110,000 to judge from letters of thanks; and newspaper clippings tell of 5,200

other cures. He has returned 100,000 pounds sterling to the healed, sent to him as voluntary gifts. All of this is certainly "miraculous." In New York, Paris, and other large cities "spiritual healers" appear from time to time, and a force of police is required to hold back the throngs from crowding the churches too uncomfortably. They occupy the headlines in the newspapers for a few days or weeks, then disappear into obscurity. Meanwhile we get this interesting cablegram from Russia:[13]

> "Moscow, Aug. 23.—An amazing story of popular faith in religious healing is reported from Pskoff, a small town on the Russo-Esthonian frontier, where for several years a certain Father Troitski had been healing the sick by the agency of a miraculous ikon.
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> "In the 'heavy years,' as the Russians call them, from 1918 to 1921, Father Troitski admitted that he received no less than 12,000 gold rubles from the peasants. There were many cures—a girl, Lydia Belskaya, of the 'king's evil'; Nadya Kolkova, of a chronic abscess; Natasha Arcipova, of paralysis, &c.
>
> "When the faithful approached the

ikon, a painted image of the Blessed Virgin, it shed abundant tears, which were collected in a sacred vessel and sold at great price. One drop applied to a wound, it was said, would heal it immediately.

"On other occasions the silver setting wherein the ikon was shown glowed with a mysterious soft light, curing afflicted persons who beheld it.

"Father Troitski acquired immense influence in Pskoff and the peasantry thronged to the ikon from the northern provinces of Russia. Finally the Soviet authorities arrested him last July on a charge based on Article 120 of the Soviet penal code, 'exploiting the religious prejudices of the masses against the Soviet government and fostering superstition among the masses.'

"Rather nervously, it appears, the police agents approached the mysterious ikon after the priest's arrest. For all their Bolshevism, they were still hardly free of atavistic fears. They found the worthy Troitski an adroit electrician. The flowing tears and mysterious light both proceeded from electric devices.

> "Troitski was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, reduced by amnesty to two. But, electric devices or no electric devices, it is curious to note that no one attempts to deny that many people were cured of illnesses which doctors were unable to remedy."

Why all this dependence on the miraculous? It is very much easier to let things slide, do as one pleases, and—expect the Lord to help us out of trouble. We have not yet learned to apply the law of cause and effect to our physical and moral life. It is, nevertheless, true that we must "seek our salvation with fear and trembling." It is through honest and diligent application of our physical and mental energy that we shall be healed. All evasions and subterfuges will fail utterly. Where, on the other hand, this law has been applied, lasting and beneficial results have followed.

IV. The Greater Efficiency of Medical Science in Healing and Preventing Disease.—Suppose that the claim for every miracle were allowed, the number would still run far behind what medicine has accomplished in a very few years. A few cases will illustrate the point. "Not so many years ago, death was considered a matter beyond man's

control. Now we know that thousands of deaths may be avoided, and succeed. England and Wales had a death rate of 21.2 per 1,000 from 1866 to 1870; it dropped to 13.5 from 1910 to 1914. This means a difference of 7.7 per 1,000; or 77,000 per 1,000,000, or about 3,500,000 for the United Kingdom. Similar results have been obtained elsewhere."[14] New York City has a truly remarkable record. By careful attention to sanitation, hygienic and medical supervision, the average length of life was increased by eleven years in a little more than half a century from 1868 to 1921, with a death rate of only 11.17 per 1,000 in 1921. These are but two specific cases which could easily be multiplied by referring to other cities and countries.

An extraordinary change has been effected in the mortality rates of certain diseases which have been the scourges of past centuries. Taking the second largest city, Chicago, as an illustration, we find the following results:

"Typhoid fever has been reduced from an average rate of 85.2 per 100,000 of population during 1851-60 to only 5.4 per 100,000 during 1911-20. This extraordinary improvement in mortality will be more fully realized when it is stated that a maximum typhoid-fever rate of 175.1 was recorded for the year 1854. The mor-

tality from all forms of tuberculosis also declined from a rate of 222.9 per 100,000 during the decade 1871-80 to 161.1 per 100,000 during the decade ending in 1920. During the year 1920 the rate was as low as 97.1 per 100,000, or the lowest on record since 1867. The highest tuberculosis death rate was reached in the year 1872 with 296.9 per 100,000, or nearly 200 per 100,000 in excess of the rate for 1920. . . . For smallpox the rate has been reduced to practically nothing against high death rates from that cause during the years previous to 1894. The average rate has been reduced from 36.3 per 100,000 during 1861-70 to 0.1 during 1911-20. Cholera prevailed to an enormous extent during the early years of the record, or between 1851 and 1860, when the average rate was as high as 328.9 per 100,000. There have been no deaths from cholera since the last outbreak of the disease in 1873. Equally extraordinary has been the diminution in the acute infectious diseases of children. At ages under ten the mortality from diphtheria and croup has diminished from a maximum rate of 579.5 per 100,000 of population under ten during the decade 1881-90 to a rate of 172.8 per 100,000 during 1911-20, and a rate as low as 120.8 per 100,000 during the year 1920. The scarlet-fever rate has been reduced from a maximum average

of 629.2 per 100,000 during 1871-80 to a rate of 74.3 per 100,000 during 1911-20, and a rate of 34.7 per 100,000 during the year 1920. For measles the rate has been reduced from a maximum average of 128.4 per 100,000 during 1861-70 to a rate of 34.0 per 100,000 during 1911-20, and a rate of 16.8 during the year 1920. The mortality from whooping cough has declined from an average rate of 111.8 per 100,000 during 1861-70 and 1871-80 to a rate of only 28.5 per 100,000 during 1911-20."[15]

What shall we say to these statements of facts? And Chicago is not the only city where such wonders have been wrought. They have occurred in Philadelphia, San Francisco, Boston, New Orleans, and other cities where medical and sanitary measures have been adopted and where people were sensible enough to follow the laws of hygiene. That prevention is a matter of human diligence and intelligence may be realized from the fact that in the Spanish-American War eighty per cent of the total deaths in our army were caused by typhoid fever, while in the World War we lost practically no men from that disease, owing to inoculation. This disease is likely soon to follow that of cholera, scarlet fever, yellow fever, bubonic plague, and become a mere matter of history. Attention should be called to the fact that

in the decade 1911-20 for the different diseases, the last year, 1920, always had a very much lower death rate than that of the decade as a whole, because the scientific methods of prevention were more generally applied. Without any attempt at invidious comparison, it may be stated that Spain, France, and Italy have not as good records for improvement, notwithstanding their numerous shrines of healing. Their death rates are considerably higher for all the diseases mentioned. Reference was made above, in connection with Lourdes, to the fact that many of the diseases for which patients seek healing at that shrine should never have been allowed to develop to the extent they have, and that the very fact that so many persons have ailments of such a nature speaks unfavorably for the sanitary conditions of France, although the father of modern medicine, Louis Pasteur, gave medical science a luster which has never been equaled. The questions arise: "Are Americans less God-fearing because they use their God-given faculties to help themselves?" "Are the French more favored by having Lourdes to resort to and having a very small number of their sick healed compared with our hundred thousands who are not allowed to get diseased?" The answer must be in our favor.

We have traveled far in this chapter. Some statements may seem materialistic to persons brought up under the older theological régime. The writer was brought up a strict "fundamentalist." It was a hard and long struggle to leave the naïve faith of his fathers and hew out a trail for himself through the jungle of modern tendencies. He never disturbed the faith of his truly God-loving father and mother. They were cast in their mold; he in his. They lived their lives according "to their lights." Responsibility in these matters is strictly individual, as Ezekiel taught us long ago. The only regret the writer has is that this knowledge did not come to him sooner, since it would have saved him many hours of agony. But then, such knowledge can come only from a conscientious search of the heart and of the truth as he sees it. He feels free now, for "the truth shall make us free." He also has experienced some joys which he never knew in the old days. Ultimately the test of spiritual life must be its power for expansion; and this power he believes to have gained. And his experience is not unique. He finds that others who have passed through a similar development have a broader outlook upon life, a deeper sympathy with their fellow men, and a greater devotion to the truly spiritual aims of life. The very fact that we are more self-reli-

ant enables us to get into more intimate relations with Jesus, who worked for the benefit of His brethren and the glory of His Father. There certainly must be joy in Heaven when men stand squarely on their own merits and employ their God-given talents—whether they be one, five, or ten, matters little—in the improvement of this life and the prevention of evil of every kind. It seems more divine to prevent men from getting into the mire and from wasting their talents than to try to save the few remnants left. In this faith alone can we look confidently into the future and face the tasks of the modern world.

[1] *Principles of Ethics,* vol. ii, pp. 335-336. New York, 1910.
[2] Matt. xii: 50
[3] Jer. xxi: 29-30.
[4] Ez. xviii, 2-9.
[5] Gal. vi: 7.
[6] W. B. Pillsbury, *The Fundamentals of Psychology,* rev. ed., p. 580. 1923.
[7] *Ibid,* p. 581.
[8] 2 Thess. iii: 10.
[9] Matt. xii: 39.
[10] Rt. Rev. William Fitzgerald, *Smith's Dictionary of the Bible,* vol. iii, p. 1947. 1887.
[11] Compare Zola's, *Lourdes,* and John Oxenham, *The Wonder of Lourdes.* 1924.
[12] For details see *New York Times Magazine,* August 3, 1924.
[13] *New York Times,* p. 1, August 24, 1924.
[14] *Major Social Problems,* by the author, p. 134. 1920.
[15] *A Half Century of Public Health. Jubilee Historical Volume of American Public Health Association,* pp. 110 and 112. 1921. (Frederick L. Hoffman.)

VIII

Tasks of Modern Religion

1. *Orientation.*—The tasks of religion have varied in the course of time. One of its earliest problems was how to secure for man what he could not get by his own efforts. The demands on religion were largely of an economic nature, as we saw in the second chapter. Man has solved that problem by his scientific investigations. He no longer offers candles to a saint for a bountiful crop, or promises a calico shirt and a blanket to Wakanda, like the Sioux Indian, for help in bringing down a Pawnee. He has mastered many secrets of nature, and expects to master many more. God no longer has favorites, and man must reap as he has sown.

The multiplicity of the gods no longer confuses man. He is not buffeted to and fro in attempting to reconcile their contradictory demands. Neither does he stand in awe and terror of the one supreme God, since he worships Him as a Father. He has also learned that this perfectly holy God does not have to be bought off with a sacrifice as a means of propitiation. He believes that the Father will

encourage every endeavor to seek completion in Him, and that every man has an opportunity to seek it. He is convinced that the principle of love for God and man is the sum and substance of the "law and the prophets."

The question of authoritative religion still confronts a large part of Christendom. The church of Rome has never given up its claim to be the only official interpreter of Christianity and to be the only possessor of the whole truth not only in religion, but, by implication, in all things. The following quotation is taken from an address of William, Cardinal O'Connell, of Boston, delivered at the dedication of St. Paul's Roman Catholic Church in Cambridge, Mass., October 13, 1924. It was printed in the *Pilot*, Boston, and those parts of it referring to Harvard University were reprinted in the *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, October 23, 1924, p. 129. He says, referring to universities in general and Harvard in particular, among other things:

"Of course, they have just missed the real things. They have some truth. They have not all the truth, unfortunately. They have missed the way because they have cut off the light. We state this with no spirit of enmity, rather in a deep spirit of regret. This sacred edifice, this temple of God, possesses the whole truth, the real truth, the

fundamental truth. It imparts the lesson every day that life can really dispense with every sort of half truth, that wealth or learning is not all, but that faith is all. Without faith all else is a mere shadow. This college, great and embellished, has a certain usefulness. It does without doubt a very large amount of good in a civic way, yet it lacks the ancient faith, and without first principles one has to be very careful even in civic life. If, however, this great school had the old faith of Christ, for which she was supposed to be erected, her influence would be supreme. We would be the first to gather around her."

The reader might add to the last statement of the Cardinal, "and strangle her." For that is what would happen to Harvard and every non-Catholic institution in our country. Be that as it may, Protestant Churches have long since dispensed with authoritative religion of that kind. These Churches have, however, adopted another authority in the form of a literally inspired Bible, which is no less menacing since it puts a minister—educated and full of apostolic zeal—at the mercy of some backward and not infrequently self-seeking deacons or elders. College and university professors have within recent years often felt the evil influence of such men by being dismissed. At present the contrast between the old and the new

view concerning the inspiration of the Bible finds expression in the terms "fundamentalist" and "modernist." We need not tarry over this matter, since in one form or another it is as old as Christianity itself. When some of the Christians wanted to restrict the Gospel to the Jews and demanded that Gentiles should pass into the church through Judaism, they were fundamentalists, and St. Paul was the modernist of those days.[1] This problem is being discussed now, and has to be considered here briefly, since it concerns the outlook of the church for the future. The problem must, however, be considered from a very much larger point of view. It is not merely a question of the infallibility of the Scriptures, but rather of the attitude of the older theology as a whole. That view has been discussed in the preceding chapter from a certain angle, and must now be considered from that of the function of religion in our own times.

The problem is briefly this: Shall we patch or build anew? Shall we try to modify, explain, justify the older theology, or shall we go back behind the bulwark of the past and construct according to our own needs? Is the religion of Jesus for the past, or for today and the future? If it is the religion of the ages, what shall be done with the immense literature which has accumulated for

nearly two thousand years? It is impossible to give a detailed answer to these questions. They may, though, be considered as parts of a larger problem, *viz.*, have we the right to stand on our own feet, or must we eternally be dependent on the sayings of our forebears? These men built with their own knowledge according to their own needs. A few of the changing problems have already been referred to as having come before religion at various times. Whether they solved their problems rightly or not, is no concern of ours. We have inherited the full benefit of both their truths and their errors. We are facing our own world, and must meet our own conditions. If we have the courage to do so, we shall conquer and leave a richer religious legacy to the future than we have received. This does not imply that the past has been useless; it means that we must use it with discretion. An illustration may help us to understand the point in question.

The geometry of Euclid has been a beacon to mathematicians, physicists, architects, surveyors, etc., for over two thousand years. A few modifications have been made lately, and latterly attempts have been made to replace it with purely logical formulæ. Whatever success these attempts may have, we need not stand by the application which the scholastics of the Middle Ages and

Dante made of Euclidean theory when they discussed the dimensions of the heavens and the problem of the number of angels dancing on a pin point. This is an extreme example, but it shows how far men may deviate from a perfectly sound principle. Similarly, the Hellenization of the teachings of Jesus has introduced any number of aberrations into Christianity, which we need certainly not revere just because they are hoary with age. We may just as well remove the débris of the ages and go down to the foundations, just as we no longer trust the statements of Herodotus about Egypt and Chaldæa, but do our own excavating and deciphering of ancient inscriptions.

Going back to the Gospels, we find many statements credited to Jesus which have only a local and temporary bearing. His teaching was necessarily colored by the local and social conditions of the times. It had to be, if He was to be understood. The performing of miracles was, as we have seen, a concession to the *zeitgeist*. The admonition to charity was another. Hard-hearted as the people of His time were, owing to economic insufficiency, some kind of amelioration had to be introduced; that could be done only by the giving of alms. It seems incredible that He should have implied the permanency of such a debasing custom as almsgiving for the sake of accumulating "treas-

ures in heaven." As a temporary measure it was a necessary concession to a generation which had grown up under the ritualistic and commercial conception of religion. The injunction to "render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's," was likewise adapted to the times, since the Jews were loath to do either. At any rate, the passage must not be construed to imply that a follower of Jesus should not take his part in affairs of the state and society, as some small sects—*e.g.*, the Dunkards—are inclined to do. There are many other cases of this kind; it would be not only foolish but wicked to interpret them as having been intended for permanent validity. Jesus would not have been the great teacher nor the unique figure in the history of religion to whom the title of God-man justly belongs, if He had not given mankind permanent ideas and relations by means of which to find our way in the labyrinth of error and confusion. What are these?

2. *The Permanent Teachings of Jesus.*—An enumeration, let alone a full treatment of the eternally valid teachings of Jesus, is out of the question. We shall confine ourselves to what may be considered the three basic teachings of the Master—the perfectibility of man, love, the Kingdom.

I. The Perfectibility of Human Nature.—Jesus had a high opinion of the worth and value of human beings. He chose His immediate disciples in several cases from very humble surroundings; at least one of them, Matthew, was a publican or a tax-gatherer. That was about as low as a Jew could go. To collect the customs and taxes for the hated Roman conqueror meant practically the renunciation of membership in the Jewish state and covenant. Yet, Jesus did not disdain to select him as one of the Twelve. He associated, moreover, with "publicans and sinners" at meat, thus scandalizing the Pharisees.[2] In these lowest of the low, He still perceived the divine spark which might be kindled into flame. The woman taken in adultery[3] was perhaps a very wanton creature, and the Jews had always looked upon women of her kind as utterly lost. But Jesus led her into the path of morality, at least if she is Mary Magdalene, as we tried to show in the preceding chapter. All through His ministry, He sought out the lowly and forsaken and abandoned, so as to raise them to a higher plane. He believed in their perfectibility. We need not assume that it was owing to a particular predilection for this class that He associated with them, but rather owing to His intense desire to show that there was still some-

thing in these wrecks of humanity that could be aroused to something better and higher.

How often the injunction, "Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect," fell from His lips, we do not know, since the number of His sayings has been preserved only in small part. The spectacular miracles and the castigation of the Pharisees and other upper-class men undoubtedly appealed more strongly to the imagination of the simple-minded and lower-class Apostles. St. Paul, the Pharisee of the Pharisees, would most probably have emphasized other sayings of the Master. His follower, Luke, is, by the way, the only one of the synoptics to report Jesus's eating at the house of Simon, the Pharisee.[4]

The many commands to forgive our enemies freely have no other meaning than the idea that the offender is still within the reach of a higher life. The offended is apt to think all kinds of bad things about an offender. Not so, says Jesus; he is still human and capable of restoration; just forgive him and find out; do it often, too, for eventually the good in him will be aroused and he will turn from his evil ways.

This perfectibility of man finds its highest expression in the more "abundant life" which Jesus has come to bring. He does not say that it is to come to one or another class or group of men, but

to men in general. He contrasts Himself with the thief who comes to steal and to kill and to destroy, but "I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly."[5] So He is the "way, the truth, and the life." His whole personality abounds with the desire to make the most of every man and raise him to the limit of his capacity. It is in this emphasis on personality that Professor Foster finds the revaluation of religions and of all other things. Speaking of the essence of Christianity, he says:

"... It is at bottom a religion of spirit and of personality. It is not a religion of facts, but of values; and values are timeless; that is, Christianity is an eternal religion which is *in*, but not *of*, the historical. In the mystery of creative personalities, fructified, indeed, by the stream of history, fountains are opened from which higher values, unattainable by us men of ourselves, stream forth from eternity into the human world. Personalities are the channels of divine grace."[6]

Jesus invites all men to come unto Him that they might find rest, for they are all heavy laden by the incompleteness of their personalities. In Him they will find that higher, fuller spiritual life which will give them the satisfaction of knowing that they are the sons of God.

II. The Other Cardinal Principle of Jesus'

Teaching Is That of Love.—The perfectibility of human nature does not come about by a miracle, as the older theologians taught. It has as definite a cause and antecedents as anything else in the natural and the spiritual world. The primary cause is love. Not the affective sentiment which usually evaporates by means of pious phrases and sweet sympathy; but that active principle in man which seeks the perfection of our fellow man. The people we love make a special appeal to us. We want them to make the most of themselves and of their opportunities. We arouse them to realize the value of their personality and of their talents, and create opportunities for them, so as to "give them a chance." This is the secret of parental love which differs fundamentally from the mere animal maternal love which is satisfied with possession. The former wants to make something of the child; the latter is satisfied with having it. Parental love wants to educate, develop, elevate the child; animal love enjoys the child, humors it, and usually spoils it. Both are intensive; but parental love tempers the emotions with reason, while animal love abandons itself wildly to the enjoyment of the child. The former respects the personality of the child; the latter wants to absorb it as far as possible and turn it into a duplicate of oneself. These two kinds of love are fundamentally differ-

ent. The one is based on the belief in the perfectibility of the child along its own God-given capacities; the latter wants it to serve as a means to one's vanity and pride. It is the disinterested love which seeks the welfare of the other and is based on the respect for the other that Jesus preaches and practices, for that love alone can become the foundation of a new society. Did Jesus wish to establish a new society?

III. The "Kingdom of God" Is Referred to Over One Hundred Times in the Synoptics.—It is certainly strange that the term has been interpreted in a purely individualistic sense or as the equivalent of our modern term "going to heaven." That Jesus had a new society in view when He used that term so frequently, seems beyond any doubt. The question whether that society was to be in heaven or here on earth has been the object of much discussion. There was, apparently, little doubt in the minds of the Apostles about it. At the time of the Ascension Jesus spoke to them about the "things pertaining to the Kingdom of God." It was then that they asked Him, "Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the Kingdom to Israel?" Jesus' reply was intended to correct any impression they might still have as to the temporal nature of this kingdom when He told them that they were to receive the power of the Holy Ghost

so as to bear witness for Him beginning in Jerusalem to the uttermost parts of the earth.[7] It seems plain from the context that both Jesus and the Apostles had some kind of organization in mind. As to its particular form, He just as certainly left no instructions. And it was the best possible thing He could do, since if He had, that form of organization would have been fastened upon Christian countries forever, and there would have been no chance of adapting government to new and varying conditions. Peoples were left free to develop their own ideas about government according to special conditions.

It was this lack of specific instructions which, coupled later with the doctrine of total depravity, induced many men—*e.g.*, Augustine—to transfer the kingdom into the hereafter; and there it has apparently stayed until recent times. All through the Dark and the Middle Ages the apparently most spiritual men "fled the world" because they disbelieved that the social order could be improved. The world was hopelessly given over to evil, and all that could be ventured was to pluck a few souls from destruction. By going back to Jesus we have rediscovered His idea about this as about other matters.

The Christian idea of a new world-order may be best illustrated by a reference to slavery, as

expressed in the Epistle to Philemon. There is nothing said against slavery either by Jesus or by any of the Apostles; it was permitted in a mild form in Old Testament times, and was apparently upheld in New Testament times as one of the secular institutions. But, since "in Christ there is neither bond nor free," something was bound to happen to slavery wherever the spirit of the Gospel took a real hold. A specific case is given in the epistle referred to. The situation is as follows.

Onesimus, a slave of Philemon of Thessalonica, had run away and finally reached Rome where he had become a Christian under the influence of St. Paul. What was to be done? The law of Rome demanded the return of a fugitive slave. To subject a "brother in Christ" to the rigors of slavery was against the spirit of Jesus. Fortunately, the master of Onesimus had also become a believer in Christ through the influence of St. Paul. The solution was easy. Send Onesimus back to Philemon, and trust the master to treat the slave as a brother, secular law or not. What the writer of the letter expected to be done is hinted at rather than ordered; it is a matter between two Christian gentlemen. "Having confidence in thy obedience I wrote unto thee, knowing that thou wilt also do more than I say."

It is this spirit of Jesus, the idea of the brother-

hood of man, the value of the individual soul, that has banished slavery from Christian territories, and from there alone, since it still exists everywhere else. Jesus need not, consequently, leave any specific instructions as to the form of the kingdom of God here on earth. If and wherever His spirit filled the hearts of His disciples, they would and must organize on the basis of love with a view of developing every man's capacity to the utmost. And this man, in turn, would do all that he could to serve his fellow men with all his might. The principles of a Christian order of society are there, and have always been there; the application has been attempted only here and there in an ephemeral manner. What has been the reason for this failure?

The church at Jerusalem made a brave attempt to put these principles into practice. It is not necessary to assume that a system of communism in the modern sense of the term was adopted. The account in Acts iv: 32-37 combined with Acts vi: 1-7 conveys the ideas that the first church desired to respect the personality of every member on the basis that his or her nature was improvable; to make love the basis of the communal life, and to give every member an opportunity for development; to establish a community where liberty and sincerity were the only laws to be observed. Ana-

nias was not bound to give anything to the communal fund, but he should have been sincere about his unwillingness.[8] The experiment failed because its aims were too lofty; there was more zeal than knowledge behind it. These first disciples may have had hearts filled with love, but that will and cannot take the place of work and knowledge. And all later experiments have been wrecked on that rock; people supposed that God would somehow or other provide for them just because they loved Him and had good intentions for everybody. Many of those disciples had taken the saying of Jesus—not to take any thought for the morrow[9]—too literally. It was undoubtedly St. Paul's endeavor to counteract that tendency when he not only worked for his living but ordered that there should be no food without work.[10]

It is, nevertheless, surprising that experiments of this kind have been so few in number. The reasons for this are the secularization of the Church after her progress in the Roman Empire, and the gradual penetration of the doctrine of the vicarious death of Christ with its forensic theory of justification by faith. The secularization of the Church meant that to all intents and purposes official Christianity modeled itself after "this world" with a hierarchy seeking power by consolidating the different national churches and eventually subjecting

the Western Church to the bishop of Rome, and the Eastern Churches to a few patriarchs. That the attempt was successful not only in the acquisition of power, but in that of large wealth is too well known and needs no further comment here. The other reason must, however, be discussed.

As was shown in the preceding chapter, salvation by faith on the basis of Jesus' vicarious death eventually came to imply a miracle. Man has, of course, no control over miracles; they happen whenever it pleases Him who has the power to work them. That meant that the process of making a better and higher type of man was taken out of men's hands and turned into a mystery. Of what use were men's efforts, after all, when a few of them had been predestined to be saved while the majority were passed by and were absolutely helpless? Were they perfectible? How could they be when they were consigned to everlasting torture? Were these people to be loved? How could one entertain any affection for people who, according to theory, were totally depraved and under the control of the "world, the flesh, and the devil"? Should one enter into any communal life with them? Plainly not, because corruption might spread to oneself, since no man could be absolutely certain of election, and discretion was the better part of valor. So the "spiritually

minded" forsook the world and sought safety in deserts and monasteries. Of one thing only men could be certain—that the plan of salvation was not to fail, since a certain number had to be saved. But who were they? No one could possibly know.

This doctrine had several results. The theory of the perfectibility of man was practically lost—hence a hopelessness and gloom settled over the people of the Middle Ages similar to that among the ancient Greeks when they found themselves in the grip of fate; the spontaneity and buoyancy of early Christian life gave way to a labored exhibition of piety, which consisted of all kinds of useless "works." There could be little love manifested under the circumstances, since the elect alone were entitled to that. The method of discovering them was purely external—belief in certain theories, chief of which was the power of the Church to open or close the gates of heaven. No attempt could be made to improve conditions in this life, and a few alms to relieve immediate distress was all one could venture to give. The world was divided into two large camps, the believers and the heretics; every means, whether torture or death, was justified to turn the latter into the former. A still further division was made among the believers, those who lived the technical "religious" life and those who were still "in the

world." The attitude of everybody was, though, to trust to some miracles for salvation, and the Roman and Eastern Churches devised ample means to satisfy the craving for them. The morality of the people as a whole was necessarily low. Why should a man exert himself, when salvation was free? Somehow or other one might "sneak" into heaven like the thief on the cross. The stories about him and about the prodigal were certainly overworked. They stood the hierarchy in good stead among the people who knew little about election and could be induced to bequeath their property to "Mother Church" for the reading of masses. For minor offenses an elaborate system of penances was installed, and eventually the sale of indulgences became general. Thus most of the real benefits of the teaching of Jesus were lost and the world sank again into the meticulous observance of innumerable petty rules. One may freely admit that underneath this cover of rules and regulations a better spirit survived among the more spiritually minded men and women; the powerful ideas which had come into the world could not be obliterated entirely. Few people were able, though, to withstand the corruption of mind that had been introduced into every relation of life.

The Reformation wrought a change. Secular

life was saved from the semicondemnation under which it had suffered. Work for one's family and fellow men was again honored. The need to prove one's "call" by a clean life was insisted on. Reference has already been made to the many civic changes which John Calvin brought about in Geneva. Forgiveness of sins could no longer be had for various considerations, chiefly of a financial nature; the sinner had to face the Almighty directly in all His august glory of purity and holiness. The saints with their suffering expressions were no longer convenient buffers between God and man; sin was a terrible offense against divine majesty, and the sinner was made to feel all his natural depravity. While he had direct access to the source of forgiveness, the way was not by any means strewn with roses. The change was wonderful in many ways; throughout Protestant countries a new and cleaner life became manifest. The fundamental difficulty still remained, though, and produced some new troubles.

Man's salvation was still beyond his own power, and the doctrine of total depravity was, if possible, more accentuated, so as to make the glory of God greater. The general attitude as to the three principles of Jesus's teaching continued practically the same as before the Reformation. There was perhaps less reason now for improving social con-

ditions, since private judgment made every man his own master in matters of religion. He might be very charitable, but almsgiving did not remedy the bad conditions to any extent; it often made them worse.

Secular life had been liberated from the stigma attached to it under Catholicism, and the conscience of the individual had been freed from the oppressive domination of the Roman hierarchy. These were tremendous gains. Men felt that in doing their work well they rendered a service to God and man; they felt that a new dignity had been bestowed upon them in being permitted to approach God directly. For, were they not "lively stones" of a spiritual house and members of a holy priesthood? [11] They were at least allowed to think their own thoughts and take their own responsibility for their acts. The religious liberation of the individual was of the greatest importance because it touched men at the most vital part of their consciousness.

A tremendous energy was set free in this manner. Men worked as they had never done before. The opening of the sea routes to the far East and to America, combined with several inventions, furnished an outlet for this energy. At first Catholic Spain and Portugal availed themselves of the new opportunities; they did not go out into the colonies

to work, but to exploit in the name of "Mother Church." When Holland and England began to go overseas, they went as colonists to work the soil and to build homes and churches. This difference has proved important in the course of time. Spain has lost practically her whole empire across the seas; England and Holland have increased theirs. Our country may be independent politically of Great Britain; spiritually and culturally she is still loyal to her mother country. Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and younger and territorially smaller colonies of England are fonder than ever of their mother. Holland has achieved wonderful results in Java and her other Eastern possessions.

The results of this newly liberated energy became most conspicuous in the industrial revolution of Great Britain. Since temporal possessions had received a semispiritual value, men strove to multiply them at any cost. Freedom in religion and private judgment were the parents of the rampant individualism of the eighteenth century. Men were free in religion; why should they be bound in industry and business? Every man had to stand on his own merits, and the victory went to the strong and frequently to the ruthless. The exploitation of English factory workers is a scandal and a blot on England's honor which will never

be wiped clean. It is officially known as the *laissez faire* theory; popularly it is known under the phrase, "Everybody take care of himself, and devil take the hindmost." Respect for the individual was almost completely lost; the worker was considered merely as a piece of productive machinery. To love him was practically out of the question; to give that "brute" an opportunity for improvement would appear ridiculous; to give him a share in politics would be folly. Down to 1825 practically no worker had the franchise. The fox-hunting parsons stood solidly by the employing class; the workers were driven into nonconformist chapels. The preaching of the Wesleys and Whitefield did much to save the workers from despair and utter degradation; it could remedy the industrial situation but little.

During the nineteenth century several movements helped to create a new social spirit. There was the Chartist movement, beginning about 1837. Then came the Christian Socialist movement in 1848 under the leadership of F. D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley. They attracted many brilliant men, and stirred England's religious conscience profoundly. Christ had come to redeem every aspect of life, not merely man's soul. This redemption must result in better wages, cleaner cottages for workers, more efficient sanitary measures, and

the suffrage. The Rochdale pioneers who had started the coöperative movement in 1843 welcomed Christian Socialism, and attempted fairly successfully to free the workers from the exactions of the commercial class. Out of these three movements emerged the labor movement which in 1924 gave Great Britain a labor government. The gradual emancipation of the working classes within less than a century is one of the most remarkable achievements in human history. It changed our whole attitude toward religion and brought us back to the three fundamental principles of Jesus's teaching, which may now be restated —the perfectibility of human nature; love as an active force in social intercourse; the Kingdom of God as an entity here and now. Religion means now less of a doctrine of salvation by forensic methods; it means hard work and a heavy responsibility to everyone to make this life an opportunity for everybody to complete his destiny by having an opportunity to develop all his talents. This idea is adhered to and believed in only by the vanguard or the prophets of the new social religion. The majority, especially of the well-to-do, still live according to old standards. Speaking of the period before the World War, Professor Ellwood says:[12]

"In commerce, in business, in polite society, and

in amusements pagan standards came more and more to the front. A large element in the privileged classes refused to recognize or to conform to any standard at all save their own pleasure and their own wishes. They belittled by contemptuous indifference, if they did not ridicule outright, Christian standards in living and in conduct. Scandalous divorces and marriages became common to an extent that the world had not seen since the decadent days of Rome. The wealthy set an example of extravagance, luxury, and fast living which inevitably demoralized the rest of society. But these were only straws upon the surface. The program of self-interest, material satisfaction, and brute force came to extend through and through the fabric of Western civilization. It was not simply the moral standards of the individual which were rebarbarized, but, as we now know, the life of whole nations."

Professor Ellwood is only one out of many writers who deplore the ever-increasing demoralization of modern life. But, what else could one expect? The plan of salvation as interpreted by official religion was individualistic, whether looked at from the point of election or of free-willism. It was individualistic chiefly because it was a matter almost entirely beyond the control of man, as pointed out before. The ethics of such a theology

was necessarily individualistic, because it demanded that you prove your salvation by abstention from certain forbidden things and by the doing of certain other things which had little or no reference to the improvement of social conditions. An occasional act of charity toward a worker was always welcomed by the latter as a manifestation of the generosity of his employer, although the worker might live in, to us, incomprehensibly bad sanitary conditions. But then, his soul could be saved anyway if he had faith.

The teaching of politics and economics indorsed those individualistic ideas with a vengeance. They were just what the "strong men" wanted—to go out, to conquer, to increase one's power, regardless of how one's actions would affect contemporaries or descendants. An extreme individualism was thus taught from every angle, and it is small wonder that the later nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century reaped a whirlwind of materialism from the seed of the wind of individualism. For, if I am able to acquire much property, why should I not use it to suit myself? If I have no social and religious responsibility for my neighbor, why should I not indulge my whims and fancies and—lusts? I am paying for everything with my own money. Thus reasoned these men and women, and they were right if their

premises are granted. These premises are, however, the denial of the three fundamental principles of Jesus's teaching, and they are, therefore, immoral and anti-Christian. It is on the basis of these principles, though, that our social ideals must be reconstructed, not by tempering our theology to the materialism of today.

3. *The Application of Christian Ideals.*—The principal task before the Church of today is the restoration of the three original Christian ideals and their rigid application to individual and social life. This attempt will mean a hard and persistent struggle against her own past with its emphasis on the future life, and against the materialism which has taken possession of the world. It will be an incomparably longer and more difficult battle than Christianity had to wage at the beginning, because the world, then as now, has always been willing to accept something for nothing. Because Jesus insisted on the new spirit manifesting itself in the three cardinal principles of His teaching, the number of disciples remained small. It was after St. Paul's philosophy had given Christianity a theology which demanded less of men, that the number of churches increased with greater speed. This tendency has persisted throughout the ages, and the rich and the powerful have always been willing to give a conventional adherence

to traditional Christianity, because there always existed the secret, if not avowed, hope of landing eventually in heaven notwithstanding many shortcomings in morality. If the Church is to save herself, she must return to the position of Jesus and try to convince the world of the necessity of accepting His principles. The special lines of application must be discussed briefly.

I. The Family.—There has been much shifting of the pivotal point in society. At one time it was politics or government, at another economic activity, at still another the religious problem, that received most attention. The family always stood in the center of any and every activity of individuals and societies. It has been and still is the central social institution which gives color and tone to all the others, and which in turn reflects the condition of the others. Originally it contained the other institutions in a simple form, as it did until recently in China. The family brings us in contact with industry, with property and inheritance, with law to regulate property and ownership, with education, with religion, and even with international relations owing to the intermarriage of dynasties. It has been primarily responsible for the moral character of whole populations owing to the impressions which children receive during their formative years.

There has always existed a very close connection between the family and religion. One may say, indeed, that the two are twins at least from the point of view of interdependence, since religion has prospered where the family fulfilled its social mission properly, and the family received its inspiration for purity and its aspiration for higher ideals principally from religion. The two have always shared the good and evil fortunes of each other and of society as a whole. Religion is, therefore, particularly concerned in the present trend of the family toward dissolution and disruption as the increasing number of divorces indicates. It is not necessary to discuss the causes and remedies of divorce here; the only point which concerns us is, what religion can and must do to bring about higher conceptions of family ideals. A brief review of what religion has done for the family in the past may help us to understand what the former can do for the latter at present. The different forms of the family—*e.g.*, polygyny, polyandry with their variations—interest us only from one particular angle.

The Christian religion has persistently insisted on monogamy. It did this, briefly, for two reasons. In the first place, Christianity has always laid the strongest possible emphasis on human dignity. That was practically out of the question in

polyandry and polygyny. In the former the woman has a chance to distribute her sexual favors to her different husbands for whatever she wants to acquire. The husbands thus become means to her own ulterior purposes. In polygyny the husband expressly gets a number of wives for the satisfaction of his physical lust and they become means to this end. It was pointed out long ago by Kant that any attempt to use another human being as a means to one's ends is immoral, because it interferes with human dignity, which demands that persons are always ends and never means. This may be one of the causes why neither under polygyny nor under polyandry very high types of men and women have developed. The fundamental condition—respect for human personality—was lacking.

The other reason why Christianity insisted on monogamy is the equal value put upon man and woman. Just as in Christ there is neither bond nor free, so there is neither male nor female. The old servitude of the woman had come to an end; she too had an individuality to develop; and she also had a contribution to make to the Kingdom of God and to society. If she had the same value in the sight of God, it could never be permitted to have one man enslave several women for the satisfaction of his lust; that would turn her into a mere

toy and deprive her of her individuality. It was not the fault of Jesus that theologians in later centuries disregarded this principle and, on the basis of the story of the fall, held woman responsible for all human ills. Fortunately, this interpretation never gained wide currency or official recognition, because women had been too prominent in ministering to Jesus to permit this fundamental religious principle to be utterly disregarded or entirely forgotten.

In addition to this strong emphasis on monogamy for the two reasons given, a new aspect of the family must be stressed in our times. In the past several causes helped to strengthen monogamy in Christian countries. There was the community of economic interests, since in very many cases the different members of the family worked at the same trade, as is still the case in countries where production by machinery has gained little headway. There was the old home handed down from generation to generation, with its numerous associations and the hallowed memories of the past, which gave a certain cohesion to families through a common psychical attitude. There was the rarity of a family changing its habitat. In most of the villages and towns the same families continued to live for many generations; each family shared certain traditions with many others; it helped

others and was helped by them. A social spirit was created in this way, which reacted favorably on the permanence of family bonds.

In most of the industrial countries these conditions have disappeared for nearly all the city dwellers. Practically every member of the family follows his or her own inclination in seeking a livelihood, and forms new associations in shop and factory. In many large cities a very small percentage of the families owns homes—*e.g.*, in the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx of Greater New York less than eight per cent. Owing to various reasons, chiefly those of rising rents and the necessity of being near one's work, families move frequently and fail to form permanent associations with any neighborhood. These and some other reasons have a psychical effect which produce restlessness, a feeling of the futility of things, and a desire to use the fleeting moment for enjoyment. A sort of instability is characteristic of modern city dwellers and they have an air of impermanence about them which may in part be created by the constant physical changes in the streets and buildings about them. This psychical attitude is bound to react on family life. The increasing frequency of divorce, the greater independence of the young people and the decreasing respect for parents, the more numerous failures

in business, and the ever larger number of paupers and recipients of charity are indications of it. The monotony of work in many factories produces an uncontrollable desire for change and amusement, and almost any avenue that promises pleasure and diversion is welcomed.

In face of these conditions the Church has a new task to meet. The situation is extremely difficult and must be handled with knowledge and discretion. A few of the steps that must be taken may be mentioned.

First of all we need a new definition of marriage as the basis of the family. The one which seems to meet the needs of modern men best is as follows:

> Marriage means the union of two people of opposite sex, suitable age, proper physical and mental equipment, for the purpose of living together in a lifelong union under the sanction of society in reciprocal love and service with a view of rearing children.

The idea of marriage as presented in many modern novels is not only false, but utterly dangerous. It is that of getting satisfaction of desires unattainable otherwise. What marriage really stands for is the completion and complementing of in-

dividuals from certain points of view. It is a matter primarily of mutual service and of the extension of personality, especially through children. Fatherhood and motherhood awaken in all normal human beings certain dormant qualities which give completion to the individual along those lines. There is an increase of responsibility, a love which is not filial or sexual, but *sui generis*, because it is a relation of the protector becoming in the course of many years the protected, a new outlook upon life because every child creates new problems as to his or her rearing, a change of position from that of a single individual to that of the center of a group. These are but a few points indicating the completion of the individual. In proportion as husband and wife have mutually complementary qualities, the completion is more general.

In the second place, emphasis must be placed on the fact that children cannot be reared properly unless the parents set an example along many lines to their children. Order, cleanliness, purity, promptness, industriousness, social responsibility, good manners—these and other modes of behavior are taught in the family. The child carries the home training through life; it marks him as a well or poorly brought up individual, since the early impressions are rarely if ever entirely shaken

off. The function of parents is not merely to give life, but to educate.

3. In the third place, this complementing of qualities and the education of children are possible only in a small but well-organized group. As a rule, only one man and one woman meet the demand for mutually complementary qualities. This implies that mates must be chosen carefully instead of in the haphazard manner of today. Some—let us hope not many—young people marry on the basis of some external attraction, with a mental reservation that they are to be divorced if they do not agree with each other. The permanence of marriage seems to be the one thought they abhor. Yet, experience proves that the frequent change of mates does not either produce happiness or complete one's personality, because the basic element of permanence is absent. The discipline of married life is as essential as that of school and business. The Church must counteract this frivolous view of marriage with all her power and insist on the necessity of more careful choice in mating, on the sanctity of marriage, and on the importance of family training for the generations of the future. She needs to join for this purpose with all the forces in society, which in one way or another tend to deepen and strengthen moral life. Here is one of the greatest opportunities to serve an

urgent need of the present time, and the Church cannot very well shirk this task if she would be true to her mission.

II. Eugenics.—Closely connected with the family is the good birth of children, or eugenics, as this comparatively new branch of knowledge has been called. Reference was made in the preceding chapter to the many cases of diseases resorting to Lourdes—cases which should have been prevented in the first place, and should never have been allowed to reach such an advanced stage in the second. As long as the disastrous doctrine was preached that man was but a tool in the hands of the deity, cure of disease was the only thing men could think of, especially as the nature of disease was not understood. The temples almost inevitably became centers of healing under these circumstances, since the gods had to be propitiated in some way to grant a remedy. With our greater self-reliance we should resolutely resort to prevention of particular diseases and prophylaxis of disease in general. This is one of the aims of modern medicine.

One of the principal means toward prophylaxis is eugenics. Many diseases are heritable; others are easily acquired by people with low vitality. On the other hand, sound structure and normal functioning of the organism are likewise heritable. The

mating of two such persons is almost bound to produce offspring with good constitutions. A good deal of sickness could be prevented in this way, and much misery obviated.

Apart from this aspect of eugenics there is the more important one of getting a higher caliber of men and women. Whatever the ultimate relation between body and mind may be, criminals and immoral people are now found to be physically inferior to law-abiding persons who make their living by honest work. In the Reformatory at Elmira, New York, not less than 13.7 per cent of the inmates had insane or epileptic heredity; at Auburn, New York, 23.0 per cent of the prisoners were clearly of neurotic origin. Similar results have been found by other investigators.[13] Criminologists are now agreed—not unanimously, it is true—that criminals as a whole are not only physically but also mentally inferior to the general body of citizens; indeed, the two kinds of inferiority are interdependent. On the other hand, the prominent men in business, whether in manufacture, finance, transportation, are superior physically to the average population, and presumably in mental capacity.[14] The whole literature on eugenics attributes this superiority of the law-abiding citizen over the criminal, and of the prominent men not only in business but in other walks of life, prin-

cipally to heredity. Environment has its place, as will be shown presently, but only in developing and not in creating capacity.

If the claims of eugenics are established—and there is little doubt about that—the Church would plainly have a duty in this matter. Why should we let the unworthy multiply disproportionately to the worthy? Why should we let people be born for crime and pauperism to fill our jails and almshouses without being any comfort to themselves, their families, and the community? There is certainly no virtue, either natural or spiritual, in having people brought into existence who are almost certainly destined for a life of crime and vice. It is these people who in many cases go to revival meetings, repent of their sins, cry and confess, shout with joy when they believe they are converted, only to be found, in the vast majority of cases, to be plying their old trades again in a week or so. They are not hypocrites, but perfectly sincere. They lack emotional and intellectual stability because they are physically subnormal. They lack the energy and vitality, the self-control and the perseverance, to lead persistently good lives. The Church must realize this fact and become a leader in eugenics; for she cannot afford to become a place of refuge for the worthless of every kind, only to see them drop

back into the mire time and again. It would be much better to see to it that these people are not born, so that the Church may devote her energies to more constructive work. Those moral, mental, and physical defectives already in our midst must be taken care of; it would be the height of folly, though, to condemn society to the labor of Sisyphus when so much more necessary work needs to be done. This prevention of evil is real kindness; it is more in harmony with the goodness of God than to let the evil happen and then try to find a remedy for what is in many cases not remediable. The Church has an opportunity to make a notable contribution to social welfare and to a higher spirituality by taking a firm stand in this matter.

III. Health.—Closely connected with the family and eugenics is health. There are no reliable statistics on the amount of disease in any country, but fairly dependable estimates in our country claim that the total number of days of sickness of the whole population equals the number of days of three million people being constantly on the sick list. Some of this sickness may be unavoidable; but the avoidable part was costing the country about $1,500,000,000 in 1908. This estimate included loss of work, medical attendance, special care and medicine.[15] Large as this sum

is, we might not begrudge it if any real purpose were accomplished by spending it. But to earn that money by hard work and then to spend it for something avoidable seems sheer waste. Apart from this waste we must consider the heartache of both the sick and their friends, and the generally diminished vitality resulting from too frequent illness. It is certainly incomprehensible why a community should burden itself with such a load when there are means to avoid it, and to have increased happiness beside.

Apart from this, health is a definite asset to both society and the individual. There is buoyancy and courage in good health, willingness and eagerness to tackle new problems. The healthy man is alert, wide awake; he takes a keen interest in things and delights in overcoming difficulties. Nothing can daunt him; his whole nature is resourceful, because it is resilient and adaptable. He may not always conquer, but he always possesses his own soul. Things are, after all, things; and man is man. It is his business to master them, not to be mastered by them; and he will never permit them to conquer him. He has himself, his balance, his self-determination. His health enables him to keep them. This is good religion.

Jesus was certainly a healthy man. When he had preached and labored for many hours in be-

half of the multitudes, he naturally got tired. A few hours of rest and of communion with God restored Him again so as to resume His work. It is remarkable how He could keep up the strain during the three years of teaching without breaking down, notwithstanding the many disappointments and heartaches from which He must have suffered when He experienced the ingratitude of the multitude and the obtuseness of His disciples. His courage never failed Him, and He never flinched even in the last sad hours. His soul was always His own, because His healthy body was a perfect instrument of His mind. It might be interesting to study the great religious leaders from the point of view of health; the writer believes that if sufficient data could be found, these men would prove to have been good physical specimens if we may judge from their fairly long lives in ages when the average life of man was less than thirty years. This is not a mere coincidence, but a matter of cause and effect, if what has just been said about health and its manifestations is true. And we are becoming more and more convinced of the interdependence of mind and body.

A man's mental outlook may not depend on his physical condition; it is, nevertheless, colored by it. Many of the supposed spiritual ailments of people have a physical basis. This is a well-recog-

nized principle in medicine, and several churches have adopted it. The so-called "Emmanuel movement" and similar attempts at reaching the mind through the body are evidence of it. Just how many aberrations of theologians and of other good Christians are due to physical malfunctioning would make an interesting study if data were available. Many "visions" have undoubtedly had their origin in a deranged digestion, and many cases of despair likewise. Perhaps the following story, told by Justice Brewer of Connecticut in a Commencement address, may not be a mere fabrication; it undoubtedly should have a general application.

"Mrs. Bateman, one of the characters in *The Farringdons*, says of husbands in general and of her own in particular, 'the very best of them do not know the difference between their souls and their stomachs. Now take Bateman himself, a kinder husband and a better Methodist never drew breath. Yet as sure as he touches a bit of pork he begins to worry himself about the doctrine of election until there is no living with him. He'll sit in the front parlor and engage in prayer for hours at a time till I say to him, "I'd be ashamed to trouble the Lord with prayer when a pinch o' carbonate of soda would set things straight again."'"

And the poet says:

> Our remedies oft in ourselves do lie
> Which we ascribe to Heaven.

The importance of health for religion is now gradually recognized. The long-faced and sad-featured man is no longer considered the ideal Christian. We have come to realize that if our religion is what we claim it to be, we should be happy and cheerful. Those afflicted with bodily infirmities but full of faith often try to be happy and cheerful; it is an effort, though, they are making, and their joy cannot be spontaneous. We give them credit for their faith and courage, although we bemoan the fact that such fine people should be handicapped by poor health. It is perhaps not too much to say that one-half of the trouble in churches as well as in families comes from irascible persons with poorly balanced nerves, persons who are below normal in vitality and suffer from imaginary ills because they cannot see things as they are.

The Church has certainly good reason to welcome and encourage every agency which aims at the improvement of health, whether it be hygiene, dietetics, sanitation, outdoor exercise, or anything else. She will surely gain immensely by standing

for one of the greatest social and individual advances made possible in modern times.

4. *Christian Ideals and Economics.*—The three ideals which have been discussed are the most important ones because they are most pressing at the present time. They are not the only ones, but a discussion of the others would lead too far. The three referred to cannot be put into practice without providing a necessary economic sufficiency for every man. There may be love in a shanty, but it is not likely to last long nor to be of a kind that enriches and elevates. For, after all, love cannot feed on itself, and if the bills of the grocer and the butcher are not paid, the supplies will stop. The writer has seen devoted couples living in one room in a New York tenement, but the anxiety to get proper food for the children nearly killed the mother and drove at least one father to suicide. Health is practically out of the question under these conditions, with short and poor rations of food and with the terrible crowding. People marry under these conditions for other reasons than those of eugenics, and after the first child has arrived, others receive a scant welcome except that of mere instinctive mother love, which soon finds its expression thwarted by sheer economic want. No one can say that people under these circumstances have a chance to develop their person-

ality, nor that the Kingdom of God can mean much to them here on earth; the only conception they have of it is as of a future state to which they look half hopefully and half fearfully. For, may not the differences of economic status be continued there? Are the rich not able to buy their way into heaven by large gifts and liberal contributions?

And when these poor people see the rich—their brothers in Christ—squander money and time and energy for useless if not immoral purposes, who can blame them if they begin to doubt the goodness of God or even a future state of existence? Need these things be?

They undoubtedly had to be in the past, when, owing to insufficient production, few people could be even in comfortable circumstances. The matter is different now. As Peter Kropotkin stated in a frequently quoted saying: "For the first time in the history of civilization mankind has reached a point where the means of satisfying its needs are in excess of the needs themselves." Perhaps this Russian prince, reared in the lap of luxury, who, like that other famous Russian, Leo Tolstoy, tried to divest himself of his ancestral wealth, had his eye fastened on absolute needs or necessaries when he made that statement. It is true that even these were often lacking in the past, as the frequent famines amply testify. Our standards of living

have risen and the comforts of yesterday have become the necessaries of today. But even with this change there is a fair surplus left over which might be more equitably distributed and save many people at least from desperation and degradation. The class hatred, so bitter and so keen, might at least be mitigated if not avoided. As Matthew Arnold says in his poem, "West London":

> Couch'd on the pavement, close to Belgrade Square,
> A tramp I saw, ill, moody, and tongue-tied.
> A babe was in her arms, and at her side
> A girl; their clothes were rags, their feet were bare.
> Some laboring men, whose work lay somewhere there,
> Pass'd opposite; she touched her girl, who hied
> Across and begg'd and came back satisfied;
> The rich she had let pass with frozen stare.
> Thought I: ("Above her state this spirit towers;
> She will not ask of aliens, but of friends,
> Of sharers in a common human fate").

"Well, what of it? Some people have to be poor, since only a few can be rich!" The religious man must and does say: "No! These are my brothers and my sisters. And I cannot let them freeze and starve and let their souls wither for lack of comfort." Sentiment does not count on the stock exchange nor in the chemical laboratory; it does count heavily in the world of men and women and of boys and girls. And the Church lives and can live only by transmuting economics

and science into that active principle of Christian love. How can that be done?

There has been charity, and there is more of it today than ever before. Many rich people feel some obligation to give of their abundance, and some give large sums. But is that what we need? Is that what builds up character and self-reliance and self-respect? Or does it beget paupers and haters of a social order which condemns some, yea, many people to live off the largess or off the caprice of others? Is that so much better than what happened in England a century ago when the employer would squeeze the workers to do their utmost during twelve to eighteen hours of labor for starvation wages, and his wife or daughter would gather the remnants from the festival board in a basket and carry them to some poor families to keep them from perishing? Have we made no progress? Is our Christian democracy still a mockery? Have we no better way than to grind people down and then give them charity? Is there no other way to keep and build up the self-respect of these people and develop their God-given qualities? There is another way.

In the first place, labor has learned to combine and has found its strength in united effort. Whatever one may think of labor organizations—there are many points for and against them—the fact

is undeniable that they have made the workingmen conscious of their human rights and of their strength in combination. The worker feels himself an integral part of society because he renders essential services to it. He no longer kisses the hand which doles out alms; he insists on getting his rights as a self-respecting man. It is only fair to add that in this attempt he has often overshot the mark and has asked too much. Such a tendency is inevitable in any transition period, and the lesson of Bolshevism with its disastrous effects has already been learned by both European and American workers. In a number of cases the workers have been willing to accept a reduction of wages after the boom period of the World War, preferring steady employment to the uncertainty of the outcome of strikes.

In the second place, capital has learned a lesson. It has come to realize the change in the relation between the employer and the employee. It has been forced in the vast majority of cases to grant shorter hours, higher wages, more humane treatment; legislation for safety devices, better ventilation, sanitary conveniences has been passed by a number of legislatures; the employer's liability in case of accident was the final step thus far in making him realize that he had a responsibility beyond paying wages and observing the legal hours

of working his men. We must frankly confess that most of these demands were opposed by the majority of employers. It should be stated just as frankly, though, that a number of managers and owners of shops and factories have been not only ready to meet these demands, but have anticipated them. Within the last few years these men have gone further and have introduced various measures to show their appreciation of the workers as human beings. Here belong, among others, the many schemes for welfare work—*e.g.*, giving the employees the opportunity to acquire an interest in the business by buying stock, and introducing so-called employee representation.

In the third place, there has been a steady enlightenment of the community concerning the need of better relations between capital and labor. This was due to various causes which are of interest here. Christian teaching concerning the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man has had a deeper and broader influence than most men realize. It was on this basis that the workers claimed a share in social and industrial affairs. The movement toward democracy is to be credited to Christianity without any qualifications. It was the religious spirit which induced that somewhat uncertain quantity, called the public, to take the part of the workers in their battle against the

tyrannical conditions of employment. It was again the same spirit that moved many employers and rich people to extend at first charity to the laborer and later to improve the worker's situation voluntarily. In addition to this general humanitarianism, there came the teaching of sociology. It brought home to all men on the basis of science the theory of our interdependence on the Biblical statement that we are members of the same body and that all members must suffer if one of them suffers.[16] All of the better books written by sociologists breathe this spirit, whether credit is given to religion or not, and the number of these books is increasing, and the number of young men and women who study sociology or read these books is growing every year. The matter may be put concretely by referring to a well-known case which happened in New York not so many years ago.

Social workers had tried for many years to eliminate at least the worst evils of the sweatshops on humanitarian grounds. The sociologists had urged the same thing on the ground of a common danger to all citizens with a plague spot in their midst. The churches had, of course, preached about brotherly love in a more or less effective way. But the sweatshops went on, because the men interested in the making of men's and women's clothes said

they could not get along without them. Then something happened. For years diseases—*e.g.*, scarlet fever, diphtheria, and tuberculosis—had been carried from these shops into families all over the city and the country, and no one could tell why they should appear in families which were so well cared for. It was presumably one of the inscrutable ways of Providence. Then the theory of bacteria as the cause of diseases became an established fact. Investigations were made. The findings were brief and terse. Clothes were made in a number of cases in sweatshops where all kinds of infectious diseases were rife. Tuberculous people made them; children with scarlet fever and diphtheria would handle them as the tired mother sat by the bedside sewing. In some cases sick people would actually sleep on these half-ready clothes. The mystery was solved. And it took only a few years to eliminate the dangerous breeding places, because the theory of the community of interest had been proved to be a fact.

Take another and more recent case. For thirty years many people with a social outlook had been working to abolish the twelve-hour day in the steel mills. Always the attempts were met with the explanation that it was impossible, that the eight-hour day would cost too much, that these workers wanted the twelve-hour day, etc. Finally

the pressure became too strong, and on September 1, 1923, the eight-hour day with three shifts of men was put into operation, grudgingly and tentatively at first, then, when the good financial results were noticed, with more confidence and finally with zest. After two years' trial the experiment has proved fully successful. The price of steel has risen only slightly; the men are happier and more eager to work because they have a chance to see their families; the savings-banks report larger deposits notwithstanding somewhat smaller earnings of the workers. Strikes—once the bane of the steel industry—seem to have passed into history. The translation of a good theory into a fact has again proved a benefit to everybody concerned.

A new situation has arisen; views which even in 1890 were considered revolutionary are now held by many religious and nonreligious but socially minded people. We are undoubtedly pressing toward a new social order. What are its characteristics likely to be? Are they going to be an increased affluence in material goods and a materialism of which that of the present time is a mere prelude? Or is the new civilization to be one of higher ethical conceptions and of a finer and more general spirituality? If it is to be materialism, Professor Huxley was right in hoping

that a kindly comet had better sweep us out of existence. If it is to be spirituality, the Church must take a definite stand in regard to the industrial order, and utilize and emphasize and enlarge the changes which have already begun to work in present-day society.

[1] Acts xv.
[2] Matt. ix: 9-13.
[3] John viii: 3-11.
[4] Luke vii: 36-50.
[5] John x: 10.
[6] George Burman Foster, *The Finality of the Christian Religion;* Preface, p. xiii. 1909.
[7] Acts i: 4-8.
[8] Acts v: 1-11.
[9] Matt. vi: 25-34.
[10] II Thess. iii: 6-12.
[11] I Peter ii: 5.
[12] *Reconstruction of Religion,* p. 102.
[13] E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology,* pp. 601f. 1921. Also Charles Goring, *The English Convict,* pp. 186-200. 1913.
[14] E. Gowin, *The Executive and His Control of Men,* pp. 22-34.
[15] *Report on National Vitality;* Bulletin 30 of the Committee of One Hundred on National Health, p. 12. 1909.
[16] I Cor. xii: 26.

IX

Through Man to God

1. *Introduction.*—There are two passages in the New Testament which have been generally neglected in our theology. St. James argues for works as an expression of faith in his Epistle, ii: 14-26. He shows as plainly as is possible that faith without works is dead, and that, consequently, we must judge a man by his works which are evidence of his faith, rather than by faith which evaporates in mere pious phrases. By faith which produces the right kind of life, he evidently does not refer to the forensic aspect of faith of the Epistle to the Romans; but to the kind which is "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen"[1]—a definition which occurs in an epistle credited by tradition to St. Paul. It is a faith which sees greater possibilities, larger opportunities, and more good deeds among men. The other passage is from an epistle credited by tradition to the beloved disciple.[2] He argues in a similar vein. How can a man love God whom he has not seen when he hates his brother whom he

does see? It is impossible. These passages are in perfect harmony with the actions and statements of Jesus. "For whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and my sister, and mother."[3]

These passages have already been referred to in a previous chapter, and need no further explanation. Taken together they furnish an argument which is irresistible. Jesus and three of His greatest disciples speak about facts, not theories. They supply something by which we may judge, rather than guess. It is an argument based on fact, and, therefore, strictly scientific. There is no metaphysics in true religion; it is a demonstrable fact, consisting in right action based on a right attitude. Both have been insisted on in preceding chapters, and what we need to do now is to point out some new aspects of a religion conceived in this way.

Is this true?

Man has always been afraid to face facts. In one way or another he has gone a long way around them and followed his imagination—unbridled as it often was—only to be called up short sooner or later and compelled to face them. There is an annoying persistence and stubbornness about facts. It takes trouble and exertion to deal with them; they will not yield except to systematic attack. But when attacked in that way, they yield ample results. All the various discoveries referred to in

preceding chapters were the result of intelligent and diligent work. The only values created are those of work.

It is the same way with religion. The fact that we must earn our salvation is staring us in the face, whether we like it or not. If it could be thrust upon us, it would have little or no value. All the ritual sacrifices and offerings of the past left men unsatisfied, because they were a wrong avenue to completion. Just as we cannot eat by proxy, so we cannot develop our talents by proxy. It must be our own deed. As Professor Foster says:[4]

"Man's worth is not a gift, merely; it is a task; not a possession, but a problem; and so not a dower to be received from *direct* divine efficiency simply, but personal values to be created by one's own self-activity also in the face of moral temptation and of pain."

The situation is, then, one that must be faced frankly and courageously. It is this: Jesus and the Apostles based their religion on facts. Man has developed his intelligence by studying facts. The conclusion is inevitable that the spiritual and moral advancement of man can be promoted only by adhering to the fact that his own activity is the means of any further progress. If we may reason by analogy, it would seem that if religion were based on facts, our progress in that line would be

Note

as marked as it has been in science. What are the facts which concern the advancement of our spiritual life? There are many of them, but only four of the main facts can be considered here—the new stewardship, the new materialism, the new Christianity, and the new theology.

2. *The New Stewardship.*—There has always been a conception in the Church that men are only stewards of the goods they own legally; they are to husband their property carefully because they are accountable to God for its proper administration and its distribution. The passages upon which the conception is based are chiefly the following: The parables of the wise servant, Luke xii: 41-48, and of the unjust steward, Luke xvi: 1-13; of the pounds, Luke xix: 11-28, and of the talents, Matt. xxv: 14-30. The ingenuity, and not infrequently the ingenuousness, employed in interpreting these passages have been marvelous. All kinds of hidden meanings have been looked for, and the commendation of the unjust steward has given rise to all kinds of questionings; and many a rich man has hugged the words, "to him that hath shall be given," because they seemed to indorse his everlasting pursuit after more wealth. The fairly general consensus of opinion seems to be, though, that we should make friends for ourselves of the unrighteous mammon by making gifts to charity

and otherwise helping people in difficulties. As long as that was done, there seemed apparently no limit as to the amount, and, consequently, no stricture as to the methods by which wealth was acquired.

It was presumably perfectly justifiable to consume as much of it as one could, maybe in wasteful and extravagant ways under the spurious notion that any kind of consumption of goods would give more work to the poor—a notion still fairly generally held by many half-educated spendthrifts. It was entirely in harmony with this idea that a part of one's income and capital should be given to churches and philanthropies in the expectation that a just claim was acquired thereby for the larger balance. Some people had a very fair sense of proportion in this matter; the more questionable the methods by which wealth was acquired, the larger the share they gave away. The churches and the monasteries of the Middle Ages grew rich from these gifts, and they are still having a plentiful harvest in all countries where the power of the office of the keys is believed in. Perpetual masses have been endowed by many people who could afford it; poorer men had to be satisfied with masses for shorter periods. Underlying this whole conception was the idea that man was helpless; he had to let things happen, and then try to remedy as

many evils as he could by almsgiving. This was, as we have seen, the old pagan and old Jewish conception according to which man was merely a tool in the hands of the deity. The idea that people should not get into trouble, that measures should be taken to prevent evil, and that a general attitude of constructive improvements is the only one worthy of intelligent men, seemed utterly strange to most Christians in the past and is still looked upon with suspicion by many today. Yet, that is the new meaning of stewardship. A brief consideration of the three fundamental principles of Jesus's teaching will make this clear.

Direct or personal charity is possible only on the basis of acquaintance. The employer, for instance, could look after the unfortunates among his workers as long as their number was small and as long as they were willing to receive alms instead of insisting on their rights. When the employer has thousands of men and women working for him and when they are scattered over a large city, personal contact becomes plainly impossible and the kindly word which formerly accompanied the gift cannot be spoken. In an age of democracy the worker has a greater sense of independence and of personal dignity, and he does not take kindly to dependence on others; he is apt to demand his rights as a free citizen and as a child of God. The

whole situation has changed for the better, even granting for the moment that the old attitude was right.

Was it right? Charity assumes that "the poor ye have always with you."[5] That was plainly a statement referring to a special situation. Jesus simply wanted to defend the woman against the charge of wastefulness by stating that charity might be exercised at any time, whereas an act of devotion to Himself could not. He did not make a prophecy, nor state a principle that there should always be poor people dependent on the gifts of the rich. That would have been contrary to His principles. Charity assumes that there is a clear and permanent division between the well-to-do and the poor. It denies, consequently, the possibility of the poor ever rising to a position of independence, and, by implication, the possibility of the poor having talents worth while developing. Again, charity is not a permanent attitude; it is an act of sympathy to get rid of a disagreeable situation; it is not interested, as a rule, in developing a person's qualities. Finally, charity is not particularly interested in creating a new social order, the Kingdom of God, in which conditions are created which will reduce the occurrence of evil to a minimum. It is, thus, the denial of the fundamental teachings of Christ owing to its misunder-

Is this true of organized charity?

standing of the essential function of religion as a matter dealing primarily with a future life.

There is often a real danger in charity. "The tragedy of their lives follows the rich in their giving. They find themselves surrounded by people who are anxious to become recipients and who will use every art of persuasion for themselves or the organization they represent. Unless careful investigation is applied, a large percentage of their gifts never accomplish their intention and act only as a reward of mendacity. If they are wise they delegate the task of dispensing their benefits to a brisk army of salaried officials habitually underpaid, experts in their several lines, who, according to temperament and function, develop in curious mixture the qualities of the saint and detective."[6] The personal touch is thus lost and the desire of the giver to rejoice in the lifting of distress is lost, too. "But the farther a man goes in the direction of charity, the more he realizes the dangers attending it. If he provides three-cent meals for the poor, they will accept still lower wages and cut under the self-supporting workers. If he feeds and clothes their children, he weakens parental responsibility."[7] The care, intelligence, and diligence of those who in modern times give liberally from their large fortunes show how the

problem of giving with a minimum of damage has pressed on them.

Stewardship cannot, then, mean the giving of alms, the occasional relief of distress, nor the granting of favors now and then to the financially less competent. That attitude is static, not dynamic; it takes the social conditions of the past as fixed for all time rather than as the product of a particular period. What, then, is stewardship?

If we are to have full-orbed men and women such as Jesus was anxious to develop, our whole attitude must change. We must realize two things —that man must have physical bread as well as spiritual bread. The Churches have constantly dwelt on the food for the soul, and have stressed spirituality. That is absolutely necessary. But the food for the body is just as necessary. A hungry man may be anxious to get into touch with God. But he will look upon Him chiefly as a provider of food and raiment; his religion will be a matter of economics just as it was in primitive times. It will not be the desire for a noble and wholesome search for completion. How is a man to develop his intellect in the search for truth, when his whole nature cries out for food? How is his sense of the beautiful to be cultivated, when he shivers in his rags? And how is he to strive and do well by his fellow men when he has hardly

energy enough to perform the absolutely necessary tasks for earning a scanty living? This is a fact which we must face frankly. Much of the sin and the vice and the crime in the world is due to economic distress.

If we are to have a greater amount of spirituality, our attitude toward business must be changed. Business must become an agency for service instead of one for profit. In making this statement there is no intention to deny that business has rendered great services to society and is rendering them now. By promoting transportation and communication within and between the nations, by manufacturing on a large scale and employing the most effective machinery, by extending credit and creating confidence, and in many other ways our business men have changed the relation between men all over the globe wherever they have had a chance to penetrate. They have applied and made available to the masses the different scientific inventions and discoveries. The wireless and the airplane will readily suggest themselves as two of the latest benefits conferred upon society. In 1900 these two inventions were known only among a few educated men and scientists as discoveries—*i.e.*, the principles of the wireless and the airplane were known. A few years later inventors went to work and applied the principles. But both the discov-

eries and the inventions would have been of no avail if it had not been for enterprising men of business who were willing to risk their money by establishing plants in order to make them commercially available. And this is what has always happened. The building of our first transcontinental railroad would have been delayed at least by a decade if it had not been for the farsightedness and enterprise of a few business men. These statements should be kept in mind during the discussion to follow.

Times have changed and business must change its attitude. Much that business was able to do was due to social conditions over which business men had no control; and much that it has done was due to the desire for profit. The two facts reduce the credit to which business is entitled considerably. To put the matter tersely, the services rendered by business were incidental, the desire for profits was primary. A single illustration will make this point clear.

The United States Steel Corporation has done good work in standardizing production and prices by eliminating the cutthroat competition prevailing before 1900. These were conspicuous services. It has, however, used every possible opportunity to increase its profits. The so-called "Pittsburgh plus" plan is the latest case. It means that prices

for steel products are based on the cost of these products at Pittsburgh plus the freight from there to the point of destination. It matters not at all whether these products come from Pittsburgh or from any other mill of the corporation nearer the point of destination. For instance, if a builder at Joliet, Illinois, orders his steel from a Chicago mill of the corporation, he has to pay the freight rate as if it were shipped from Pittsburgh to Joliet, even though it was shipped only from Chicago. The additional freight paid was, of course, pure profit, and the Federal Trade Commission charged that the practice cost the farmers of eleven Western states $30,000,000 annually. The Commission forbade the continuance of the practice, and the corporation stopped it at once.[8]

In view of these facts the new stewardship can mean only one thing—the development of full-orbed men and women by service and the respect for the personality of the other party so dominant in the life and teachings of Jesus. Men can be developed only by having their self-respect built up, their liberty respected, and the inestimable value and sacredness of their personality recognized.[9] Charity makes dependents; it makes the liberty of the other party depend on good will or a whim instead of on a right, and respects the sacredness of the other party only occasionally—

i.e., when in trouble or when brought to our special attention. Charity has, therefore, failed to meet the needs of the modern world, no matter how far it has extended by larger sums given and more institutions built. Service must take its place.

There are certain vocations like the ministry, teaching, medicine, and, to a certain extent, law, which have service instead of profit for their main object. In each of them the object is to build up by fostering spirituality, informing and developing the mind, restoring and preserving health, and guarding and increasing liberty. These vocations are called professions. What is a profession?

A profession consists of a socially recognized body of knowledge which cannot be readily picked up by an amateur or laboriously acquired by an apprentice, but only through a process of education. The professional man is animated by the motive of service, the desire for self-expression urging him always to do his best, and the duty to render public service and to increase knowledge for that purpose.

If we are to achieve the purpose of Jesus our life must be professionalized. This is particularly true of business, because it plays such a large rôle in modern times and has a vast power over all of us since it supplies all our economic needs. Busi-

ness is very anxious to be recognized as a profession so as to enjoy the social esteem attached to that status. It points to the training required today for becoming a banker, a manufacturer, railroad manager, advertising man, etc. Schools of commerce have been established to develop men of this type by careful training. Harvard University appealed for $5,000,000 in 1924 to equip its business school properly. One sentence reads: "For lifting business to the dignity of a profession with recognized principles, more skilful methods and higher ethical standards."[10] In 1924 a book was published by Henry S. Sturgis under the title, *Investment, A New Profession.* These are but two cases out of many which could be cited to indicate the desire of the more prominent men of business to rank as professional men. Many men have, as far as is possible under present circumstances, actually conducted their business as a profession, with a view to service rather than profits. A few only can be mentioned.

So-called "Golden Rule Nash" of Cincinnati has conducted his business in a thoroughly Christian spirit by paying high wages, shortening hours, lowering prices, and creating a pride in good workmanship among his employees. He has built up a high *morale* and a fine spirit of self-respect among his workers. Filene Brothers of Boston have for

many years conducted their store as an enterprise based on three principles: maximum wages to employees; self-government for employees; minimum charges to customers. Filene Brothers have also given the workers a place on the board of directors, about which one of the brothers says:

"The arrangement cuts both ways, for chief among the powers given the employees, after the right to administer their own internal affairs, is one permitting them every year to nominate a panel of at least six of their fellows who seem to them qualified for membership on our board of directors. From this annual panel we select four who sit with us as directors. By the terms of our own corporate agreement we also make our choice of two more employees as directors. As the management, so-called, consists of five members—my brother, myself, and our three partners—we thus deliberately create an employee majority in the directorship itself."[11] The admission into the directorate seems inevitable to Mr. Filene, although he knows that his views are not shared by other employers.

"Those who might be called the Old Guard among employers know that, in facing this gathering consciousness of dignity and value in the workingman, they are front to front with a force as natural and inevitable as summer warmth and sum-

mer rain. But to them the force seems a menace and not a help. It strikes them as an assault on their own dignity and authority, a rocking of their thrones, to be fought to the last. So they fail to meet the worker on a common ground; instead of joining with him, they prolong industrial strife —and are themselves the first to bear the costs of it."[12] "As I see it, it is the very bigness of big business that has forced on those in command of it this turning to experiments in a more humanly coöperative industry, and this not as a showy humanitarian move, but as a hard, practical endeavor to find some way out of ills of organization and management that appear inevitably wherever industry grows to giant scope and gets out of hand."[13]

The third case illustrating the professional attitude in business is taken from England. Lever Brothers have not only paid good wages in a large manufacturing enterprise, but have built Port Sunlight near Birkenhead as a garden city for their employees, and have taken other measures to insure a fuller mental and spiritual life to their workers. They have gradually reduced the hours of work and found each reduction to be not only practicable, but profitable. The final conclusion of this long series of experiments beginning in

1888 is the six-hour day for workers, about which one of the brothers says:

"The worker would have opportunities for recreation, for education, and for the achievement of a higher social standing. . . . The factory employee . . . would go for six hours a day to the factory in the true spirit of service. He or she would receive for that six hours at least the same pay that he or she now receives for eight hours, . . . and would be able to produce as much in the six hours as is now produced in the eight, while the machinery, running in two six-hour shifts, would produce a vastly increased output." [14]

These cases have been referred to not necessarily as illustrations of method to be followed (ultimately each employer must work out his own method according to the special conditions prevailing in his shop or factory), but as illustrations of the spirit to be imitated, the spirit which looks upon one's responsibilities from the larger angle of the workers and the community instead of that of the stockholders only. Employers, workers, and the citizens generally are aided and improved by this larger viewpoint, and the profits have not been decreasing, but increasing.

There is another problem which must be considered briefly—that of unemployment. The fear of unemployment is the permanently pervading

background for a large number of our population. The fact of unemployment is the breeder of discontent, resentment, and bitterness. We have about 1,000,000 workers out of work practically all the time; in the summer of 1921 there were 5,000,000 with about 15,000,000 dependents. They are approaching destitution, if not desperation, a little closer with every hour of unemployment. A business man, realizing the gravity of the situation, said some years ago:

"If ever our present economic structure is ruthlessly torn down, the cause is likely to be unemployment. The amount of enforced seasonal idleness in this country is a grave reflection upon the master minds of the financial and business communities. There is lacking among employers a proper feeling of responsibility, a due realization of what they owe not only their employees but the nation. To allow unemployment to become extensive this winter will be extremely dangerous. This is no time for each employer to think only of himself and let others suffer as they may. That selfish, shortsighted, unbusinesslike attitude has brought grave trouble to other countries. If persisted in long enough and carried far enough, it would assuredly bring trouble here also.

"Continuity of employment is a problem which should be exercising the minds of every employer

and every business association in the United States. If it does not exercise the minds of business men, it will probably be taken out of their hands and handled by others less capable of effecting the desired result. If a million men who are willing to work cannot find work, they are not at all likely to go hungry submissively."[15]

The problem of giving continuous employment has been solved by many business men animated with the professional spirit. One case will illustrate the problem. William H. McElwain started a small shoe business in 1895 in Boston. He had but small means and the sales amounted to only $75,957 in that year. He was so skillful and enjoyed the coöperation of his employees to such an extent that in 1908—the year of his death—the sales amounted to $8,691,274. One reason for the confidence and zeal of his employees was his ability to supply them with work for three hundred days of the year. This was not an easy task. Shoe manufacturing is a seasonal industry, and most manufacturers have to lay off their employees for from three to six months a year. McElwain studied the problem, arranged his production in such a way that he could deliver his orders as promptly as other men meet a note falling due, with the result that his factories kept open all the year round.[16] This problem can be solved; it must

be solved for the nation as a whole if, as Mr. Forbes says, disaster is to be avoided.

Closely associated with the problem of unemployment is that of strikes. Mr. Noel Sargent, the manager of the Open Shop Department of the National Association of Manufacturers, estimated the loss from these industrial disturbances during the eight years, 1916 to 1923, inclusive, at *over* $12,500,000,000. The loss to the employers was $478,500,000, or about four per cent of the total loss during the eight year period. The loss to the employees was $1,740,000,000, or about fourteen per cent; and the loss to the public was the balance of eighty-two per cent, or some $10,300,000,000.[17]

Losses from other sources run into several billions, as the *Report of the Federated Engineers*, compiled at the request of Mr. Herbert Hoover and published in 1921, proves. The interesting thing is that these engineers held labor responsible for only twenty-five per cent of this loss; management for fifty per cent; and duplication of plants, overstocking, and low production for another twenty-five per cent.

Here is, then, a great responsibility before our men of business and before the workers. The problem of providing sufficient means for every man, woman, and child in our country can be solved. If proper coöperation between workers

and managers is assured, if strikes and unemployment are reduced, if waste is eliminated, there will be an opportunity to provide a suitable living for every inhabitant in our country. The new stewardship means just that. Most men have considered their duty ended when they provided for their own families. The new stewardship means that the task is much greater, since the interrelations between men are much more complex today than ever. In any case, we cannot expect the hungry and the naked to be very spiritual; they will seek in religion—if they seek it at all—just what primitive man sought, namely, economic advantage. And this advantage will be sought, as has happened in other countries, through revolt and rebellion, as Mr. Forbes indicated above. Charity is no longer sufficient, because it stultifies the recipient and is contrary to Christian democracy. The problem of unemployment, for instance, cannot be solved according to the parable of the laborers in the vineyard.[18] An act of generosity may give the worker the wherewithal to live; it will not compensate him for the anguish suffered, nor make a man of him when he has to take what he has not earned. That problem, like all others, will require thought and a willingness to help without injuring the manhood of the worker; and the worker in turn must do his share

of work so as to earn his wage for his own as well as for the common good.

One more question must be answered concerning the new conception of stewardship. Is that, after all, a question of religion? Is it not a question of economics? The answer is twofold.

In the first place, religion cannot be separated from economic life. Try as we may, the two are inseparably welded together. Those who have seen the despair of honest workers who, like the men in the parable, waited all day to be hired, or rather, trudged from place to place all day long and perhaps for weeks, have realized what a burden is laid upon them, especially when there are families to be provided for. The burden, not infrequently, becomes too heavy, and deeds are done of which everyone who has a social and religious consciousness is ashamed.

In the second place, religion has always tried to solve this problem. It was by means of charity in the past; it must be by means of proper wages, suitable hours, and continuous employment in the present.

We have seen that many business men have solved the problem as far as they could. It is certainly not too much to ask that other men should do the same thing. As soon as all business men get the professional spirit, the economico-

religious problem will be solved on a large scale for the whole country. We have quoted only business men, because we wanted to show that these men are realizing their responsibility. It is of the utmost importance that these men should be encouraged by every religious man and every minister of God so as to disseminate that spirit of the new stewardship among all men of business and among all workers. For he that has one talent is bound to be as faithful in managing it as he that has ten; but he with the ten talents must set the example and inspire the other. Here is a task greater and more beneficial than has ever been before a scientist, because it is more complicated and far-reaching for human welfare and the moral uplift of mankind. For, if "true religion and undefiled before God and the Father" consists in visiting the widows and fatherless in their affliction and extending charity to them how much higher a religion must that be which prevents misery in millions of homes and brings joy and happiness to other millions by providing honest work!

3. *The New Materialism.*—If the new stewardship should fail to appear and become general, the new materialism will be the cause of our destruction. In ancient times materialism manifested itself chiefly in the search for the necessaries of

life. Few Americans have any conception of the grinding poverty still to be found in many parts of the world. In some parts of the interior of China a number of tribes still live like the cave man of old, in dire need of food and clothing and housing. We read occasionally of the oppressed peon in Mexico and his want of nearly everything for supporting himself even physically. The Russian famines of the last few years have made us somewhat better acquainted with the meaning of economic insufficiency because pictures of children, reduced to mere skeletons, were shown all over our country, and we read of cannibalism and other heinous crimes due to starvation. The further back we go in history, the more frequent and widespread were want and famine. People died by the thousands and millions without being able to call for help, owing to lack of communication. That was a kind of materialism which brutalized men and women and children and gave little chance for the development of the finer emotions. When children were exposed and the sick and the old were abandoned out of sheer economic necessity as a regular practice for many generations, we can imagine how gross the feelings of human beings must have been. It was a time when man was wolf to man. Fortunately, this poverty was neither universal nor permanent; it was of suffi-

cient extent and frequency, though, to prevent a general rise of the more humane emotions; and the tortures practiced on captives, heretics, and criminals during the Middle Ages furnish ample testimony that they were still absent even then. The change has come about only within the last few centuries.

The new materialism is due to affluence, not to poverty. It is for that reason more dangerous, because it is more subtle and attractive. When you enter a house exquisitely furnished with pictures, rugs, and furniture, and meet people with charming manners and well educated—it is somewhat difficult to call them materialists. It is only when you learn that their moral valuations depend entirely on utility and expediency that you become convinced that their moral life is a sham. They may give liberally to philanthropies and churches, have a pew in a fashionable church and a box in the grand opera; it is all for the sake of its indirect cash value in business. When again you read of some of these people having thrown off the mask of propriety and divorcing each other and marrying the very hour the law permits, the indications of materialism in the form of immorality become more apparent. When, finally, the extravagance of these people knows no bounds and millions are spent for utterly superfluous luxuries, the

words of Jesus, that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven, may readily suggest themselves—not because these people are rich, but because they are so utterly immersed in the things which the dollar can buy. That is their only standard of value, physical enjoyment their only desire, and a cheap notoriety as extravagant spenders their only aim. How did the old materialism change into the new?

There have always been a few rich men within historic times. Solomon with his palaces and villas and many wives, Lucullus and Crassus with their baths and feasts, the Medici with their picture galleries and robes and armor—will readily suggest themselves. Down to recent times the number of these persons was very limited; they were mostly rulers who got their wealth by war and oppression. In our times there are many rich people because our methods of production have changed from *manu-facture* to *machino-facture*. A much more extensive exploitation of natural resources has thus become possible, and many people have become rich where formerly there were and could be only a few.

The change was brought about by science, which gave us discoveries and inventions of every possible kind. These increased the comforts of the

masses considerably and made possible large fortunes for many. This is one reason why science has been called atheistic by some men. It is, of course, nothing of the kind. The fault is ours and not that of science if we have allowed a few to reap where they have not sown. We have permitted the fruits of science, which is ultimately the foundation of all material wealth, to be appropriated by the grasping and the enterprising. Our social development is lagging behind our material, and our spiritual behind our intellectual. The result is that the products of our material civilization have by far outstripped our moral. Our moral ideas are still those of the past based on individualism; we have not had time or have been unwilling to recast them so as to make them fit a society of interdependent persons and peoples. An individualistic society, like that of the eighteenth century, has given us our moral and political codes, and we naturally suffer from maladjustment. Most people have not yet acquired a true sense of social responsibility; they imagine that they can discharge it by giving alms in the form of charity. The result is that they think they can spend large sums of money as they please, whether in socially injurious ways or not.

Materialism has changed our lives. Not only do many rich people spend extravagantly and

wastefully, but their poison has penetrated the professional classes. The profession of law has become almost entirely commercialized. Teaching and preaching have felt the influence of wealth. The presidents of our colleges and universities are always looking to wealthy patrons for endowments; and the bishops and ministers, anxious to erect a fine church building for "the greater glory of God," do not hesitate to make friends with the often unrighteous Mammon, since money is not supposed to be tainted. Even in medicine some scandals have occurred by very rich persons being charged large sums for operations. We are, thus, in danger of losing our real standards of values by supplanting those of integrity and spirituality by those of financial success. The reason why business is still denied the dignity of a profession lies here: It measures success by the increase of wealth on the basis of a still low moral standard. The individual business man may be and is moral within the limits of that standard, but —it is not high enough for the modern responsibilities of business in society.

The Church has an everlasting duty to preach idealism and to inculcate spiritualism in face of this situation. Commercial materialism means not only a danger to individuals but to society. It is the denial of all that is truly Christian. It is

the corruption of men by the thousands and millions. Manhood cannot be built up that way, but only through the ideals of integrity and spirituality. Perfectibility cannot be found in externals, whether they cost much or little, but only through an inner sense of harmony by the development of our own talents and those of our fellow men. In this way only can we serve God, because we serve our brother whom we can see.

4. *The New Christianity*.—The preceding section has prepared us for a new attitude in Christianity, and we must indicate its manifestations briefly. Only three of them can be referred to.

I. There is a new spirituality pervading the modern Christian world. This statement may seem strange after what has been said. Yet, underneath the flippancy and the materialism of this commercial age there is a serious tone which brands the surface manifestations of life as false and spurious. The mere fact that people spend lavishly does not mean that they are wicked, but merely that they have not yet become accustomed to their wealth. All through the ages economic insufficiency has been the condition of the many. The desire for wealth has become almost second nature to man. To have not only enough to secure the necessaries of life, but to enjoy comforts and luxuries, has been the dream of the ages.

Owing to the general inability of nearly all social groups to acquire even moderate wealth, this desire was sublimated and its realization postponed until after death. The paradise of the Mohammedan is a place of plenty, the heaven of the Indian is one with an abundance of game, and the Valhalla of the ancient Teutons was one flowing, not with milk and honey, but with mead. The unattainable was injected into religion and made a part of the hereafter. The "Holy City" of St. John [19] does not mention food; but the new Jerusalem with its gates of pearl and its streets of gold is of such magnificence that we can easily discern the desire of the early Christians, who were generally poor, for a place where wealth untold was within every man's reach. The deferred enjoyment of riches is just as plain there as in other religions.

Wealth has come to many people recently, and comforts have come within the reach of nearly all. It is small wonder that the new situation did not develop a corresponding judgment and discretion concerning the use of wealth. During the World War, when wages were high, many workers spent extravagantly just because they wanted to have their "fling" and for once satisfy every suppressed desire. What happened in their case temporarily, happens in that of the *nouveaux*

riches more frequently. Families accustomed to wealth for generations do not spend so wastefully. But underneath this reckless spending there is a serious questioning and investigating. The theories of biology and other sciences have upset many of our old *mores* and moral concepts, and the new wealth has acted like new wine on many people. They must have their "fling," but they ask many questions.

The modern world cannot possibly get rid of the idea of immortality. The pagan who had little faith in the beyond might ask himself, How to be happy? He had, after becoming a sceptic, only one desire: to make the most of this world. He could readily adopt the maxim, Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die. It is different with modern man. He may have his doubts about immortality. That thought is, however, too deeply rooted in our lives to be despatched easily. And so there is a questioning and a searching; we have to argue ourselves into disbelief and fortify ourselves when we indulge in the "lusts of the flesh." Lavish spending with us is not merely poor judgment; it is immoral because we have, whether we acknowledge it or not, the expectation of a future life. Our indulgence is shamefaced, not as that of the Greeks and Romans of the later period, frank and natural. We have learned some-

thing about sin and our permanent value, and we can never rid ourselves of that knowledge with its accusing finger. So we find that those people who are deliberately or accidentally keeping away from the churches are nevertheless permeated with the Christian spirit. As they spend liberally for their own amusements, so they spend generously for the relief of "those in need, sorrow, or any other adversity." This is an entirely new feature in history.

II. This generosity is based on another Christian idea—the greater valuation of life. In the past this valuation referred primarily to future salvation. Everything must be done to save a man's soul. We have supplemented that idea with salvation for this life. Whatever doubts we may have concerning the value of a particular individual—*e.g.*, a criminal—our faith in the value of man in general remains unshaken. We believe more than ever in the potentialities of every man, and so we want to give even the criminal a chance. The hesitation to inflict capital punishment has no other meaning. We must, of course, protect ourselves against evildoers; but we do not punish with zest and delight; we admit every extenuating circumstance, and make reform possible if not easy. Mediæval Christians punished for retaliation, and seemed to enjoy it.

The same idea manifests itself in the change from charity to philanthropy. Almsgiving was largely a matter of pity and of acquiring merit. Philanthropy is chiefly for "setting the needy on their feet." We want to give them a chance to become self-respecting by being self-supporting; we offer them opportunities to develop whatever talent they may have. The almost innumerable plans for the "improvement of the condition of the poor" have primarily this meaning. We want to save them for this world in the expectation that they will seek salvation for the next.

Another aspect of this valuation is modern education. Mediæval schools were intended primarily as "signposts" to heaven. The pupil was taught his catechism or its equivalent and deemed educated. This view still prevails in schools controlled by churches. Today our principal object consists in fitting the pupils for a life of usefulness in society. We want them to develop their gifts so as to be able to stand foursquare on their own merits and be beholden to no one.

The final aspect of this faith in the potentialities of man consists in our belief in democracy. This belief has always existed in the Church, but with numerous reservations. As children of the same Father, men were equals. When it came to having a voice in the management of their own affairs,

most men were deemed inferior by the few who planned and schemed to keep the majority down. These devices were put under all kinds of pretexts for the supposed benefit of the masses. Today we give all men and women the suffrage, not with the expectation that we shall be better governed—since democracies are, owing to the comparatively recent intrusting of the affairs of the state to the masses, notoriously poorly governed—but in the hope that the talents of every man should have an opportunity for development. Our faith in the capacities of the mythical average man is the basis of democracy, and that faith is in turn based on the brotherhood of man in God.

This higher valuation of life manifests itself in different ways. The greater importance of health referred to in the preceding chapter is due to the fact that if human life is valuable it should be freed from as many handicaps as possible. Low vitality and sickness are certainly handicaps. There are certain Christians who are sound in belief, beyond reproach in character, zealous in the performance of their religious duties. By some sort of moral chemistry life loses its bright hue, though, when they appear, and even conversation its pleasant flavor. Many people are sometimes tempted to wish for their early departure to Para-

dise, since they are "vinegar saints." The *Watchman-Examiner* has a philosophy about them:

"It is an open question whether these folks are not more difficult to get along with than some other folks who make less claim to sainthood, but who exhibit less acidity of spirit. Good people they are, but their goodness is ingrowing rather than outgrowing; saints whom grace has not yet succeeded in making gracious; trees of the Lord the output of the fruit of which is unhappily more from the old natural stock than from that which is ingrafted by the Holy Spirit. They will undoubtedly get to heaven by and by, but they certainly are not doing much to make this world a foretaste of heaven to those with whom they have dealings.

"It is singular, and as sad as singular, that the love of Christ in the soul does not always seem to result in loveliness and lovableness in the outward life; that the sweetness of the gospel is not always registered in sweet and amiable character; that real saints can sometimes be really sour. Vinegar is good in its place, but its place is not the heart and life of the Christian. Something is the matter with vinegar saints, seriously the matter with them. Still, the Lord is patient with them, and we might as well try to be." [20]

The matter with these saints is, as a rule, their

low vitality and the poor functioning of their organs. With chronic dyspepsia a person cannot very well be cheerful, no matter how great the joys of heaven. Joy is the result of physical and, inferentially, mental well-functioning, and no amount of "grace" can take its place. The Lord most probably has to be patient with vinegar Christians, since we cannot imagine Him as being more pleased with them than we are. One of the features of Christianity, which we have come to realize, is its cheerful and joyous character; it must, though, have a basis in sound physical structure and function.

We are coming to recognize more and more that this life is not a mere "vale of tears," but something with a value of its own. If so, we have the right and the duty to make it as happy a life as we can by making it a means for our own and other men's development.

III. The new Christianity has a greater sense of coherence. In the past we had mostly national churches, and religion was a more or less integral part of nationality. Today we realize more than ever not only the universality of Christianity, but the interdependence of human beings as such. The great impetus to foreign missions came from the recognition of this fact. And this new sense of coherence among all Christians is being trans-

lated into the political sphere. Whether it is expedient for America to join the League of Nations, the World Court, or any other international organization for the preservation of peace and the extension of political and commercial comity, need not be discussed here; the matter has received ample attention on the part of various churches and the Federation of Churches. That the Christian spirit pushes us with increasingly greater force toward closer intercourse with other peoples is beyond any doubt. The Church of Christ is one, not necessarily in doctrine and in policy, but in spirit and in practice. Ultimately the fruits of the Spirit must be the same everywhere, and we realize today more than ever that only as Christian living improves elsewhere, will it be possible for us to advance further. We are members of the same body, and if one member suffers, all must suffer. That is the law of every organism and organization; unless we act upon it and obey it, we shall and we deserve to suffer.

5. *The New Theology.*—If the argument in the preceding sections is correct, the new theology must be anthropocentric not theocentric. Only thus can we proceed scientifically—that is, from the known to the unknown and from the simple to the complex. The old theology started from certain assumptions which had gathered weight and

volume in the course of millenniums. There was the original assumption of spirits who might bring good or bad luck to man; later came that of polytheism and still later that of henotheism. At last a final conclusion was reached in monotheism which had the support of philosophy as well as of science. It was an overwhelming idea, and it was inevitable that men should not be able to understand that doctrine in all its bearings. Being arrived at principally by speculation, the tendency to reason from the whole, which was tentative and still largely unknown, to the parts, was inevitable. Into this reasoning crept some new assumptions.

One of these consisted in making the glory of God the greater, the more man was supposed to be depraved. This led to another, equally important and false, namely, the fall of all men in Adam. The third assumption followed, with logical necessity, the sacrificial death of Jesus Christ. The chain was thus complete, and it was not only a chain of reasoning, but one around the neck of man. It has been the cause of many excrescences and superstitions. It meant that Jesus had come to teach us how to die, instead of how to live. As was shown in the beginning of this chapter, Jesus and His foremost disciples placed the emphasis upon the present life. This was a clear indication that in building up a system of reasoning about religion,

our starting point must be man, and that we must proceed from man to God. The old view meant, if an analogy may be used, that a father's greatness should be judged by the degree of wickedness and feeble-mindedness of his children instead of by their health and mental and physical virility. No one can imagine how such a view could possibly enhance the glory of our heavenly Father, just as we do not praise a human father under similar circumstances. If the completion of man in every respect is the aim of salvation, we must begin here and now, and work upward, instead of starting with certain assumptions and working downward. We must, of course, have some theory of religion, because we are rational beings and because our actions must be justified before our own best judgment. We cannot act merely on impulse like the animal and let the consequences be what they may. Just because our lives are continuous and form a unity, and because we are facing immortality, our actions, words, and thoughts must be brought in harmony with some general principles with a central idea. In the brief space available here, only a few propositions can be stated along which a new theology may be constructed. It seems to the writer that the time for such an enterprise has not yet come, although one brave attempt has already been made with no conspicuous success.[21] Before

such an attempt can be even halfway successful, much preparatory work along many lines must be done. Some of them will be indicated in the propositions to follow. These should be taken for what they are—a feeble attempt to grapple with a tremendously important and complicated subject. The three fundamental aspects of the teaching of Jesus have been repeatedly referred to, and the propositions must be grouped around them, or rather, be an extension of them.

(1) The perfectibility of man.—(a) Observation proves that there is some good in every man, which implies that he can be educated for a useful life and be made a better man. (b) Every man is perfectible only within his own capacity, but each man has enough capacity to strive for completion and seek it in God. (c) Every man should be honored and esteemed for developing his capacity through useful work, whether his talents are few or many.

(2) Active love.—(a) Every man is capable of loving, not merely in a sentimental but in an active manner by contributing something to society. (b) Active love implies that the more gifted can never be satisfied until all men have reached the maximum of their completion. (c) A full development of *every* man depends on the full development of *all* men, since we are interdependent.

(3) The Kingdom of God.—(a) A new social order is necessary for the development of all men. (b) Such an order should imply more opportunities for the men of few talents, so that they may at least not be hindered in becoming what they are capable of becoming. (c) The handicaps from which the less talented suffer at present are chiefly economic, racial, and governmental. (d) It is the duty of our business men to devise an industrial order which will provide work at suitable wages for all men willing and able to work; the duty of statesmen, teachers, ministers and all Christians to work for the extirpation of race prejudice; and the duty of governments to distribute rights equally and responsibilities proportionate to ability. (e) Some kind of international agreement must be made to eliminate the oppression of weak and backward nations by strong and advanced nations, to work in harmony for the welfare of mankind, and to prevent war.

(4) The Fatherhood of God implies (a) that He has given us freedom and opportunities to develop ourselves and that it is our principal duty to make use of them; (b) that He delights in our development, because He wants to see us become free and full personalities under His guidance and loving care; (c) that His children will gladly unite in

every effort to make this life more worthy and the future life more certain.

A few words of comment may be necessary. We need considerably more knowledge of the physical and psychical nature of man and his relation to environment before we can approach the problem of wrong and sin on the one hand, and of right and virtue on the other. Do men sin because they cannot help it, or because they are not properly brought up? The greatest uncertainty exists at present on this point as the contention between the defenders of heredity and of environment proves. Both agree, though, that every normal man has some capacity which may be developed. But how and by what agency? Psychology and pedagogy will have to shed considerably more light on this problem than they possess at present. The so-called "intelligence tests" are but a feeble beginning.

Again, what relation has the individual to society? Is the man of one talent as worthy of esteem and as necessary to society as the man of ten talents, provided that each uses his gifts to the utmost? Ethics and sociology have only begun to probe this problem. To what extent are we dependent on one another and how can we help each other? This is a question for sociology and philosophy to answer. Furthermore, what share in

the production of wealth do the individual and society have? Should it go chiefly to the few, as at present, or is there a more equitable distribution possible? Economics, politics, and sociology must supply the answer when they have learned something more about the interdependence of human beings and the dependence of the individual on society. Just as individuals are interdependent, so are nations. The unity of mankind was a tenet of religion, it has become a theory of science, and is becoming a fact of commerce and statecraft. Both international business and statesmanship must rise to higher levels before they can state definitely how our affairs should be arranged in order to benefit all mankind.

Finally, what is the nature of God—personal or superpersonal, transcendent or immanent? What are His attributes—omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, righteousness, holiness, perfection, love, fatherhood? What do we mean when we use these terms? What is His relation to us? Ours to Him? Science may have something to say eventually about His metaphysical attributes. Concerning His moral and spiritual qualities, faith and experience and our own spiritual nature can be our only guides.

The new theology will be full-orbed and many-sided. We are no longer living in the simple times

of the Apostles when men knew little and were ready to accept almost any theory which would furnish some kind of a key to the unseen. Many things which were mysteries to them are taught today in our kindergartens. Are we worse off, or better? That depends on the point of view. A childlike faith is a good thing for a child. "When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things."[22] We must seek our own explanations, although we may still see "through a glass, darkly." It is we, however, who see through that glass and not some one else. This new theology will, when it comes, enable us to adjust ourselves better to our times and conditions, and to live more worthy lives, and strive higher and further. There will be much need for circumspection. We cannot tie up our theology to any passing theory of philosophy. But we have made some permanent acquisitions to our knowledge which preceding ages lacked. It will be possible, therefore, to build broader and more firmly. Just because our knowledge is more comprehensive, it should be deeper and enable us to find more satisfactory solutions. There will still be mysteries, but they will be of a different character and will lead to still further development.

One of these developments will undoubtedly be

in the direction toward prophylaxis. We shall utilize every well-established principle of the various sciences to have people born right, stay right, and die right; to have them placed in a proper environment economically and socially, educated in the needs of today, and trained for self-mastery by paying more attention to health and the changing psychic conditions at different periods in life. It will be considered a crime against society and a sin against God to let people go wrong and then try to restore them to whatever condition in life they are still fit for.

The report on the 161 Protestant theological seminaries furnishes evidence that the new attitude is beginning to make itself felt. There were 103 seminaries in 1922-23 which offered courses on "religious education." The report says: "In the development of specific methods, the largest number of courses available are concerned with childhood and adolescence, but there are courses in kindergarten methods and in adult life. The religious life of boys and young men, and of girls and young women, is studied in a number of courses, while the application of method to city schools, to foreigners, and to home department is appearing."[23] And this is not the only indication of a change in religious perspective.

6. *The Outlook.*—The nineteenth century has

been called the century of science. Dr. Osler aptly summarizes its characteristics in the following words:

"For countless generations the prophets and kings of humanity have desired to see the things which men have seen and to hear the things which men have heard, in the course of this wonderful nineteenth century. To the call of the watchers on the towers of progress there has been the one sad answer—the people sit in darkness and in the shadow of death. Politically, socially, and morally the race has improved, but for the unit, for the individual, there was little hope. Cold philosophy shed a glimmer of light in his path, religion in its various guises illumined his sad heart, but neither availed to lift the curse of suffering from the sin-begotten son of Adam. In the fullness of time, long expected, long delayed, at last science emptied upon him from the horn of Amalthea blessings which cannot be enumerated, blessings which have made the century forever memorable; and which have followed one another with a rapidity so bewildering that we know not what next to expect." [24]

Shall the twentieth century be the century of religion? To the writer this seems not only possible, but probable. The signs for a revival and renascence of religion in a higher form are so nu-

merous that he is tempted to say, *certain*. These signs may be mentioned briefly.

Reference has been made to the yearning for a more moral and spiritual life in our times. Some of these aspects can be specified. Our young men and women are growing more religious, as may be shown by a quotation from an address of the late President Burton of the University of Chicago:[25]

"Statistics from eighty state institutions in 1921 show that out of a total enrollment of 152,461 students, 130,486 had religions affiliations, while 21,975 made no statement regarding their religious life. This is very encouraging when compared with our early history, when even though the colleges were church institutions, practically all the students were outside the Church. In Princeton from 1778 to 1782 there was but one professor of religion. At Bowdoin College in 1807 there was only one Christian. At Yale for four years there was but one, and but four or five in other years about the beginning of the century. Many of the students assumed the names of leading infidels and atheists. Often every student was a professed infidel, or at least outside of the Church. Bishop Meade of Virginia said in 1811 that William and Mary College was a hotbed of French infidelity, and that for many years in every educated man he expected to find an infidel."

These figures may furnish too favorable a picture for us and one too unfavorable for our forebears; but, as President Burton in quoting them from the *Literary Digest* says: "Though I have not verified them (they) are substantially correct."

There are also almost innumerable associations for helping the distressed of one kind and another. No country and no century has seen such benefactions as America has witnessed since 1900. In a long article the *New York Times*[26] figures out that $2,000,000,000 has been given to the public in ten years. This sum is equal to our total national wealth a century ago. Some of this money was given before the last decade, but became available within it. About thirty individuals gave $1,629,000,000, none of them less than $4,000,000. If the numerous gifts below $1,000,000 are included, the *Times* claims that the total for the decade would amount to about $2,500,000,000. Education leads in the benefactions with $800,000,000; philanthropic and religious institutions follow with $500,000,000; scientific research comes next with $300,000,000; art, books, and music receive $200,000,000; and special or undefined purposes finish with $200,000,000.

Practically all of these benefactors started life as poor boys, and take pride in helping other boys to get a good start with fewer handicaps; and they

delight in seeing their benefactions at work while they are still alive.

It would be futile to cavil with such good intentions and apparently great benefits to the public. The question as to the ultimately really beneficial effects has already been raised. The only questions which need to be asked here are: Would it not be possible for men of such business ability to devise a way to keep that money, or most of it, in the hands of the public from which it came? Can these and other leaders of business amass fortunes only to be staggered by them? Would it not be better to arrange business in such a way as to keep shops and factories open all the year round, pay good wages, and obviate the taint of charity? That this is possible has been proved by specific examples in another part of this chapter. These large givers act in the best possible way open to them now; but a look into the future will convince them that a socially more beneficial way is possible.

There are about 9,000 students in the various Protestant seminaries of our country. Most of them come from the farm, a large percentage come from ministers' families, and a smaller proportion from the towns and cities. The training required for the ministry is long. A goodly proportion have college degrees, take a three-year

course in a seminary, in a few cases spend a year or two in special graduate work. And what is the financial reward? Perhaps less than what a typist receives, and certainly less than what a skilled mechanic gets. The persistent zeal which leads young men to submit to the long training when the material rewards in the ministry are so slender compared with other vocations, is a modern miracle.

It is, perhaps, due to this unbounded enthusiasm of the young, of which the seminary students are the best examples, that the trend of church life is tending in new directions. These men do not, as a rule, want to spend too much time in hairsplitting discussions on abstruse doctrines or ancient heresies. They want to see life advanced and righteousness promoted. They are back of many movements in the churches tending to improve the living conditions of the economically less favored. They realize that a closer union of the churches in matters political, social, and industrial is not only desirable but absolutely necessary. They have found out, often from bitter experience, that it is sheer folly to send two, three, or four men to that many denominational churches in a village which can support only one comfortably. The men behind the great interdenominational movements were and are young, because religion is a life to them and not a dogma.

Another favorable sign is the new direction which our better-class literature has taken. There is, unfortunately, much in present-day literature that is raw, and callous to the higher aspirations of man; it is the product of the mechanics in literature who get so much per line. The better-class writers are, however, increasing in number and improving in the choice of their material. Social and moral and religious problems are discussed not only with freedom, but with an open mind and an attempt to improve life. Many of the best novels are leading the way to higher aspirations and to a deeper and broader conception of life. They are problem novels in the best sense of the word.

Science, too, is finding that mere material advance is not the boon it was supposed to be thirty or fifty years ago. The World War has taught us that science may destroy as well as build. The more important lesson science is trying to teach the world, though, is that of its own limitation to a certain category of phenomena, outside of which its reasoning does not apply. Professor Vernon Kellogg may not speak for all scientists, but he certainly speaks for many when he says:

"The only thing we know now about many things in human life is that they are attributes of human beings and of human beings alone. By such attributes are we really distinguished from

other creatures. We are arisen from other creatures, but we are different from them. We are like them in structure and physiology, and share with them certain psychological possessions. But we are different from them in possessing capacities unique with us. And these unique capacities are the greatest things in life. I believe that most scientific men recognize them as such, recognize them as greater than that very great thing, science itself.

"Outside of science is religious belief. Science has been often pictured as intolerant of religion, even subversive of religion. It should not be. There are bigots both among scientists and among those of religious faith. These bigots make dogmatic and irritating declarations. They condemn each other to purgatory. One group would keep the home fires of the Inquisition burning; the other would gladly try the effects of experimentally submitting a Bryan to the temperature of absolute zero. Neither group helps anybody to any understanding.

"Scientific men may be ardent apostles of Jesus or Mohammed; some are. Religious leaders may welcome every new advance of science; some do. Science may be truth and so may religion. Science and religion coexist. Both are realities in human life. They should not be looked on as antagonistic or as displacing each other. They should be

looked on as complementary. A full human life includes both, depends on both.

"The cause of things may be called God; the manner of things, science. Science has never explained ultimate causes. It doesn't know ultimate causes. It explains much of the course of things, whose existence it accepts because it sees them exist. It is gratifying that science knows as much as it does. It is unfortunate when its too narrow-minded devotees claim that it knows more than it does. And it is wholly unnecessary for the glorification of science, and entirely unconvincing, for any such devotee to claim that it will some time know everything.

"Science steadily gains more knowledge of the ways of nature; it as persistently knows no more about the ultimate cause of nature than it did when the Greeks and Egyptians, Cro-Magnon or Neanderthal men, made their beginnings of scientific knowing. Primal being and ultimate becoming are beyond the purview of science. They are truly something that science doesn't know, and I very much doubt will ever know." [27]

These are but a few of the auspicious signs at the close of the first quarter of the twentieth century. They augur well for the future. Will the churches take advantage of the opportunity? Will they have the courage of their conviction? Will

they fearlessly insist on a new interpretation of Christian stewardship? The world seems ready for a new moral and spiritual advance. Why wait? "Stir up the gift of God which is in thee, for God hath not given us the spirit of fear, but of power and of love and of a sound mind."[28] "Lift up your eyes, and look on the fields, for they are white already to harvest."

[1] Hebrews xi: 1.
[2] I John iv: 20.
[3] Mark iii: 35.
[4] *The Finality of the Christian Religion,* p. 245.
[5] Matt. xxvi: 11; John xii: 8.
[6] W. Rauschenbusch, *Christianizing the Social Order,* p. 298. 1912.
[7] *Ibid.,* pp. 298-299
[8] See the *New York Times,* July 23 and 24, 1924, for details.
[9] Henry Churchill King, *The Moral and Religious Challenge of Our Times,* pp. 10-13.
[10] William Lawrence, *An Opportunity for National Service,* p. 3.
[11] Edward A. Filene, *A Merchant's Horizon,* p. 57. 1924.
[12] *Ibid.,* p. 2.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 31.
[14] Lord Leverhulme, *The Six-hour Day and Other Industrial Questions,* pp. 34-35. 1919.
[15] B. C. Forbes in *Forbes' Magazine,* quoted in *American Labor Legislation Review,* p. 240, December, 1920.
[16] For other cases of business men combining idealism and common sense to the benefit of employer, worker, and the consumer see *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* September, 1919.
[17] Address at the Annual Convention of the National Clay Products Industries Association, Chicago, 1924. Printed by National Association of Manufacturers, 50 Church St., New York, N. Y.

[18] Matt. xx: 1-16.
[19] Rev. xxi: 10-25.
[20] Quoted by the *Biblical Review Quarterly,* July, 1924, p. 419.
[21] W. Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel.* 1917.
[22] I Cor. xiii: 11.
[23] Robert L. Kelly, *Theological Education in America,* p. 142, 1924.
[24] Quoted in *A Half Century of Public Health, American Public Health Association,* Foreword, p. v. 1921.
[25] *The Divinity Student,* p. 83, November 15, 1924.
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